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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Are there genuine issues of material fact precluding

summary judgment on the basis of misrepresentation in the insurance
application?
A. Misrepresentation: 1. Did Lynn Hardy inform
Prudential's agent of his 1974 heart attack? 2. Did Prudential's
agent represent to Lynn Hardy that the old heart attack need not be
disclosed in the application?
B. Intent to Deceive: Did Lynn Hardy intend to
deceive Prudential?
C. Materiality: 1. Was the omitted information
material to Prudential's risk? 2. Does Prudential's rule of disregarding medical history beyond five years old render the omitted
history immaterial? 3. Does Prudential's waiver of a rating on the
disclosed information render immaterial the omitted information?
D. Reasonable Reliance: Did Prudential rely on the
omission and was that reliance reasonable?
II.

Was Prudential on "inquiry notice" so as to equitably

estop* it from asserting the defense of misrepresentation?
A.

Was Prudential on notice to conduct a further
—
B. Did Prudential conduct a reasonably thorough
inquiry prior to issuing the policy?

inquiry?

III.

Did the trial court err in granting rescission on

the basis of claimed misrepresentations outside of the insurance
application?
IV.

Is Prudential precluded from obtaining rescission by

its own discriminatory and bad faith handling of the claim and by
the inequitable result that rescission would produce?
A. Did Prudential unfairly discriminate against Mrs.
Hardy in denying the insurance proceeds in violation of the Utah
Insurance Code?
B. Did Prudential violate its duty of good faith and
fair dealing in handling Mrs. Hardy's claim?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover the proceeds due under a life
insurance policy issued by the Prudential Insurance Company of
America on Lynn Hardy, the plaintiff's deceased husband.

Prudential

counterclaimed for rescission of the policy on the basis of misrepresentation in the insurance application.

Third District Judge Dean

E. Conder granted defendants' motion for summary judgment rescinding
the policy.

(Record pp. 1041-43; Addendum pp. 1-3.) Plaintiff filed

a motion to reconsider under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., on the grounds of
material misrepresentation of facts by opposing counsel.
reexamined the file and reaffirmed its prior decision.

The court
(Rec. p.

1146.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Application and Underwriting
Lynn Hardy was a truckdriver by vocation.

In 1977 he

married the plaintiff, Cheryl Hardy, and together they started their
own trucking business.

They built the business up over time until

they had acquired on contract five trucks and eight trailers.
(Hardy Dep. pp. 5-7.)

About that time, Prudential's agent, defen-

dant Wayne Rigby, contacted the Hardys and interested them in some
mortgage life insurance on Lynn to cover the debt on the trucking
business if he died.

(Frankel Dep., Ex. 1, hereinafter referred to

as FDE-1, p. 142; Hardy Dep. pp. 35-36, 38-39; Rigby Dep. pp. 3637.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
2 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Agent Rigby brought a life insurance application form to
the Hardy home on August 4, 1981. Rigby completed the answers to
Part 1 of the form as Lynn responded to the written questions.
(Hardy Dep. pp. 41, 43-44.)

The amount of coverage applied for,

based on the approximate amount of the business debts, was
$300,000.

The named beneficiary was Lynn's wife, Cheryl, and Lynn

was to pay the monthly premium of $161.65.
pp. 4-7.)

(FDE-1 pp. 81-82, Add.

During the completion of Part 1, Lynn told Agent Rigby

that he had a heart attack in 1974, seven years earlier.
Dep. pp. 47-48, 60, 62, 73, 128. ) 1

(Hardy

Rigby responded that the heart

attack would not affect issuance of the policy and that the information need not be included in the application because Prudential
disregards medical history beyond five years old.

(Hardy Dep. pp.

63, 48-49, 59-63, 65-66, 71-73;-see also Aff'ts of Jan Hardy and
Mark Ith, Rec. pp. 1012-15, Add. pp. 30-33.)
Part 2 of the application consisted of questions regarding
medical history and a physical examination.

Agent Rigby arranged

for Part 2 to be completed by Launa Perry (now Noble), a paramedic,
on August 7, 1981. In reliance upon Agent Rigby's assurance that
the old heart attack need not be listed in the application, Lynn did

'On January 5, 1974, Lynn suffered a sudden inferior wall
myocardial infarction, (FDE-1 pp. 59-60, 68), which is an
insufficiency of circulation to the inferior wall of the
middle layer of the heart muscle. Stedman's Medical
Dictionary pp. 630-31, 820 (3d Lawyers1 Ed. 1972).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not disclose the heart attack to Ms, Perry.

However, Lynn did dis-

close that his father and two brothers had died prematurely from
heart attacks, that he smoked cigarettes, and that he had received a
Department of Transportation physical from Dr. G.W. Taylor in
1979.

Ms. Perry's physical examination consisted of little more

than an electrocardiogram (ECG).

She did not complete the sections

of the exam pertaining to cardiovascular and circulatory condition.

Lynn signed the Part 2, authorizing Prudential to obtain his

medical records from any physician listed. (Hardy Dep., Ex. C, Add.
pp. 8-9.)
Prudential's underwriting department in California
received Lynn's application on August 11 and was required to make a
final determination by October 5, sixty days from the application.
(FDE-1 pp. 207A, 225, 284.)

As part of its routine underwriting

review, Prudential requested a background and financial inspection
by Equifax Services, an independent information service, and an
attending physician's statement (APS) from Dr. Taylor, who was
listed on the Part 2.

(FDE-1 pp. 207, 214; see also Wiczek Dep. pp.

6-7; Reed Dep. pp. 51-55 and Ex. 6.)

The Equifax report confirmed

Lynn's two-pack-per-day smoking habit; disclosed the name of another
attending physician, Dr. Peterson; and revealed that another of
Lynn's brothers, still living, also had "heart problems."
pp. 208-10, Add. pp. 34-36.)

(FDE-1

The APS from Dr. Taylor revealed no

cardiovascular information. (FDE-1 p. 215.)

Meanwhile, the under-

writing department received the result of the ECG performed by

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ms. Perry, showing a first-degree atrioventricular (AV) heart
block.2

(FDE-1 p. 211, Add. p. 37.)
On August 14 the underwriting department discovered that

Part 2 of Lynn's application had mistakenly been completed by a
paramedic rather than by a physician, as required by the policy
amount.

(Rec. p. 82; Reed Dep. p. 56 and Ex. 7; FDE-1 p. 283.)

As

a result, a second Part 2 was completed by Dr. Joseph R. Evans on
August 25.

Reference to Lynn's prior heart problem was omitted in

continuing reliance on Agent Rigby's prior instruction that it need
not be listed.

However, Lynn confirmed that he had smoked for 20

years and disclosed the additional information that he had rheumatic
fever as a child; that he received a Department of Transportation
physical every two years, including a recent exam by Dr. Jay
Capener; and that he had previotrsly been treated by Dr. Val Sundwall
at Cottonwood Hospital, the same physician and hospital that treated
Lynn for his 1974 heart attack.

(See Rec. p. 1059, Add. p. 38.)

Dr. Evans1 physical examination of Lynn reported no current cardiovascular disorder.

Lynn also signed this Part 2, again authorizing

Prudential to obtain his medical records from any of the named
sources.

(Hardy Dep., Ex. D, Add. pp. 10-11.)
Based on Lynn's medical information, his heart block and

family history of heart disorders in particular, underwriter Tom

^Obstruction causing impairment or prolongation of normal
conduction time (P-R interval) between atria and ventricles
of the heart. Stedman's Medical Dictionary p. 162 (3d
Lawyers' Ed. 1972).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

Shaw recommended issuing the policy with a special class 1 rating to
account for the higher risk.

(FDE-1 p. 217, Add. p. 39.)

However,

Prudential's medical department waived the rating, stating that Lynn
was "standard physically." (Id.) Shaw's supervisor, Marilyn Reed,
then discovered that another mistake had been made.

According to

underwriting rules governing applications with three known cases of
early coronary death, Shaw should have requested Dr. Evans to obtain
a chest X-ray at the time he completed the Part 2 on Lynn.
p. 218, Add. p. 40; Reed Dep. p. 66 and Ex. 5, p. VII-1.)

(FDE-1
A chest

X-ray was then ordered, but before the result was received on
October 7, the deadline for final action had passed and no further
underwriting investigation was undertaken.

(FDE-1 pp. 285, 223,

225, 290.) Notice that the policy had been approved standard was
mailed the next day, but the policy was back-dated to take effect as
of September 17, 1981.

(FDE-1 p. 286, Add. p. 41; Id_. p. 229, Add.

p. 12.)
B.

Review and Denial of Claim
Lynn Hardy died suddenly and unexpectedly of a myocardial

infarction on December 4, 1982, fourteen months after the policy was
issued, and within the two-year contestability period.

J

(FDE-1 p.

A policy may be issued "standard," if the insured has no
ratable physical impairment, or "rated," according to the
degree of physical impairments. A special class rating is
determined by assigning "debits" for each impairment,
totaling the debits, and then classifying the policy
according to the corresponding debit total in the given
table. A rated policy requires charging a correspondingly
higher premium. (See Reed Dep., Ex. 5.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law -6Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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204; Add. p. 17.)

Lynn's widow and beneficiary, Cheryl, submitted

her "Claim for Insurance Contract Benefits" on December 15.
p. 200.)

(FDE-1

Prudential's claims department immediately sent Lynn's

file to its home office investigator, Richard Stelzner, requesting
him to conduct a "contestable investigation."
Stelzner Dep. pp. 21-22.)

(Id. pp. 188-89;

Stelzner reviewed Lynn's application for

medical leads and conducted his investigation on January 6, 1983.
(FDE-1 p. 140, Add. p. 42.) He confirmed with Mrs. Hardy that Lynn's
physician was Dr. Val Sundwall.

Stelzner then visited Dr.

Sundwall's office and obtained a lead to the University Medical
Center.- At the University Medical Center, Mr. Stelzner obtained the
records of Lynn's 1974 post-heart attack tests and a lead to the
Cottonwood Hospital.

At the Cottonwood Hospital, Stelzner obtained

the records of Lynn's 1974 heartrattack.

(Add. pp. 42-45.)

Following Stelzner's report of Lynn's 1974 heart attack,
Prudential's claims department deliberated for the next month and a
half over whether they could deny the claim despite their rule to
disregard medical history beyond five years prior to the application.

(See Frankel Dep., Ex. 2, p. 9, Add. p. 46; FDE-1 p. 123-24,

Add. pp. 47-48.)

The question was finally referred to Prudential's

corporate headquarters in New Jersey, and senior claim consultant
Jan Drosendahl (LeRoux) ruled that an exception to the five-year
rule should be made in this case.
50.)

(FDE-1 pp. 117-18, Add. pp. 49-

Ms. Drosendahl also acknowledged the rule of law that bars

rescission for misrepresentation if the insurer was "on notice" to
conduct an inquiry that would have revealed the truth.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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She conceded

that "the underwriters were concerned about Mr. Hardy's cardiovascular status," but claimed that they "thoroughly investigated all
given possible leads to information."

Therefore, she concluded that

the claim should be denied for nondisclosure of the 1974 heart
attack.

(Id.) The claim was formally denied for that reason, and

Mrs. Hardy was informed of the denial on February 22, 1983, over two
months after the claim was submitted.

(FDE-1 pp. 116, 113-14; Rigby

Dep. pp. 47-48; FDE-1 p. 102.)
C.

Facts Subsequent to Denial of Claim
Following Prudential's denial of the claim, Mrs. Hardy

filed a written complaint with the Utah Insurance Department.

(FDE-

1 p. 76, Add. p. 51.) The Insurance Department reviewed the matter
and concluded that Prudential should reconsider its decision for
possible error:
It appears an error may have occurred in the underwriting
department . . . . If [the application] questions had been
reviewed more thoroughly the policy may not have been issued;
but the policy was issued and the insured and beneficiary
believed they would be protected if a loss did occur.
(FDE-1 p. 75, Add. p. 52, emphasis added.) The Insurance Department
requested that Prudential perform an "independent review" of the
claim, but Prudential's Vice President and Counsel, Ernest A. Long,
responded by sending a copy of his "informal analysis," previously
sent to plaintiff's counsel.

(Long Dep., Ex. 2.)

The Insurance

Department took no further action.
Mrs. Hardy subsequently filed this action against
Prudential and Agent Rigby alleging (1) breach of the insurance
contract, resulting in denial of the policy proceeds and loss of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hardy trucking business; (2) bad faith denial of the insurance
claim, justifying an award of consequential damages for emotional
suffering, punitive damages and attorney fees; and (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

(Rec. pp. 613-17.)

Defendants

answered, (Rec. pp. 627-32), and Prudential counterclaimed for rescission of the policy, alleging fraudulent concealment of Lynn's
prior heart problem, (Rec. pp. 44-46).

Mrs. Hardy filed a Reply

denying misrepresentation and alleging (1) that Lynn's prior heart
problem was disclosed to Agent Rigby and omitted from the application at his suggestion; and (2) that Prudential is equitably
estopped from asserting the misrepresentation defense because it was
on notice to conduct an inquiry that reasonably would have revealed
the omitted history and it failed to conduct such an inquiry.

(Rec.

pp. 619-21.)
Defendants moved for summary judgment.
664.)

(Rec. pp. 472,

Plaintiff opposed the motion, detailing and documenting

several material factual issues, including whether Prudential's
agent was informed of the prior heart problem.
1015.)

(Rec. pp. 992-

Plaintiff also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on

the counterclaim for rescission on the alternative ground that even
if there were a misrepresentation, it was not sufficiently material
to justify rescission of the contract because Prudential conceded it
still would have issued the policy, but at a higher premium.

(Rec.

pp. 975-87.)
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment and rescinded the policy.

The court found that Lynn and

-9- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Cheryl failed to disclose the prior heart attack and supposed medication and treatment for heart disease.
1-3.)

(Rec. pp. 1041-43, Add pp.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration under Rule 60(b),

U.R.C.P., on the grounds that defendants' counsel misrepresented,
and the court mistakenly relied on, the supposed facts of follow-up
medication and treatment.

(Rec. pp. 1046-88.)

Plaintiff obtained

the affidavit of Dr. Joseph L. Thorne to prove that Lynn's condition
was in remission and asymptomatic in the years following the heart
attack and that Lynn was not taking heart medication or being
treated for heart disease.

(Rec. pp. 1068-70, Add. pp. 53-55.)

The

court reexamined the matter but reaffirmed its prior decision of
summary judgment.

(Rec. p. 1146.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In reviewing this summary judgment, this Court must view
all evidence in a light favorable to the plaintiff, resolve all
doubts in favor of the plaintiff, and reverse the judgment if there
is any evidence from which a jury could possibly find the issues in
favor of the plaintiff or against the defendants.
In this case, there are several issues of material fact
precluding judgment as a matter of law.
argues that:

In essence, the plaintiff

(1) the medical history omitted from the application

was disclosed to the agent and imputed to Prudential; (2) the agent
directed the insured to omit that information from the application
and the insured was justified in relying on that direction; (3) the
agent's explanation for omitting the information was that Prudential
disregards medical history beyond five years old; moreover,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-10Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Prudential does have and apply such a rule; (4) the insured did not
intend to deceive Prudential, as evidenced by what he disclosed to
the agent and on the application, and by his sincere belief that he
was in good health; (5) the omissions were not material to
Prudential's risk, as evidenced by the five-year rule, Prudential's
waiver of a rating on the information it did have, and the fact that
the policy still would have been issued; (6) Prudential is estopped
to rely on the claimed omissions and to assert the defense of misrepresentation because it was "on notice" to conduct a further
inquiry by checking available medical records and it failed to do
so; (7) Prudential may not void the policy on the basis of statements made outside the application; and (8) Prudential is precluded
from obtaining rescission by its discriminatory and bad faith handling of the claim and by the inequitable result that rescission
would produce.
On each of these arguments there is evidence from which a
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff and against the defendants.

Therefore, it was reversible error for the trial court to

weigh the evidence, judge credibility, and decide these issues without a trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
THE FACE OF MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT ON EACH ELEMENT OF THE
MISREPRESENTATION DEFENSE.
Summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits and other documents show clearly that there
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is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.4

In order to avoid liability under an insurance policy on
the grounds of misrepresentation, the insurer must prove that (1)
there was a misrepresentation of fact; (2) the misrepresentation was
made with intent to deceive; (3) the fact misrepresented was
material; and (4) the insurer reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation in issuing the policy.

Utah Code Ann. §31-19-8(1)(1953);

Moore v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491
P.2d 227, 230 (1971).

Each of these elements of Prudential's

defense constitutes a separate question of material fact for the
jury.

See, e.g., Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance

In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court must
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences •
fairly drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
losing party. E.g., Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434
(Utah 1982). All doubts or uncertainty as to the
correctness of summary judgment must be resolved in favor of
permitting the issues to go to trial. E.g., Butler v.
Sports Haven International, 563 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1977).
Summary judgment may be affirmed only if it appears to a
certainty that the plaintiff in this case would not be
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of her claims. See, e.g., Securities
Credit Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422
(1953). If reasonable men could differ on the evidence in
this case and could reasonably find for the plaintiff,
summary judgment must be reversed. E.g., Jackson v. Dabney,
645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982); Cardwell v. United States, 186
F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1951). It is not for the trial
judge on motion for summary judgment to weigh evidence,
judge credibility, and resolve factual disputes. The sole
inquiry is whether a material factual issue exists, and if
the trial judge went beyond that inquiry the summary
judgment cannot stand. E.g., W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio
Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981).
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Society, 457 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Utah law); Burnham
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co,, 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261 (1970);
Lester v. Sparks, 583 P.2d 1097, 1100-01 (Okla. 1978); 12A Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice §7297 (1981).

When any one of these

issues is disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Moreover,

Prudential must establish each element of its defense not by a mere
preponderance of the evidence, but by "clear and convincing" evidence.

See Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Pierren, 619 P.2d

1380, 1381-82 (Utah 1980); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d
273, 274 (1952); Ostrov v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 379 F.2d
829, 838 (3rd Cir. 1967).

Therefore, if a jury examining these

issues could possibly find for the plaintiff, or find that the evidence of fraud is anything less than clear and convincing, the summary judgment must be reversed.
Applying the principles of appellate review to the elements of claimed misrepresentation in this case, it is evident that
summary judgment was erroneous and must be reversed.
A.

Misrepresentation
Prudential initially denied Mrs. Hardy's insurance claim

for the stated reason that Lynn failed to disclose his 1974 heart
attack on Part 2 of the application.

(FDE-1 pp. 117-18, Add. pp.

49-50; FDE-1 pp. 116, 125, 187, 140-43, Add. pp. 42-45; FDE-1 pp.
113-14; Rigby Dep. pp. 47-48; FDE-1 pp. 102-03.)

When it became

apparent, after commencement of the litigation, that the plaintiff
was prepared to dispute that claim, Prudential came up with the
additional allegation that Lynn also failed to disclose follow-up

-13-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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medication and treatment for his heart problem.

While this belated

claim will be demonstrated to be immaterial and inaccurate, both
claimed misrepresentations are addressed together.
While Lynn did not disclose his 1974 heart problem on the
application, he and Cheryl did disclose it to Agent Rigby at the
time of the application.

Cheryl Hardy testified:

Q.

Okay. At some point you and Mr. Rigby discussed Lynn's
prior medical history?

A.

Yes. There were a couple of different days involved. I
can't remember which one it was, but it was why [sic] part
of the application was being filled out.

Q.

Where was this discussion held?

A.

In the kitchen at my house.

Q.

Mr. Rigby was there?

A.

Mr. Rigby, Lynn and I and I keep thinking somebody else
was there. I can't put my finger on who it was.

Q.

Tell me about that discussion.

A.

I know that Lynn told him that he had a heart attack in
1974.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I told Mr. Rigby that he had some kind of clogged valve or
something just below the heart.

Who else was there?

(Hardy Dep. pp. 47-48, emphasis added; see also pp. 60, 62, 73,
128.)
Agent Rigby's response was that this medical history would
be no problem and need not be disclosed in the application because
Prudential disregards medical history more than five years old.
Mrs. Hardy testified:
Q.

What did Mr. Rigby tell you about the application about
how far back it went?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-14Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

In essense, we only went back five years on the application. [Hardy Dep. p. 49.]

A.

I do know that we discussed going back five years
[Id. p. 59.]

Q.

Do you remember him [Rigby] saying to Lynn in substance or
effect that he did not have to report his heart attack on
Exhibit C [Part 2]?

A.

I would have to basically say, yes.

(See also id. pp. 65-66, 71-73.)

. . . .

[Id. p. 63.]

The testimony of others present on

that occasion corroborates these facts.

Jan Hardy, a daughter-in-

law, and Mark Ith, Cheryl's son and Lynn's step son, both were present in the Hardy home and heard Lynn tell Agent Rigby of his prior
heart attack.

Both also remember Rigby responding that it did not

matter because medical history more than five years old was not
required in the application.

(Aff'ts of Jan Hardy and Mark Ith,

Rec. pp. 1012-15, Add. pp. 30-33T)
Agent Rigby's instruction not to record the old heart
attack in the application is corroborated by the fact that
Prudential does have such a five-year rule.

Corporate Claim

Memorandum 76-40 (June 3, 1976) states the rule as follows:
Even though an insured omitted information from the application, common knowledge or a review of the Underwriting Manual
may disclose that the information would not have had underwriting significance. The file should be noted to reflect this
unless the information relates to treatment so old or a condition so minor that it would obviously be of no significance.
Question 9 on our application . . . is limited to treatment,
tests, etc. within five years of the application date.
Although the other questions on the application do not have any
time limitation, it has been our practice to disregard treatment more than five years old.
(Frankel Dep., Ex. 2, p. 9, Add. p. 46, emphasis added.
FDE-1 pp. 123-24, 117-18, Add. pp. 47-50.)

See also

This rule was current
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and applicable to the Lynn Hardy case, and the claims manual contained no provision for qualifications or exceptions to the rule.
Claim consultant Mary Burke testified:
Q.

. . . Do you know of the existence of any guideline which
sets forth the proposition that you should make exceptions
in certain areas with reference to this five-year
practice? [Question restated.]

A.

Not that I'm aware of. The only memorandum I'm aware of
is the Exhibit 2 [Claim Memorandum 76-40].

(Burke Dep. p. 18; see also Frankel Dep. pp. 10-12, 15-16; LeRoux
Dep. pp. 119-21.)
Thus, the record contains three sworn statements that Lynn
Hardy did disclose his prior heart problem to Agent Rigby, and the
law is clear that disclosure of information to an agent of the
insurer constitutes disclosure to the insurer, whether the information is actually communicated to the insurer or not.

E.g., Major

Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 457 F.2d 596f 603
(10th Cir. 1972) (Utah law); Wootton v. Combined Insurance Co. of
America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964); Lumbermens Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Bowman, 313 F.2d 381, 388 (10th Cir. 1963);
National Life Assurance Co. v. Neves, 370. S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963) (agent's knowledge is imputed to his company); Johnson v.
Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 52 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1951).

The

underlying rationale for this rule is that the potential insured may
"reasonably assume" that the agent will perform his duty to report
all relevant information to the officers of the insurer responsible
for approving the policy.

See 16C Appleman, Insurance Law and

Practice §§9101, 9104; 3 Couch on Insurance 2d §§26:132-133.
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Prudential's own claims manual acknowledges that disclosure to an agent is treated as disclosure to the insurer:
[T]he courts ... generally impute any knowledge of the agent to
the Company under the law of Agency, which holds that knowledge
of an agent is knowledge of the principal.
(Corp. Claim Memo. 76-40 p. 18, Frankel Dep., Ex. 2.) Moreover
Prudential has followed this rule in other similar cases.

In the

Emma Harris case, Claim No. N0D815009, Prudential paid the claim
despite material misrepresentation in the application because its
agent was told of the omitted information:
Based on the agent's knowledge of the insured's kidney disease,
which legally can be imputed to the Company, would suggest
making payment of death benefits to [beneficiary]. Agent's
knowledge would seem to estop us from claiming reliance on a
material misrepresentation. [Add, p. 77, emphasis added.]
Likewise, in the Barbara Sullivan case, Claim No. N0D89484, Prudential's claim department concluded:
Because it is apparent that Agent Painter ... was also cognizant (and had been for some time) of the insured's poor health
at the time he took the applications, we have dropped our misrepresentation action and are accepting full death claim liability of $47,000. [Add. p. 78, emphasis added.]
Thus, the rule of imputing an agent's knowledge to the insurer is
widely acknowledged and applied, even by Prudential.
Having disclosed his prior heart problem to Agent Rigby,
Lynn was justified in relying on Rigby's representation that Lynn
need not disclose the problem again to the medical examiners who
completed the Part 2's:
An insured is usually justified in relying upon the advice
and assistance of a soliciting agent in preparing his application • • . •

-17-
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17 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §9410.

For example, in

Central National Life Insurance Co. v. Peterson, 23 Ariz. App. 4,
529 P.2d 1213 (1975), the insured told the insurance agent of a
prior hospitalization, but, as in the present case, the agent told
the insured that it need not be included in the application because
it "was not necessary to go back any further than five years." Id.,
529 P.2d at 1215.

The court held that the insurer was bound by its
<

agent's representation as to the scope of the application and was
barred from rescinding the policy for omission of the undisclosed
hospitalization.

Id. at 1215-16.

See also Lazar v. Metropolitan

Life Insurance Co., 290 F. Supp 179, 181 (D. Conn.

1968) (insurer

bound by agent's explanation that certain medical history was not
required by application); Howard v. Golden State Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 60 Mich. App. 469, 231 N.W.2d 655 (1975).
Thus, based on the foregoing facts and law, it is apparent
that there was no misrepresentation regarding Lynn's prior heart
problem.

Based on the evidence in the record, a jury could reason-

ably find that Lynn did disclose the heart attack to Prudential,
through Agent Rigby.

Therefore, it was clear error for the trial

court to conclude that Lynn never disclosed the heart attack to
Prudential "nor anyone else acting on behalf of Prudential." (Add.
p. 2, Finding #5.) Whether Lynn disclosed the heart problem is
clearly a material factual issue, and the trial court erred by
weighing the evidence, judging credibility, and resolving that issue
without trial.
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B«

Intent to Deceive
The law is clear that to support a misrepresentation

defense the insurer must show that the omissions in the application
were made with the "intent to deceive" the insurer.

In Wootton v.

Combined Insurance Co. of America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724
(1964), this Court stated:
Unless the misrepresentations in the negotiation for an
insurance policy are made with the intent to deceive ... the
insurance contract cannot be avoided by an insurance company.
Mere falsity of answers to questions propounded are insufficient if not knowingly made with intent to deceive and defraud.
Id., 395 P.2d at 725.

See also Marks v. Continental Casualty Co.,

19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P.2d 387, 389 (1967); Cardwell v. United States,
186 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1951); 22 Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice §§13028, 13030.

Moreover, the question of an insured's

intent is a factual issue for the jury.

Burnham v. Bankers Life &

Casualty Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261, 263 (1970) (reversing
summary judgment for insurer).
In this case a jury could reasonably find that Lynn Hardy
did not intend to deceive Prudential concerning the fact of his
heart problem.

To the contrary, the evidence shows that Lynn and

Cheryl volunteered to Agent Rigby the information of the prior heart
attack and occluded artery.

Under similar facts in Wootton, supra,

this Court held that omission of certain information from the application did not evidence an intent to deceive because the omitted
information was disclosed to the agent.

395 P.2d at 726.

See also

Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Willsey, 214 F.2d 729, 732
(10th Cir. 1954) (Utah law); Roy v. Trans-World Life Insurance Co.,
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199 So. 2d 416, 418 (La. App. 1967).

Thus, a jury could reasonably

make a similar finding in this case.

Moreover, it was Agent Rigby

who instructed Lynn not to include that information in the application because it occurred more than five years previously.

Lynn's

good faith reliance upon that instruction cannot be viewed as
"intent to deceive." See Central National Life Insurance Co. v.
Peterson and Lazar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra.
The information Lynn did disclose on the application is
also inconsistent with an intent to deceive.

He freely disclosed

information that would draw his health into question, such as his
extensive family history of heart disease, his childhood rheumatic
fever, and his heavy smoking habit, and also revealed the names of
several doctors and a hospital where Prudential could go for further
information.

He also willingly submitted to two physical examina-

tions, an ECG, and a chest X-ray.

If he had actually intended to

deceive Prudential, he could have disclosed much less detail on the
application and been less cooperative.
Lynn's sincere belief that he was in good health at the
time of the application is also consistent with his answers and
belies an intent to deceive.

Following his 1974 heart attack,

Lynn's recovery was rapid and uneventful.

He was discharged from

the Cottonwood Hospital in "good condition" after only ten days, and
within one month he was briskly walking one mile per day and driving
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trucks again, all without any sign of chest pain or cardiac irregularity. His condition was thereafter asymptomatic, and he returned
to a normal active life.

(PDE-1 pp. 57, 68, 160-61.)

In 1979 Dr.

Thorne referred Lynn to the Coronary Consultation Clinic at the
University of Utah for tests as part of a study on the relationship
between family lines and heart problems.

(Thorne Aff't 1(6, Add. p.

54.) The tests there showed that Lynn's blood pressure, lungs, heart
sounds, and cardiovascular data were all normal.

The only abnormal

finding was high cholesterol, for which he was taking atromid. (Rec.
pp. 819-24, Add. pp. 56-61.)

Dr. Thome's final "Clinic Note," on

January 2, 1980, confirmed those positive findings:
Lynn is doing very well, he lives an active physical life, he
has not had any symptoms to suggest coronary artery insufficiency and has not had anything to suggest angina pectoris.
His physical capacity is good .... The heart is in a regular
sinus rhythm, no cardiomegaly, no extrasystoles. The abdomen is
not remarkable and the extremities are normal with no evidence
of edema. [FDE-1 p. 155, Add. p. 62.]
Other physical examinations of Lynn during this period of
time also indicate that he had recovered from the 1974 heart attack
and was in good physical condition.

Lynn was required by the

Department of Transportation to undergo a complete physical every
two years, and none of those examinations revealed any cardiac disorder.

For example, on January 7, 1977, Lynn was examined by Dr.

Val Sundwall, the same physician who attended Lynn at the time of
his 1974 heart attack.
cardiovascular problem.

Dr. Sundwall found no residual or continuing
(Id. p. 176.)

Lynn's last D.O.T. exam,
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performed on August 7, 1981 by Dr. E.J. Capener, also reported normal cardiovascular findings.

(Id. p. 144.)

Lynn also appeared to those closest to him to be in good
health.

For example, when Lynn married Cheryl in 1977, he told her

of the old heart attack, but she found it difficult to believe
because of his heavy work schedule and physical capacity.

Lynn was

able to do heavy lifting associated with his job and never seemed
limited in his activities or worried by the old heart problem.

The

matter was rarely if ever discussed with his new wife and both they
and the doctors assumed that the problem had improved or corrected
itself.

(Hardy Dep. pp. 53-58.)
Thus, when Lynn applied for life insurance from Prudential

in August 1981, he reasonably believed himself to be in good health
and fully recovered from the 1974 heart attack.

Similarly, this

Court held in Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, that an
omission in the insurance application was not made with intent to
deceive because the question related to a condition from which the
insured sincerely believed she had recovered years before. 427 P.2d
at 389.

See also National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sumlar, 51

S.W.2d 866 (Ark. 1932) (no fraudulent intent where insured denied
prior heart problem in the belief he had recovered); National Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 200 S.E. 319 (Ga. App. 1938) (insured's
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belief of good health is relevant to jury question of fraudulent
intent.)

5

Finally, Lynn's incomplete answers in the application may
also be attributable to the negligence or inadequate explanations of
the medical examiners.

For example/ in Rutherford v. Prudential

Insurance Co. of America/ 44 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Cal. App. 1965)/ the
court held that Prudential was estopped to rely on omissions in the
application because its own medical examiner did not adequately
explain the questions, gave the impression that the partial answers
were sufficient/ and conducted the exam in a cursory and careless
manner.

Id. at 702-04.

While the examiners in this case have tes-

tified that they read every question and recorded the answers, (Rec.
pp. 730-33/ 736-37)/ they have not yet been cross-examined on that
testimony/ and their claims do not preclude the reasonable possibility of unrecorded discussion regarding the scope or intent of the
questions.

For example, on the question regarding medication/ Lynn

may have been led to believef upon inquiry, that it pertained only

D

Prudential also considers the insured's own belief
regarding his good health as relevant to the question of
fraud. In the case of Josephine Oertel, Claim No. DOD085459,
Prudential approved the claim despite nondisclosure of an
old myocardial infarction:
It does not appear fraud would be a good defense in
this case. The applicant gave a partial admission and
considering the date of her last MI (1967) and no
specific ongoing treatment for this, she, in all
likelihood, may have believed she was giving truthful
answers. She probably did not recognize the ongoing
nature of her heart disease. [Add. pp. 79-80, emphasis
added.]
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to medication for current serious illnesses.

In responding to the

question about recent examinations by a physician, he may have been
led to believe that it pertained only to the most recent or most
serious examinations and that it did not call for mere "checkups."
i

See id. at 703. See also Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v.
Lanigan, 19 So. 2d 67, 68-69 (Fla. 1944).
In sum, because of (1) the information that Lynn did disi

close; (2) his sincere belief that he was in good health; and (3)
potential error or inattention by the examiners, a jury could reasonably find that Lynn Hardy did not intend to deceive Prudential;
i

therefore, it was error to grant summary judgment on that issue.
C.

Materiality
The materiality of a claimed misrepresentation is to be

determined not by what the insurer may think about the importance of
the omission with the advantage of hindsight, but by "an industry
standard," that is, on the basis of what a reasonably prudent
insurer would have done had it known the truth.

Burnham v. Bankers

Life & Casualty Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261, 263 (1970);
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mardanlou, 60 7 P.2d 2 91,
293 (Utah 1980).

Moreover, this Court held in Moore v. Prudential

Insurance Co. of America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 P.2d 227 (1971), that
the issue of materiality is exclusively a question of fact for the
jury.

In that case, Prudential argued that the issue of materiality

should not have gone to the jury because Prudential presented unrefuted evidence that it would not have issued the policy had it known
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the undisclosed medical history.

This Court rejected that argument

because it
relates to a matter of post-mortem conjecture concerning which
it is easy enough to now declaim in its own favor, and difficult if not impossible for the plaintiff to directly refute.
This testimony was suffused with self-interest; and it was not
mandatory for the jury to find in accordance therewith.
491 P.2d at 230, emphasis added.

Thus, even where the evidence of

materiality is unrefuted, the issue should still go to the jury to
judge the credibility of the evidence.
In this case, Prudential claims that nondisclosure of the
heart attack was material, not because disclosure would have precluded issuance of the policy, but because Prudential would have
rated the policy and charged a higher premium.

(Response to

Interrogatory No. 7, Rec. p. 75.) Prudential now estimates that had
it known of the old heart attack, it would have rated Lynn's policy
a special class 4 and charged a temporary extra premium totaling
$3,318 more than what Lynn actually paid.
942, 1(8; Rec. p. 948, 1f3.)

(FDE-1 p. 125; Rec. p.

However, this Court rejected a similar

claim of materiality in Pritchett v. Equitable Life and Casualty
Insurance Co., 18 Utah 2d 279, 421 P.2d 943 (1966), because the
insurer still would have issued the policy and the revised policy

°Estimated monthly premium of $398.65 multiplied by the
fourteen months the policy was in force equals $5,581.10,
minus the $2,263.10 in premiums actually paid ($161.65 x 14
mos.) equals $3,318.
-25-
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still would have covered the insured's ailment.

Moreover, as the

Court stated in Moore, supra, Prudential's claim of materiality is a
matter of post-mortem conjecture ... suffused with self-interest"
and the jury would not be required to believe it.
One basis for a jury's disbelief concerning materiality is
Prudential's admitted rule, communicated to Lynn by Agent Rigby, of
disregarding medical history beyond five years old.

(Add. p. 46.)

Prudential has frequently applied the rule in other cases. For
example, in the Ida G. Floyd case, Policy No. 70 785 063, the claim
investigator stated:
Dr. Lindell last saw Mrs. Floyd as a patient in October 1973.
Since this is well beyond the five year limit, we did not contact Dr. Lindell's office in person. [Add. p. 81.]
Prudential has also applied the five-year rule to cases of prior
myocardial infarctions, such as that suffered by Lynn Hardy.

In the

case of William V. Cupp, Policy No. 84 116 781, payment was recommended with the following note:
Even though it appears there was an old inferior myocardial
infarction, there was no need to pursue it. [Add. p. 82.]
Similarly, in the cases of Josephine Oertel, Claim No. NOD085459,
and Marcelino Garza, Policy No. 70 720 480, Prudential paid the
claims despite unadmitted old myocardial infarctions.

(Add. pp. 78-

80, 83.)
Another reason for a jury to disbelieve Prudential's claim
of materiality is that Prudential refused to rate the policy on the
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basis of the ratable information it did have.

Underwriter Tom Shaw

recommended rating Lynn's policy a special class 1 because of the
family history and heart block:
Please note, 42 year old male applying for 300f000. ECG indicates 1st degree AV block. Strong family history of circulatory
disorders. No credits available. Suggest we accept at a special
class-1. Please advise.
(FDE-1 p. 217, Add. p. 39, abbreviations extended; see also Shaw
Dep.

pp. 25-29.) The ECG test performed on Lynn by Prudential

showed a PR interval of .22 seconds, which is classified as a first
degree atrioventricular block.

(FDE-1 p. 211, Add. p. 37.)

Prudential's underwriting guidelines required an assignment of 30
debits for that impairment. (Reed Dep. p. 30 and Ex. 5, p. 111-33.)
Lynn's family history of three or more cases of cardiovascular
disease required an additional 20 to 40 debits.

(Reed Dep. p. 31

and Ex. 5, p. VII-1.) When mulCTple impairments are present the
debits are combined, and when the impairments are inter-related,
particularly cardiovascular impairments, additional debits are added
to the sum "because of the added significance of the combination."
(Reed Dep., Ex. 5 p. B.)

Other factors, such as Lynn's long smoking

habit, his mother's stroke, his brother's suicide, and the early
death of seven out of fifteen siblings, were also significant and
"call[ed] for special consideration," or additional debits. (Id. p.
VII-1; Shaw Dep. p. 45; Ketchum Dep. p. 19.) Thus, Lynn's underwriting debits should have totaled at least 75, based solely on the
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4

heart block and family history.

A total of 75 debits would have

required a rating of special class 2.

(Reed Dep.f Ex. 5 p. B.)

Thus, Underwriter Shaw was being "liberal" with a recommendation of
special class 1. (See Ketchum Dep. p. 17.)
However, other members of the underwriting department were
even more liberal and rejected Shaw's recommendation in favor of
issuing the policy standard.

They figured that only 20 debits was

appropriate for each of the heart block and family history impairments, for a total of 40 debits. (Reed Dep. pp 31-32.)

40 debits

would still require a class 1 rating, but rather than combine the
debits and add the inter-related impairment factor, the impairments
were considered separately, both classified as "minor," and then
totally disregarded to obtain a standard rating. (Id_. pp. 34-36.)
Dr. Robert Ketchum, the medical consultant to the underwriting
department, acknowledged the indications for rating the policy, but
concluded that "absent other ratable impairment feel he's standard
physically." (FDE-1 p. 217, Add. p. 39.)
Thus, Prudential intentionally waived the justified rating
of Lynn's policy, and frequently waives ratings for "competitive or
business reasons." (Rec. p. 942 1(9? Rec. p. 710 n.16.) The

7
Impairment

Debits

Heartblock
30
Family history
30
Subtotal
60
Inter-related impairment factor
15 (25% of 60)
Total
75
See Reed Dep.,
Ex 5 p. B.
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"competitive reason" is that an unrated policy has lower premiums
and is therefore more marketable, especially to a middle-income
buyer like Lynn Hardy.

(See Reed Dep. pp. 67-69 on underwriting

concern over Lynn's financial ability to buy $300,000 policy.)

For

example, in the case of Manfred Mandelbaum, Claim No. WOD082 820,
the insured failed to disclose a history of heart disease in
applying for a $300,000 policy.

The same underwriter, Tom Shaw,

recommended to the same medical consultant, Dr. Ketchum, that the
policy be rated special class 2 on the basis of an abnormal ECG and
a history of "vague chest pain."

However, as in Lynn Hardy's case,

the medical department down-played the significance of the known
impairments and concluded to waive the rating:
liberal .... Feel we may accept standard."

"Feel we may be

(Add. p. 84.)

The

policy was issued standard and the insured died of a myocardial
infarction nine months later.

The claims department then figured

that if the insured's medical history had been fully disclosed, the
policy would have been rated special class 3.

However, claim

consultant Susan Frankel recommended payment of the claim because
underwriters had waived the rating on the basis of the information
they did have:
Given that we waived a recommendation for Special Class 2 on
the information we did have, which included references to the
cardiac abnormalities,... I feel that we would have no basis
now for declaring a misrepresentation ... and that we should
pay the claim.
(Add. pp. 85-86, emphasis added.) Prudential admits that the rating
in the Mandelbaum case was waived "for competitive reasons." (Rec.
p. 710 n.16.)

-29-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Prudential's "business reason" for opting not to rate a
ratable policy is that it strengthens their claim in a potential
misrepresentation action that they were not "on notice" of the medical impairment justifying the rating.

Prudential acknowledges the

rule that if it was "on notice" of an impairment at underwriting
time, it would be estopped to later claim misrepresentation on the
basis of that impairment.

(Frankel Dep., Ex. 2 pp. 16-17.)

More-

over, Prudential recognizes that a prior rating is prima facie evidence of prior notice.

For example, in the case of Edward A. Klug ,

Policy No. D84 081 443, a prior rating showed that Prudential was on
notice of the misrepresented condition; therefore, the claim was
T

paid:

In view of the fact that we knew of insured's condition, policy
was rated, and insured died of same condition, will approve
claim and waive contestability. [Add. p. 89.]
Prudential took the same action on rated policies in the Richard A.
Colwell case, Policy No. 79 056 337, and the Katherin Opgaard case,
Policy No. D44 866 890.

(Add. pp. 90-91.)

Therefore, to avoid this

prima facie evidence of "notice," Prudential waives the rating when
possible.
To illustrate the legal effect of a waived rating, in
Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., 77 N.M. 671, 427 P.2d 29
(1967), the auto insurer claimed that had it known of the insured's
prior license revocation it would have still issued the policy, but
with higher premiums.

The court rejected that claim because of the

insurer's failure to rate the policy and adjust the premium for the
other negative information that was disclosed.

The insurer's dis-
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regard of disclosed facts "could properly be considered by the court
in determining" the materiality of omitted facts. Id., 427 P.2d at
31.
Thusf based on the facts that Prudential (1) still would
have issued the policy; (2) disregards medical history beyond five
years old; and (3) waived a rating on the basis of the adverse
information it did have, a jury could reasonably reject Prudential's
"post-mortem" claim that omission of the old heart problem was
material.
D.

Reasonable Reliance
The law in Utah is clear that an insurer may not rescind a

policy for misrepresentation unless the insurer actually relies on
the misrepresentation, and that reliance is reasonable.

Reliance is

not reasonable if the insurer had sufficient indications to put it
"on notice" to conduct an inquiry which, if carried out with reasonable thoroughness, would have revealed the truth.

In short, an

insurer may not close its eyes to a misrepresentation and later
plead reliance upon it to void the policy.

See, e.g., Wootton v.

Combined Insurance Co., 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964); Major
Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 457 F.2d 596 (10th
Cir. 1972) (Utah law).
Since the question of reasonable reliance parallels the
issue of equitable estoppel to raise the misrepresentation defense,
the two are addressed simultaneously under Point II. Suffice it to
say at this point that there is sufficient evidence in the record
from which a jury could reasonably find that Prudential either did
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not rely on the omissions in the application, or that its claimed
reliance was unreasonable.

.

Therefore, it was error for the trial

court to grant Prudential summary judgment on the issue.
E.

Claimed Misrepresentation of Follow-up Information
£

C

t

The trial court based its decision in part on the omission
of Lynn's supposed heart medicatiion and treatment within five years
prior to the application.

(Add. pp. 2-3.)

That finding is both
i

false and immaterial.

Dr. Joseph L. Thorne, the cardiologist who

gave Lynn periodic check-ups following his 1974 heart attack, testified that Lynn's only medication within that period was atromid,
taken to regulate his cholesterol level.

He took no "heart medica-

tion," such as digitalis or nitroglycerine.

(Rec. p. 1069, Add. p.

54, 115; see also Rec. pp. 822, 824, Add. pp. 59, 61.)
receiving any "treatment" for heart disease.

Nor was Lynn

His condition was

"totally asymptomatic," and his life was "active and normal." (Add.
p. 54, 1|4; see also Add, p. 62.)

As explained above, Lynn's visit

to the University Medical Center in 1979, referred to by the court
at Add. p. 2, 115, was merely for tests in connection with the
Center's family studies, not for treatment of heart disease.

(Add.

p. 54, 116.)
More importantly, the atromid medication and the check-ups
by Dr. Thorne are immaterial in the context of this case.

If the

heart attack itself were not disclosed, then this follow-up information would be material as evidence leading to knowledge of the heart
attack.

However, the evidence shows that the heart attack was dis-

closed; therefore, omission of the follow-up evidence is immaterial.
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The same would be true in the analogous case of a real estate sales
contract under which the seller discloses that the basement floods
during rainstorms.

The buyer could not later rescind the contract

for the seller's failure also to disclose that the basement wall was
cracked.

Disclosure of the ultimate fact renders immaterial the

omission of minor evidences of that fact.

In this case, disclosure

of the heart attack put Prudential on notice of the entire problem,
rendering immaterial the omission of minor details. Moreover, there
is no evidence that the follow-up information would have increased
the rating above what it would have been for the heart attack alone.
Thus, a jury could reasonably find this information immaterial, and
it was therefore error for the court to rely upon it.
Point II; PRUDENTIAL IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE
DEFENSE OF MISREPRESENTATION BECAUSE IT WAS "ON NOTICE" TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY THAT REASONABLY WOULD HAVE REVEALED THE
OMITTED INFORMATION ANTJ IT FAILED TO CONDUCT SUCH AN
INQUIRY.
The leading case of this Court illustrating application of
equitable estoppel in the present context is Wootton v. Combined
Insurance Co. of America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964).

In

Wootton, the insurer refused payment on a life insurance policy
because the applicant stated on the application that her husband was
in good health and free from physical defect, when in fact he had
previously retired from work and applied for social security on the
claim that he was totally disabled by polio.

The Court rejected the

insurer's defense of misrepresentation because the applicant
informed the insurance agent at the time of the application that her
husband had polio and the agent saw that the husband walked with a
limp.

The Court ruled that the false answer on the application that
-33-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the husband was free from physical defect "must be taken in conjunction with the disclosure" to the agent that the husband had a polio
defect. Id., 395 P.2d at 726. The Court concluded:
Appellant had sufficient knowledge of the physical disability
of respondent's husband to ascertain all the facts it needed as
to its extent, if it had deemed it important, by either asking
further questions or conducting an investigation; and it cannot
blind itself from ascertaining the truth and then claim wilful
misrepresentation of the truth on which it relied in order to
avoid payment under a policy. [Id., emphasis added.]
The case of Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 457 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1972), applying Utah law, is also
similar factually to the present case and illustrates the rule of
equitable estoppel.

In Major Oil the insured had a history of hos-

pitalization and treatment for alcoholism and an impaired liver.

On

his life insurance application, the insured falsely denied any
treatment for a liver disorder, denied any treatment by a physician
within the previous five years, and made no mention of his hospitalization and treatment for alcoholism.

However, agents of the

insurer were informed orally that the insured had been hospitalized
for alcoholism, and the insurer's underwriting department learned
from an independent information service that the insured had a
drinking problem.

The underwriting department then conducted its

own routine investigation, which failed to confirm the drinking
problem.

The insurer then decided to issue the policy, without

following its leads to make a further inquiry into the seriousness
of the drinking problem.

The insured died shortly thereafter, and

only after the beneficiary's claim did the insurer investigate its
lead from the information service to learn from another insurer of
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the insured's alcoholism and liver disorder.

The insurer raised the

defense of misrepresentation, and the beneficiary contended that the
insurer was estopped to raise the defense because the insurer was
"on notice" through disclosure to the agent and the lead from the
information service.

The court agreed with the beneficiary, stating

the general rule in two parts, as follows:
(l)if the insurer has actual knowledge of the true facts, or of
the falsity of the statements, or at least has sufficient indications that would have put a prudent man on notice and would
have caused him to start an inquiry which, if carried out with
reasonable thoroughness would reveal the truth, he cannot blind
himself to the true facts and choose to 'rely' on the misrepresentation; (2) if the insurer chooses to make an independent
inquiry and the subject matter and the circumstances are such
that he is in a position to ascertain the facts by a reasonable
search, then he cannot plead reliance even if his investigation
is as a matter of fact cursory and did not reveal the true
facts—and if in the course of such an investigation he finds
clues indicating the falsehood of some representations he is
also bound, by the first rule, by what a reasonable inquiry
into those clues would show. [Id. at 602. Quoted by Prudential
as the applicable rule in Corp. Claim Memo. 76-40, p. 16,
Frankel Dep., Ex. 2.]
Applying that rule to the facts of that case, the court
first concluded that the information disclosed to the agent was
imputed to the insurer.

Id. at 603. Concerning the quantum and

nature of the information necessary to put an insurer "on notice,"
the court ruled that the test is not whether the insurer had actual
knowledge of the true facts or actual knowledge of the falsity of
the insured's statements, "but whether it had sufficient information" to put a prudent man "on notice" to start an inquiry that
reasonably would have revealed the truth. _Id_. at 604.

Nor is it

necessary that one disclosure alone be sufficient to put the insurer
on notice; rather, the test "is whether the cumulative effect of all
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the evidence bearing on this issue was sufficient to put [the
insurer] on notice." Id.

If the insurer was on inquiry notice it

"may be charged with knowledge of facts which it ought to have
known." Id. at 603.

The court concluded that the fact of the

insured's "drinking problem," disclosed to the agent and reported by
the information service, was sufficient to put the insurer on notice
to investigate the seriousness of the drinking problem.

Moreover,

judging by the ease with which the insurer discovered the omitted
history after the insured's death, it was apparent that a reasonable
search would have revealed the same information before issuance of
the policy.

Therefore, the insurer was charged with knowledge of

that information and was equitably estopped to raise the misrepresentation defense.

Id. See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

Co. v. Wood, 25 Utah 2d 427, 483 P.2d 892 (1971) (insurer lost right
to rescind for misrepresentation by its failure to make reasonable
investigation of insurability before issuing the policy); Taylor v.
Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d 222, 228-29 (1935) (party with means of
discovering truth cannot be inactive and afterwards allege fraud);
16B Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§9081-9082, 9088; 7 Couch
on Insurance 2d §§ 35:252, 35:254; 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1018.
A review of the information admittedly known to Prudential
at the time of underwriting Lynn's policy demonstrates that Prudential was "on notice" to conduct a further inquiry and should be
charged with knowledge of what that inquiry would have revealed.
Prudential learned from the first Part 2, completed by Launa Perry,
that Lynn's father and two brothers had died at young ages from
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heart attacks; his mother died of a stroke; one brother died of
suicide; three other brothers and a sister died at birth; he smoked
cigarettes; and he had been examined by Dr. Taylor in 1979. (Add. p.
8.)

The Equifax report confirmed the smoking habit; disclosed that

a third brother, still living, also had heart problems; and listed
another physician, "Dr. Peterson." (Add. pp. 34-36.)

Prudential

then learned from the ECG performed by Ms. Perry that Lynn had a
first-degree AV heart block.

(Add. p. 37.)

Prudential learned from

the second Part 2, completed by Dr. Evans, that Lynn had smoked
heavily for twenty years; he had rheumatic fever as a child; he
received a recent I.C.C. exam from Dr. Capener; and he had been
treated by Dr. Val Sundwall at Cottonwood Hospital. (Add. p. 10.)
The "cumulative effect" of the above information was "sufficient to excite attention and call for [further] inquiry" into
Lynn's physical condition.

See, Johnson v. Life Insurance Co. of

Georgia, 52 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1951); Union Insurance Exchange,
Inc. v. Gaul, 393 F.2d 151, 154-155 (7th Cir. 1968) (insurer had
sufficient information "to awaken further inquiry").

Prudential

admits the significance of Lynn's extensive family history of heart
disease and his heart block.

Prudential's underwriting manual

states:
A number of deaths from cardiovascular-renal disease in a
family at ages under 60 is significant, especially if the
applicant shows any indication of any cardiovascular-renal
impairment.
(Reed Dep., Ex. 5, p. VII-1, emphasis added.) It also states that
where three or more cases of cardiovascular disease exist "[i]n
combination with ... any evidence of cardiovascular-renal disease"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the applicant, the debits for the two impairments should be combined, id., and additional debits should be added because the
impairments are "inter-related." (Id. at B.)
In addition to the family history, Lynn's own childhood
rheumatic fever could be indicative of future heart problems,
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, Ch. 257 pp. 1400-02
(10th ed. 1983); 1 Anderson's Pathology, pp. 606-07 (8th ed. 1985)
(Add. pp. 65-71), and a first-degree AV heart block may be indicative of a prior inferior wall myocardial infarction, such as Lynn
suffered in 1974, J. Hurst, The Heart, pp. 544-45 (5th ed. 1982); E.
Goldberger, Textbook of Clinical Cardiology, p. 550 (1982) (Add. pp.
72-76); see also FDE-1 p. 59; Ketchum Dep. p. 12; Reed Dep., Ex. 5
p. 11-33.

The underwriting manual also indicates "special consider-

ation" for a suicide in the family and "several early family deaths"
where "the lack of longevity is very marked." (Reed Dep., Ex. 5 p.
VII-1.) Smoking also has significance in conjunction with other
impairments. (Shaw Dep. p. 45; Ketchum Dep.
12; see also Thorne Aff't 118, Add. p. 55.)

p. 19; Wiczek Dep. p.
Thus, Lynn's application

did show indications of cardiovascular impairment.
Prudential's underwriters recognized the significance of
the indicated impairments and the need for a further investigation,
such as requesting medical records from the listed physicians and
hospital.

As shown previously, underwriter Shaw judged the impair-

ments significant enough to rate the policy and charge a higher
premium.

(Add. p. 39.)

He recognized that the AV heart block indi-

cated "some sort of abnormality," and that the family history and
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heart block together were "indicative of a potential heart problem."
(Shaw Dep. pp. 26-28.) Underwriter John Wiczek, who ultimately
approved the policy unrated, also testified concerning the indicated
impairments:
Q.

... Having in mind that information as an underwriter and
based upon your experience and training, would that be a
significant factor which in your opinion would warrant
some further investigation and analysis?

A.

Yes, I believe it would.

(Wiczek Dep. p. 12.) Jan Drosendahl LeRoux also testified:
Q.

Would you consider [the family history of heart disease]
to be a red flag under those circumstances?

A.

Three more incidents of coronary artery disease under age
60, yes, in a family history.

Q.

Would you also consider a red flag the fact that the EKG
showed a Class 1 heart block?

(LeRoux Dep. p. 19.) Dr. Ketchum agreed that a prudent underwriter
would have requested and reviewed available medical records:

Q.

... Were those two red flags, family history and the ECG,
sufficient to warrant a request from attending physicians
for their statements?

A.

... Certainly using those two—using the term red flag—
taken together, could well prompt a reasonable underwriter
to get an attending physician's statement perhaps from at
least the most proximate physician who is listed on the
declarations as having been seen in attendance ....
[Ketchum Dep. p. 49.]
Prudential could have readily obtained or checked the

medical records indicated in the application, and Lynn's signed
release authorized it to do so. Underwriter Shaw testified that
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requests for medical records were commonly made, directly by
Prudential or through Equifax:
Q.

It was not unusual in the Underwriting Department in
various cases to make a request for attending physician's
statements and hospital records; isn't that true?

£.

That is correct.

Q.

And those documents could either be procured directly by a
secretary or someone working for Prudential Insurance
communicating with the doctor or the hospital or by
sending it out to these independent investigators; isn't
that true?

A.

That is correct.

(Shaw Dep. p. 14; see also pp. 15, 38-39 and Wiczek Dep. pp. 9,
15.)

Underwriter Wiczek testified that a request for Lynn's medical

records should have been made to Equifax:
Q.

. . . [Biased upon what you know of this case now and as a
general rule, with reference to the practice that's
followed in the Underwriting Department, wouldn't you
normally expect that a form like Exhibit 8 [requesting
medical records] would have been completed and sent to
Equifax?

A.

Yes. [Id. at 23.]

In fact, no such form or request for medical records was sent to
Equifax.

Stanley Vogen, of Equifax, testified:

Q.

Since you have printed forms in that regard, is it fair
for me to assume that insurance companies do make requests
on occasion for you to secure medical history from doctors
and from hospitals?

A.

True.

Q.

They would return that [form] to you together, apparently,
with an authorization for you to get the information?

A.

Yes.

Q.

There's nothing in your files or records in this case of
-40-
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Lynn Hardy to indicate that such requests were made by
Prudential?
A.

No. [Vogen Dep. pp. 27-28.]
Thus, despite the indications of cardiovascular impairment

in Lynn's application, and the leads to four doctors and a hospital
known to have further medical information, Prudential made no
further inquiry beyond requesting the APS from Dr. Taylor, who was
listed on the first Part 2. Prudential made no request from the
doctors or hospital listed on the second part 2, or from the doctor
listed in the Equifax report. Therefore, Prudential's conclusion in
the claims investigation, that "[u]nder-writing thoroughly
investigated all given possible leads to information," (Add. p. 50),
is false. Prudential did not follow the leads to Doctors Sundwall,
Capener, and Peterson, or the lead to Cottonwood Hospital. If
Prudential had inquired with Dr. Sundwall or Cottonwood Hospital
before issuing the policy, it would have learned of Lynn's 1974
heart attack, just as it did following his death.
Relevant case law demonstrates that Prudential's failure
to check with the hospital or doctors listed on Lynn's application
estops it from asserting misrepresentation.

For example, in

Rutherford v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 44 Cal. Rptr. 697
(Cal. App. 1965), the insured failed to disclose on Part 2 of the
application a history of treatment for chest pain and the doctor who
had been treating him.

However, he did disclose the names of other

doctors who had treated him for other ailments, and who were also
aware of the insured's history of chest pain.

The court found that
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the answers in the application put Prudential on notice of a
possible misrepresentation, imposing a duty on Prudential to conduct
a further inquiry by contacting the two doctors in the application.

Had additional information been requested from those doctors,

the insured's true condition would have been learned.
707.

Id.

at 704,

Prudential's failure to make that further inquiry barred it

from claiming misrepresentation.
On facts even closer to the present case, the court in
Trawick v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 447 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.
1971), reached the same result.

There, the insured denied a prior

history of heart disease on the application.

However, the insurer

possessed at the time of issue an abnormal ECG reading and the
insured's family history revealing that his father and two brothers
had previously died of heart trouble. Id. at 1296.

The court con-

cluded that while such evidence does not show "actual knowledge" of
the insured's true condition, it is sufficient to put the insurer
"on notice" to conduct a further inquiry.

Since the insurer was on

inquiry notice and was "in a position to ascertain the facts by a
reasonable search, then the insurance company cannot avoid liability
by pleading reliance on the insured's application." Id.
Likewise, in First National Bank v. Modern Woodmen of
America, 486 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1973), the insured failed to disclose a history of hospitalization and treatment for potential heart
disease and listed only one doctor and hospital that had treated
him.

However, he did disclose that his father had died of heart

disease and also gave other answers indicating other hospitaliza-
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tions.

The court held that the purpose of the medical examination

is "to develop leads for future investigation." Id. at 13.

Had the

insurer inquired at the listed hospital or requested the medical
records from the listed physician it would have learned the full
history; instead/ the insurer made no such further inquiry.

The

court concluded:
Appellant could have readily obtained all the relevant information from [the physician listed on the application] but it
failed to do so. Upon these facts we can only conclude that
appellant was sufficiently put on notice as to Kellams1 condition and, therefore, is chargeable with knowledge of facts
which a prudent inquiry would have revealed.
Id. at 14.

For other cases illustrating the estoppel rule in the

insurance claim context see Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v.
Rodgers, 116 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1940) (courts loathe forfeitures);
Security Life & Trust Co. v. Jones, 202 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. App.
1967) (estoppel based on failureTto consult available physician and
hospital records); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 19
S.E.2d 557, 559 (Ga. App. 1942) (failure to make inquiry of listed
physician); Wabash Life Insurance Co. v. Maguire, 461 S.W.2d 916
(Ky. App. 1971), Washington National Insurance Co. v. Estate of
Reginato, 272 F. Supp. 1016 (D. Cal. 1966); Northern National Life
Ins. Co. v. Lacy J. Miller Machine Co., 305 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. App.
1983); Johnson v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 52 So. 2d 813 (Fla.
1951); Pipes v. World Insurance Co., 150 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. La.
1957) .
Prudential has acknowledged and applied the rule of
estoppel for its failure to check available medical records in other
similar cases.

For example, in the Manfred Mandelbaum case, Claim
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No. WOD082820, the insured failed to disclose an extensive history
of heart disease but did disclose the names of two Kaiser medical
centers where he had been treated.

Prudential obtained the medical

records from the Kaiser-Sunset center and discovered a history of
chest pain and an abnormal ECG.

Prudential waived the recommended

rating and issued the policy standard.

After the insured died of a

myocardial infarction within the contestable period, Prudential
obtained the medical records from the Kaiser-Cadillac center and
learned the full undisclosed history of heart disease, which would
have required a special class 3 rating.

Prudential paid the claim

despite the misrepresentation because it was "on notice" to check
available medical records and failed to do so:
Because it was decided at issue to waive a Special Class 3
rating based on the insured's cardiac abnormalities you are
recommending that we pay the claim. I agree. As I see it, there
is no basis for a misrepresentation defense. At underwriting
time we were on notice. . . . Underwriting . . . did not pursue
obtaining his medical records . . . .[Add. pp. 87-88, emphasis
added.]
Likewise, in the Josephine Oertel case, Claim No. NOD085449,
Prudential paid the claim despite a misrepresentation because of its
failure to obtain available medical records:
Underwriter's comment on reverse of Part I indicates that there
was a basis for requesting an APS [attending physician's statement] , but he opted not to. Thus we waived the APS and accepted
the risk with our eyes open. [Add. p. 80, emphasis added.]
Prudential also paid the John Richardson claim, No. NOD 070413,
despite a misrepresentation, for the same reason:
The Company had an opportunity to obtain clarification of dx
[diagnosis] and prognosis, etc. from the source (A.P.) and
opted not to do so. These factors would substantially weaken a
misrepresentation defense. . . .We would also be vulnerable to
a contention that we were "reunderwriting"1 at time of claim and
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thus be exposed to a damages action. On balance, I am reluctant
to resist liability in this case. Pay death benefits. [Add. pp.
92-93, emphasis added.]
Thus, in the case of Lynn Hardy, Prudential was on inquiry
notice, it was in a position to learn the truth, and failed to conduct a further inquiry.

Therefore, Prudential is charged with know-

ledge of what a reasonable search would have disclosed and is now
estopped by its own inaction from claiming reliance on a misrepresentation.
POINT III:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON CLAIMED
MISREPRESENTATIONS OUTSIDE THE APPLICATION.

The insurance policy issued to Lynn Hardy prohibits Prudential from relying on statements outside the application to void
the policy:
We will not use any statement, unless made in the application,
to void the contract or to—deny a claim.
(FDE-1 p. 233, Add. p. 16.) Prudential violated this provision by
alleging, as grounds for rescission, that Mrs. Hardy intentionally
withheld Lynn's medical history from Prudential.

(Rec. p. 671 et

seq.) The trial court seized upon this error and based its decision
on claimed misrepresentations of Mrs. Hardy.

The court's decision

repeatedly refers to the "plaintiff" and to both Lynn and Cheryl.
For example, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the court's decision cite omissions of "Mrs." Hardy, and the court concludes that "the plaintiff"
has withheld information justifying rescission.

(Add. pp. 2-3.)

The trial court's construction of the policy in relying on
omissions of Mrs. Hardy, outside the application, constitutes reversible error.

By the clear terms of the policy, Prudential may rely
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only on claimed misrepresentations made in the application.

Since

only Lynn Hardy made statements in the application, Prudential and
the trial court were limited to reliance on those statements. To
illustrate, in Wabash Life Insurance Co. v. Maguire, 461 S.W.2d 916
(Ky. App. 1971), the insurer attempted to rely on omissions of the
insured's widow and beneficiary to void the policy.

The court

rejected the attempt:
The further claim that ... the insured's widow and beneficiary under the policy, cannot recover because, in substance,
she knew of the policies and knew her husband's condition is
nothing short of ridiculous, and we shall not dignify it by
further mention.
Id. at 919. The same holding is justified in this case.
POINT IV: PRUDENTIAL IS PRECLUDED FROM OBTAINING RESCISSION BY ITS
OWN DISCRIMINATORY AND BAD FAITH HANDLING OF PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM AND BY THE INEQUITABLE RESULT THAT RESCISSION WOULD
PRODUCE.
The Utah Insurance Code, U.C.A. §31-27-22(1), prohibits
unfair discrimination by insurers in the handling and payment of
claims.

(Add. p. 63.) In this case, Prudential has engaged in flag-

rant, unjustified discrimination in the handling and denial of Mrs.
Hardy's claim.

For example, as demonstrated in the preceding argu-

ments, Prudential failed to apply the rules commonly applied in its
other similar cases, including (1) imputing the agent's knowledge to
the company, supra p. 17; (2) accepting the insured's sincere belief
of good health, supra p. 23; (3) disregarding medical history beyond
five years prior to the application, including old myocardial
infarctions, supra p. 26; (4) paying the claim where it was "on
notice" of the condition and waived a rating, supra p. 29; and (5)
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paying the claim where it should have consulted available medical
records but failed to do so, supra p. 44.
Prudential has also violated the duty of good faith and
fair dealing inherent in every contractual relationship.

See, e.g.,

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 306 (Utah
1982).

In no other area of the law is this duty more applicable and

better developed than in the area of insurance contracts.

In the

insurance context the insured occupies an inferior bargaining position, and where the loss insured against does occur, the insured is
placed in an economically vulnerable position at the mercy of the
insurer.

Thus, to better protect insureds from arbitrary and unfair

insurance practices, the majority of courts now recognize a cause of
action for an insurer's bad faith handling and denial of a claim.
E.g., Noble v. National American Life Insurance Co., 128 Ariz. 188,
624 P.2d 866, 867 (1981); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.,
577 P.2d 899, 901 n.l (Okla. 1978); Ghiardi & Kircher, Punitive
Damages:

Law and Practice §8.11 n.14 (1984); Annot., Insurer's

Liability for Consequential or Punitive Damages for Wrongful Delay
or Refusal to Make Payment Due Under Contracts, 47 A.L.R.3d 314
(1973).
This Court has also recognized a cause of action for an
insurer's bad faith.

In Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 19

Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576, 578 (1967), the Court stated:
[T]he cause of action for bad faith, though arising because of
the policy, is not, strictly speaking, an action on the policy.
. . .[I]t is properly regarded as a separate cause of action
for a wrong done to the insured by violating a fiduciary duty
owed to him.
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See also Auerback v. Key Security Police, 680 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah
1984); Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co*, 25 Utah 2d 311,
480 P.2d 739, 745 (1971); Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.,
598 P.2d 346, 349 n.7 (Utah 1979); American States Insurance Co, v.
Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1971).

This duty is

reinforced by the Utah Insurance Code, U.C.A. §§31-1-8, 31-27-1(1),
and by the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations of the
Utah Insurance Department, sections 2 and 5.

(Add. pp. 63-64.)

While space does not permit a discussion of all the bad
faith practices of Prudential in this case, it is apparent from the
"entire course of dealings between the parties" that Prudential has
violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

See Timmons v.

Royal Globe Insurance Co., 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982); Pistorious v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 123 Cal. App. 3d 541, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 660 (1981).

For example, (1) Agent Rigby mislead Lynn to

believe that disclosure of the 1974 heart attack in the application
was not required; (2) Prudential had at least imputed and constructive knowledge of Lynn's medical history, intentionally waived
rating the policy, and now falsely denies that it was "on notice";
(3) Prudential failed to conduct the further inquiry indicated by
the information it had; (4) Prudential falsely represented to Mrs.
Hardy and the Utah Insurance Department that its underwriters
"thoroughly investigated" all leads prior to issuing the policy and
that it was not "on notice" of the omitted history; (5) Prudential
knew that Mrs. Hardy would lose her trucking business if it denied
her claim and yet acted with total disregard for those consequences;

-48-
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(6) Prudential unfairly discriminated against Mrs. Hardy's claim, as
shown above; and (7) Prudential sought rescission of the policy
without attempting in good faith to settle the claim.

This unfair

and bad faith conduct of Prudential precludes it from now obtaining
the "equitable" remedy of rescission.
Rescission is also precluded by the inequity that results
from restoring the parties to their precontract, or "no-contract,"
position.

As shown above, even if Prudential had known the omitted

history, it still would have issued the policy for the additional
premiums totaling $3318.

Since the policy would have been issued in

any event, it is not reasonable or equitable to restore the parties
to a no-contract position.

Rather, they should be restored to the

position they would have occupied absent the claimed misrepresentation.

Under that remedy, often referred to as "reformation," Mrs.

Hardy would receive the insurance proceeds, less the additional
premiums of $3318.

Such a remedy is more consistent with the

approach of "common sense and flexibility" that characterize a court
of equity.

D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies §4.3 (1973);

see also Restatement of the Law of Restitution §28, comment d.
Moreover, in the context of life insurance contracts it is impossible to restore the parties to their precontract positions:
The need to protect the stability of transactions is especially
important in the case of insurance policies, where the attempt
to rescind is made by the insurer after the occurrence of the
insured event. In these cases, of course, rescission does not
return the parties to the status quo ante; after the loss it is
too late to procure substitute insurance.
James & Gray, Misrepresentation—Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 500-01
n.ll (1978) (emphasis added).

Likewise, it is too late for Lynn
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Hardy to obtain other life insurance. Thus, on the facts of this
case, it would be inequitable to grant Prudential a windfall of
$300,000 because of a disputed $3318.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mrs. Hardy respectfully requests
that the order of summary judgment be reversed and that the case be
remanded for trial.
Dated this /5l^day of August, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

BV <&J#*L

7Z6^

Dan S. Bushnell
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t
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Agency Code

Regular Ord.

%/&C*6S(Ac.(According to interval of premium payment)

Parti
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The Prudential Insurance Company of America

1a. Proposed Insured's name —first initial last (Print)

• Widowed
• Divorced
5b. For how long?

5a. Occupation:

f&ttf$&

lb. Sex

I^MDF

j/**&f

3. D Single
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D Separated
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PRATE DREE

SAP" LAKE CITY AGENCY
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^Individual
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Agency
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.% Credit to

A
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I**
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spouse proposed for coverage, give
>. If spouse is proposed for
a. Name
Amt. of life
b. Date of birth c. Age d. Place
ins. in force
Mo. Day Yr.
of birth

\*>6 76£ 4%Z~*

2a. Date of birth

2b. Age 2c. Place of birth

7W<rt\rA Or*«

Address for mail
No. /£.<Q
Street JO <
Cit

State fSr

V-T C C

KV1TV//9

7. For each child proposed for coverage give:
First name & Relation- Date of birth Amt. of life
ship
Mo. Day! Yr. ins. in force
initial

c.
d..
e..
10. Accidental death coverage f..
9. Rating if not
a. Initial amt $.
Standard
Insurance for a child will not start until the 15th
b. RatingD2 Q 3 • * Q 5 of life.
11. To apply for any of these Supplementary Benefits, give details
th Contract Anniversary on
a
Year Decreasing Term on Insured
Family Income to.
$
Initial Amount.
.per
month.
Insured $
Year Decreasing Term on • Spouse
Family Income to 20th Contract Anniversary on
• Insured & Spouse $
Initial Amount
Q Spouse Q Insured & Spouse $
per month.
Decreasing Term to Age 65M/68F on Insured
Family Income to Age 65M/68F on insured
$
per month.
$
Initial Amount
Family Income to Age 52M/55F on Spouse
Decreasing Term to Age 62M/65F on Spouse
$
per month.
$
Initial Amount
.Year Level Term on Insured $ .
j. Level Term on Dependent Children $
• Level Premium Digitized
• Mod.
Premium
k. J.Option
to Purchase
Insurance $by the
Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Reuben Clark
Law School,Additional
BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR,
maycomplete
contain errors.
//^
^ _ - (Do
not
for a family or Insured 8t Spouse Policy.)
I 12. Beneficiarv: ^
8a. Kind of policy

I 8b. Initial amount

-~-

^ *.

1

-^^^ar

^^a>/^

13. State any special request.

14. List all life insurance, annuities and variable contracts on proposed Insured. (If NONE, so state.)
4fHti«H -¥ear
Kind'Life,
Medics!
^Company,
End't.Qfoup) Ye No
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D

M

qgy

D D
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n

15. Will this insurance replace or change any existing insurance or annuity in any company on any
person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes", give their names, name of company, plan, amount and policy Y e s N °
numbers.
E «fij
16. Is anyone applying for, or trying to reinstate, life or health insurance on any person named in 1a, 6 or Yes No
7 in this or any company? If "Yes", give amount details and company.
•
J3?
17. Does any person named in 1a, 6 or 7 plan to live or travel outside the United States and Canada Yes No
within the next 12 months? If "Yes", give details.
•
&>
18. Does any person named in 1a, 6 or 7 plan to fly an aircraft, glider, balloon or like device or, within the
last 2 years, has any such person flown as a student pilot, pilot or crew member or had any other Yes No
duties aboard an aircraft, glider, balloon or like device while in flight (including flight for flight pay)?.. Q
If "Yes", complete Aviation Questionnaire.
19. Has any person named in 1a or 6, within the last 12 months:
Yes No
a been treated by a doctor for or had a known heart attack, stroke or cancer other than of the skin?— D "6£
b. had an electrocardiogram for chest pain or for any other physical complaint or taken medication
for high blood pressure?
D JB20. Premiums payable QAnn.

• Semi-Ann. QQuar. J&Aon.

21. Amount paid $ / f r f / . £ ^

QPay. Budg. QPru-Matic D G o v ' t Allot

D None (Must be "None" if either 19a or 19b is answered "Yes".)

22. Is it understood that a medical examination will be made on any person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes", Yes No
on whom?
j^f D
23. If 22 is "Yes", is it agreed that no insurance will take effect on anyone until all medical examinations Yes No
are made, even though 21 shows that an amount has been paid?
.
/&[ D
24. Changes made by Home Office.

The proposed Insured declares that, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, the above statements are
complete and true. When Prudential gives a receipt form, ORD 22385-79, of the same date as this Part 1, coverage
will start as shown in that form. Otherwise, no coverage will start unless: (1) a contract is issued, (2) it is accepted,
and (3) the full first premium is paid while all persons to be covered are living and their health remains as stated in
Parts 1 and 2. If all these take place, coverage will start on the contract date. Any entry in 24 made at a Home Office
will be approved by acceptance of the contract. But where the law requires written consent for any change in the
application, such a change can be made only if those who sign This form approve the change in writing. No agent
can make or change a contract or waive any of Prudential's rights or needs.
OWNERSHIP: Unless otherwise asked for above, the owner of the contract will be (1) the applicant if other than the
proposed Insured, otherwise (2) the proposed Insured. But this is subject to any automatic transfer of ownership
stated in the contract
Applications
Date
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,,
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TO FIELD OFFICE
SERVICE STAFF:

County Code

KR M?

Appt. Checked and County Code entered by
Initials

TOWRmNGRB»RESENTATTVE
1. If 19a or 19b of the application is answered "Yea":
a. Any application which would normally have to be prepaid is to be written on a non-prepaid basis.
b. If Government Allotment, Payroll Budget or Pro-Matfe, 13 of the application MUST state "Insurance to begin when policy issued".
2. If the proposed Insured is a member of the Armed Forces, 13 of the application must state "Military Serial Number is.
Also show in "REMARKS" the full name, relationship and permanent address of someone who will always know where the proposed
Insured can be contacted during and after termination of military service.
3. You must furnish the information asked for below, and complete and sign the Certification below.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

~

1. Give proposed Insured's HOME and BUSINESS addresses for last 3 yeaf»ifamoumatriskislessthan$100,0(X);for5year»if $1C»^
$249,999; for % of lifetime if $250,000 or more. (Print)
City or Town
From
To
Street
Apt No.
(If in country, give distance from
(If R.D., state number.)
or
No.
and name of trading town and
State
County
Mo. t Yr.
Mo. | Yr.
nearest post-office.)

From
Mo.

.r

Yr.

&

TTZ7 o*-.

SIT5322

S1U

To
Mo. I Yr.

Employer

No.

vm

City or Town

Street

•S^p
£*&**>

State

S.ce.

2. Does more than 50% of the proposed Insured's support come from someone else?
If "Yes", give that person's: Full name
Relationship
Occupation
Amount of life insurance in force $

OJL

Yes Q NoJ?^

1 3 . Did someone other than you suggest this insurance? rf "Yes", state in "REMARKS" who and what prompted the request. Yes •

NorfS

4. How well do you know the proposed Insured? (Check each applicable box.)
D Met very recently
^gf-Known slightly for__^^Lyears at: Q Home ^Business Q Other (explain)
Q Relative (state relationship)
-.years at: • Home u Business • Other (explain)
Q Known welt for.
5. Do you have, from any source, facts which you have not stated any place else in the application which indicate that any person named in
la, 6 or 7 of the application may:
Yes No
a. replace or change any current insurance or annuity in any company?
•
^&
b. have in the last 3 years participated in hazardous sports (such as auto racing or parachuting), or been arrested for driving
recklessly or while intoxicated?
D mG
c. have frequently drunk to excess, illegally used habit forming drugs or have a criminal record?
D
Si
d. have volunteered or been ordered to report for active duty in the Armed Forces?
D JST
(Give details of "Yes" answers in "REMARKS".)
\ J
6. Does the amount applied for plus applications in the past 3 months in ALL companies equal $100,000 or more?
YesjjpAlo D
If "Yes", complete the following
b. Is total amount being applied for in ALL companies
Yes No
to
be
placed?
If
"No",
explain
in
"REMARKS"
7
5
D
Total Amount
Total Amount
c Will more insurance than shown in a. be applied for
being applied for
now in force
in any company in the next 3 months?
D
T ^
in ail companies
in all companies
If "Yes"
Business
Amounts.
—Company
• Business
• Personal
7 V Hasthelastnameofanypeiaonnamedin1a,6or7oftheapplicationbeenc^^
^** ^ S
rf "Yes", who, and what was the previous last name?
1
±3—25*
8a. What is the proposed Insured's total yearly income from all sources (before deductions)? S _ J ^ ++*
b. If married, wrujt is the spouse's total yearryiricc^^
JO9. Identify the group that beet covers the proposed Insured*s occupation: (Check owe)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,OF)
J. Reuben
Clark Semi-SMIed,
Law School, BYU.
KSkiHed,
Foreman, Part-time Fermer
(A) O Professional, Executive, Scientific
Machine-generated OCR, may(G)
contain
errors.
tm\ l—J I . M ^ L A , nm^4mmmlf%nmi
JunifMT C»^<MrfilM
U Unskilled.
Service Worker, Laborer

(D) • Full-time Farm Operator
(E) G Clerical, Sales Clerk

(I) O Student
U) D Military
11. if this application is for personal insurance, what is(are) the
110. Who is to pay the premium? (Check one)
purposeje)? (Check appropriate boxes.)
(A)JBClnsured
(J) Q , Estate Conservation
(E) • Family Income
(B) D Employer
.(relationship)
(Ch&Mortgage Insurance
(C) • Policy Owner (not employer).
(F) • Retirement
( V ) Q Other.
* (Of D Education Fund
(D) D Third Party (not policy owner).
(name and relationship)
12. Check appropriate Special Financing {or None):
(A) Q Split Dollar
(B) D Minimum Deposit/VOP
(C) Q Initial Premium from Policy Loan
(F) • Other
(E)jZLNone
114. What was the primary source of this sales lead? (Check one)
(A) D Cold Call - Phone (E) 0 Policyholder Service
(B) Q Cold Call - Visit
(F) Q Personal Acquaintance
(G) D P & C Lead
(C) • Referral
(D) • Direct Mail
(H)&£ther

15. What Sales Services did you use? (Check appropriate boxes.)
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(U
(I)

•
D
Q
Q
•
•
D
Q

0 » .

CP1 — Computer Ledger Statement
Employers Advisory Service
Variable Outlay Plan
Estate Conservation Proposal Service
Business Valuation Proposal Service
Capital Planning Guide
Business Security Analysis
Other compter services
None of the above used

ura i

13. If this application is for business insurance, complete the following:
(a) (G) D Buy-out
(H) • Key Employee-Employer Indemnification
(Y) • Key Employee-Deferred Compensation
(W) D Non-Qualified Employee Benefits Ran
(X) D Section 303 Plan
(Z) • Other
(1) Q Sole Proprietorship?
(b) Is firm a:
(2) • Partnership?
(3) • Corporation?
(c) Is proposed Insured: Q Owner of firm? (state
%)
• Employee?
(d) Amount of business insurance in force and applied for in all companies on each officer or member of the firm.
Name

Age

Position

In force

Applied for

16. Proposed insured's telephone number ftfpf

)p)2r~g&7^

Complete if children are to be covered
17. Are any of the children named in 7 of the application foster children or children whose legal adoption has not yet been made
final? If "Yes", explain in "REMARKS"
18. Are there other children less than 18 years of age who have not been named in 7 of the application?
If "Yes", explain in "REMARKS".
19. Are there any children named in 7 of the application who are:
a. living in a household other than the proposed Insured's?
b. dependent on someone other than the proposed Insured for support or maintenance?
If either is "Yes", explain in "REMARKS".

Yes •

Yes No
•
Q
No Q
Yes No
Q
•
D
D

CERTIFICATION
Yes No
Did you deliver the notice that an investigative consumer report may be necessary?
jE^ O
I certify that (a) on this date I saw the proposed Insured and (b), except as stated in "REMARKS", I am not aware of any information that was not
shown in the answers to the questions in any Part of this application, which would adversely affect the eligibility, acceptability or
insurability of any person proposed for coverage. I recommend that Prudential accept the risks proposed for coverage.

Y

,„f(

i
•\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Pwdential

Pert 2 of Application or
—
Wsquatt For Change of Policy

1. Name of person examined — first initial, last (Print)

» IvA/A*

//A*.JI

2. Family racord

'

Living
(give age)

Father
Brothare
Hn/O

Dead
Cause

Living
(give age)

Year

Mother
Sisters
No_2
V^gx, //iatl
3. a. Has your weight changed more than 10 pounds in the past year?
b. If "Yes", Gain
lbs.
Loss
lbs. Reason for change
c How long has the present weight been the same?
iT ~C **€+0t,*
4. Have you ever smoked?
tf "Yes", give date(a) last smoked: Cigarettes Mo. ? Yr. ?J Cigars Mo. Yr.
5. When did you last consult a doctor?
Mo. ^
Yr. f^
(Give details in 12.)

JLL*

3ffiS

piai_

*

*

•

Dead
Afle Year
/?*-</
J322&&£
Cause

/&&!

6. Are you now being treated or taking medicine far any condition or disease?

YesQ NoQf
j ;
Yes^y NoD
Pipe Mo. Yr.
Yes • N o g '

Have you ever;
a. had any surgery or bean advised to have surgery and have not done so?
b. regularly used or are you now using, barbiturates or amphetamines, marijuana or other hallucinatory drugs, or heroin, opiates or other narcotics, except as prescribed by a doctor?
c. been treated or counseled for alcoholism?
d. had life or health insurance declined, postponed, changed, rated-up or withdrawn?
a. had life or health insurance canceled or its renewal or reinstatement refused?
Have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of:
a. JiigfvbJood pressure? (tf "Yes", state datefound,if drugs are used and if still being treated.) ..
b. chest pain, pressure or discomfort? (If "Yes", state where located, number of attacks, their
duration, date of last attack and treatment)
c. heart murmur or rheumatic fever? (If rheumatic fever, state number of attacks, date of last attack
and how long disabled for each.)
d. asthma, emphysema or tuberculosis?
a. tumor, cancer, leukemia, diabetes or syphilis?
f. nervous trouble, convulsions, epilepsy or mental disorder?
Other than as shown above, have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of a
disease or disorder of the:
Yes No
a. heart arteries or veins?
Q fit
kidneys, bladder, genital organs or urinary tract?
b. lungs, chest or throat?
•
£?
c brain or nervous system?
Q JQ
spine, joints, skull or other bones?
d. liver, gallbladder, stomach, intesWood, glands or skin?
ears, eyes, nose or sinuses?
tinet or rectum?
Q "gf

Yes No

D 0
Q
Q
•
Q
Yes .No

M

D %
Q

J2T

G
Q
G
G
Yes No

K
Q Jjjff

10. Other than as shown above, have you in the past 5 years:
Yes No
a. consulted or been attended or examined by any doctor or other practitioner?
G M.
b. been in a hospital, sanitarium or other institution for observation, rest diagnosis or treatment? G .83.
c. had electrocardiograms, X-rays for diagnosis or treatment or blood, urine, or other medical
tests? (If "Yes", state dates, why made and by whom.)
G jBi
d. made claim for or received benefits, compensation, or a pension because of sickness or injury? O j ^
11. Do you now have a known sign of any physical disorder, disease or defect not shown above? .. YesQ No[%[
12. Whet are the full details of the answer to 5 and to each part of 6 through 11 which is answered "Yes"?
Illness or other reason.
If operated, so state. Reason
for
Time lost
Full
PRINT full names
any check-up, doctor's advice,
Began
from normal recovery and addresses of
Question No. treatment and medication.
Mo. Yr. activities
Mo. Yr. doctors and hospitals
«gr « A fruH+Mi rtt'cJ
4 qfcMVS *SJ*m*/

7d7&Vfs«<i>'/i
/SiJk/rr

* i
bfk*L
*y/*rJ*L.

OfVrV ,W klriL

/ r flrtrsrw7 &r*u Jit ,4^*
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-^

h0T

if

*r*/

fhitftff/'foT&etf'Tf
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9*7?

y*3<TJ. &e*fc£~J>KJL

«s»ry^*fc;s
V t#<

I dedere that to tha beet of my knowledge and belief, the above statements mm complete and true,
before signing.)

(Be sure you have read ad the questions and
Witness

J

/""")

Signature/Of person examined
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Z-7-^.,

COMB 72 T-79 I CM

TO OUkMmm*: Th« authorisation muat ba aignad and datod by tha propoaod Inaurad.
MnHOffZftnoN
For tna Raiaaaa of

.19

hoapltai. cUnieor othar madicat)/ ratatad facility, inauranoa oompany, tha Madicat Information
•uraau or othar organization. inaUtuiion or paraon.
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Machine-generated
may
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ft. Timaofdayonminad

MyORtea
L HEART — A N Y M L * M U R PRESENT?
ff "Yos". eompioto 1, 2. 3, 4 and 5

3 i ^ O P.M.

to thsporoonoxaminad your potior*? . . . . . . . . . . Y o a Q Nojkj
f "YMT and any kthrmmbon was notrtoxluaaU,gtva Oats* baton?

Mdyoumaoaun•7
0. HEIGHT

^

fL

/in.

No D

^

* / o ^ **

ft, WEKSHTfln
IP.

OW you wokjh?

SLOOO PRESSURE

SYSTOLIC

vwjef Nog
DIASTOLIC
Ossoppooranco of Sound

•MP*

I9X

lot Wooding
2nd
"
3rd
"
Raoorvfinsf fwadtng fataln. 0tyttodie o) ovsr MP or dimtotk ovor
M t or * osfWMBsn/ ovorw) tQtrt, locofu two fnoto laadinQt tattati of
OMSrVOKS. OlO// MO 0 MTWH taaeiman 0 ayttoiie it ovar 140 or diatloocaovorftL

1. Murmur datosa —
A. D Apical

D Soaai

ft. D Syotolic

O Praaystoiic
Q Slowing

E. Q Tranamittod

• LocahW .

. . . Yaa Q No Q
(If mora than ona

• «/

D Diastolic
Q'Othar
C D *o«0*
D 0 BoraiyHoord- D Mod.-GrJ
Aj Vary Lood-Gr. 5
Gr.1
D Loud-Gr. 4 /
Q Loudost Possibla• Palnt-Gr. 2
/
Gr.6

lEffoctofbody
poaMon?
VoaQ
Yaa D

o. Any otrtor abnormal caafliac findings?
(ff ofthor is "Yaa", daaerlM) boiow.)
4. What is your diognoi
or opinion?
J

NoG
No Q

7

« . PULSE
AtraaHaaotsd)

jff

(20 body bondings in 00
ooconda of OQuivoionti

E THERE ANY AatftORMAUTftft O f : (Rooord oil ofctoiN boiow)
\LOOD VESSELS
Mlor)?
Y a o Q No Q
2.RESPWA'itoRYORGANS~"~
(including
ig noaa>tqroat and

. Yoa Q

No Q

YasD

No p

Yaa D

No

1 ASOOMIrW O W G A d S s ^
(including tandamaaa. honnaJ7
4. NERVOUS SYSTEM? (Examino
and. whan tndicotad, othor rofkwosl
BaKoaX^.

5, EYES? (If morkod rsfractiva arror or hiatohsof
• a.- injary, racavd vision by Snoilan
m m oach aya)

^ ^
YoTQ

ft EARS? (Daacriba any diaehargo praaant or
fl) Y<

*,

No Q

ros p No g .

J, ANALYSIS O f URINE
Albumin
-r
wya<
^
Yos Q
No J K
Y« D
No & r
If oUnor it "Vol", moH us a portion of tho urina axaminad.
K. Ara you mailing us a urina apacimon?
Yaa B£-*No D
Mali a apadman:
(1) ff roquirad by instructions on ravaraa of vouchor.
(2) If Ufa tnauranca application for —
$30,000 or mora, and aga SO or over, or
360,000 or mora, at any aga.
L Hova you any information about this parson not
racordod aiaowhara on this form rotating to
physical or montal impairmant?
Yas Q

No|

« V S COMPLETE OETAftJ OP ALL -YES* ANSWERS TO OJJtlTIONS Q<2J. K 1 3 a - b . and L

m

CfiTjCTCP

w

AUG - t T98I

I oortrfy that on tho data shown I axaminad tha parson nomad on tho ravaraa whoaa anawars to tha quastions on tha ravorsa wars raviowad
by mo, and that ha or aha aignad thia form in my prooonco.
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Zip

Prudential

fart2of Apfifcatlunor
l For Chenpe of PeJssy

No.

6-

1. Name of personejua^med — fWst, initial, last (Print)

L\j)J/j

UAg^v/

2. Family racord

Living
(give age)

Living

Cause l Afle l Yaar {

Cauaa

^Ktto^ril

Brothari
No

M in frrpnr/vn
No_

imfinfiiUiri

Daad
Ape Year

LAnKn^UiL

3. a. Haa your weight <
I mora than 10 pounds in the peat yaar?
b. If "Yea". Gain.
Loae_^tbe.
Reason for change
mmmm
c. How long haa the \
t waight baan the aama?
4. Have you aver smoked?.
...lfa..*~7rM..*4.y«+^.T:A.^S./!^
—• Cigarattaa Mo. Yr.
Cigars Mo. Yr.
if "Yet", give date<s) iaat
S. Whan did you teat contort a doctor?
Mo. f
Yr. ? J (Give detail* in 12.)

YaeQ NoH)

Ya»& NoD
Pipe Mo. Yr.

6. Are you now being treated or taking medicine for any condition or dtteeee?.
• YatDNoJS.
7. Have you even
Yes No
a. had any aurgaty or baan adviaad to have aurgary and have not dona ao?
D S
b. bun in a hospital, aanitarium or other institutionforobservation, rest, diagnosis or treatment? B D
c. regularly used or are you now using, barbiturates or amphetamines, marijuana or other hallucinatory drugs, or heroin, opiates or other narcotics, except as prescribed by a doctor?
B
d. baan treated or counseledforalcoholism?
a. had life or health insurance declined, postponed, changed, rated-up or withdrawn?
t had life or health insurance canceled or its renewal or reinstatement refueed?
BHave you ever baan treated by a doctorforor had any known sign of:
Yes No
a. high blood pressure? (If "Yes", state datafound.If drugs are used and if still being treated.) .. D B
b. cheat pain, pressure or discomfort? (if "Yea", state where located, number of attacks, their
duration, data of Iaat attack and treatment)
D B
c. heat murmur or rheumatic fever? (If rheumatic fever, state number of attacks, date of last attack
and how long disabledforeach.)
B D
d. asthma, emphysema or tuberculosis?
D D
a. tumor, cancer, leukemia, diabetes or syphilis?
D Q
f. nervous trouble, convulsions, epilepsy or mental disorder?
D Q
9. Other than aa shown above, have you ever been treated by a doctorforor had any known sign of a
Yes No
i or disorder of the:
a. kidneys, bladder, genital organs or urina. heart, arteries or veins?
ary tract?
b. lungs, chest or throat?
6
1 spine, joints, skull or other bones?
c brain or nervous system?
ES
d. liver, gallbladder, stomach, intesg. blood, glands or skin?
O
tines or rectum?
h. ears, eyas, nose or sinuses?
B
10. Other than aa shown above, have you in the past 5 years:
Yes No
a. consulted or been attended or examined by eny doctor or other practitioner?
S D
b. had electrocardiograms. X-raysfordiagnosis or treatment or blood, urine, or other medical
testa? (If "Yes", state dates, why made end by whom.)
S D
c mada claimforor received benefits, compensation, or e pension because of sickness or injury? D 09
11. Do you now have a known sign of any physical disorder, disease or defect not shown above? .. YesQ N o ^
12. What are the full details of the answer to 5 end to each part of 6 through 11 which ia anawered''Yes''?
Illness or other reaeon.
If operated, ao state. Reason
for
Time tost Full
PRINT full names
any check-up, doctor's advice,
Began
from normal recovery end addresses of
Question No. treatment and medication.
Mo. Yr. activities
Mo. Yr. doctors end hospital
JZS'M.^'
.^rY^fiitf^
s *• <-» •
f *(
-aSw£*w£_

JJL-

&***!&? \ f^*£t~>-

ftp* <B^V^JbuJIt*'**

TT

TEL
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~m

•ir**
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I dadara that, to the beet of my knowledge and belief, the above statements are complete and 1
(Be aura you have read all the questions and answers before eigning.)
I SJgnatureyef parson examined

K £Z**u, U^> \t fi^,,- stCz
•g-35"
TO IXMSJNPU Thts authonttion must t » mqrwd and d w d by tht ptopo—d insumd.
AUTHOfVZATKW

o f tLaw School, BYU.
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.is ? )

was mads at

y^yo*-

Q Homo

& ffmaofdoyo

L HEART—AMY MURMUR PRESENT?....
Yaa Q_ Noj &
IT n a T , aompiata 1. 2, S. 4 and 5 baiow: (K mora than
in opan spacs baiow.)
C. to tho parson axaminad yourP»*»"tf
p
Va»D Nofcbl
, ii—,,--,-^^
w isa"* and any anbrmabon w
I W M — ^ y i — • w w r .
A, D
D Apical
ApiQl
•D Basal
t—I
Q
DOthar
A.
DM your
B. D Syatoiic
D Praaystoiic
0 Diastolic
Y
0. HEIGHT
C Q Rough
Q Blowing
D Othar

VJSrfS)

ip n. 2 - in.

I . WEIGHT (in dothaa) / ? 7 A j N P. BLOOD PRESSURE

SYSTOUC
/?•

-fl J* 0

Yaa |fe No {
DIASTOLIC

^

0. Q BaratyHaard* Q Mod.-Gr.3
Gr. 1
Q Loud-Gr. 4
D Faint-Gr. 2
E. Q Tranamlttad Q Loeafasd
Z» Eflsct ofbody
poatton?
3a. fc haart anlargad?
b> Any othar abnormal cardiac findings?
(If aMhar is "Yaa". daacriba baiow.}

0 Vary Loud-Gr. 5
0 Loudaat Po»6(eGr.6

Yas Q
Yas D

NoH
No@

n>if imdmg ojaan. tftyttoHe m o*r 140 or
OfaOtmtnttthf
OV9fW9tQnt, fWCOft/tWO 191099 fOOdtofft CSSOn Mt
4 What is your diagnoais
MmtvuH Mail ta » urint Mpmammt If wymoiic i$ ovmf 140 or dim-or opinion?
toUc m oyfr 90.
S. Mart poairjon of apax; location of murmurta) and transmission
0. PULSE
Piamatuia Contractions
NaparMmuta
w
jrs u A > 4
«.Ck
Position of apax bast... ^%
90*

Anw of ojstribtfbon

^^

pomt of najKNaunt atasn- ^^^
atoy of murmur
O

1

lfMYar'.daaer1taabalow.

**

IN. ARE THERE ANY ABNORMAUTES OF: (Racord all datsUs baiow) J. ANALYSIS OF URINE
1. HOOD VESSELS
(artarioaeiarosis. paripharal vascular)?
Yat Q * • £ l
*•» D
• ^ L
Yaa Q " NO Sj£(
IT althar is npjs^ mail us s portion of ths unna axaminad.
2. RESPWATORY ORGANS
|
(including noas. throat and mouth)?
Yaa Q No)gj
K. Ara you moMng us a urina spaciman?
Yaa Q No Q
». ABDOMINAL ORGANS
No^
MaN a apaeiman:
(1)
If
raqutrad
by
Jnatructiona
on
ravaras
of
wjuchar.
4. NERVOUS SYSTEM? (Examinaaya. paiaNar
(2) If Ufa inauranco application for —
NofeB
$30,090 or mors, end sga 55 or ova.-, or
[ fc EYES? (if marsad ratrscttva arror or hiatory of
dtaaaaa or in|ury, racord viaion by Snailan
Notation in aach aya)
Yaa O N o t e
L Havayouany ii
1 C EARS? (Daacriba any diacharga praaant or
lacordad anawhara on this form raiatmg to
NoQ.
physical or marital JmpaJrmant?
Yas Q No & .
tfVEOOMPiCTEOETAsUOFALL-YCS0

TO OAJESTIONB OftL I t I Ja-b. and L

JSBSJSEL
iu •-* ? iggft-

5*
I cartffy that on tha data shown I axaminad tha parson nomad on
by ma. and that ha or aha sigjnad this form in my
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Prudential
Insured
Fece Amount
Term Period
Premium Period
Agency

The Prudential Insurance Company of America
a mutual life insurance company
Corporate Office, Newark, New Jersey

70 ?bfc H t 3 t ^©•teY Number
SEP 1 7 , l ^ f i l i Contract Dete

LYNN HARDY
$3D3tDDD—
S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE M

S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE H
G-SLCX

We will pey the beneficiary the proceeds of this contract promptly if we receive due proof
that the Insured died in the term period. We make this promise subject to all the provisions
of the contract. The term period starts on the contract date. The term period and the
contract date are shown in the window of this page.
Please read this contract with care. A guide to its contents is on the last page. A summary
is on page 2. If there is ever a question about it, or if there is a claim, just see a Prudential
egent or get in touch with one of our offices.
Right to Cancel Contract.—Not later than ten days after you get this contract, you may
return it to us. All you heve to do is take it or mail it to one of our offices or to the agent
who sold it to you. We will cancel the contract from the start and give beck your money
promptly.

Signed for Prudential.
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CONTRACT SUMMARY
W e offer this summary to help you understand this
contract. We do not intend that it change any of the
provisions of the contract.
This is a contract of term life insurance. It is payable only
if the Insured dies in the term period shown in the
window of the first page or any later renewal term period
which we describe under Renewal on page 15. We show
the amount(s) of renewal premiums in the Table of
Renewal Premiums on page 4. The amount of the
premiums will change as we show in the Schedule of
Premiums. Premiums are to be paid during the premium
period. If a premium is not paid before its days of grace
are over, the contract may %nd and have no value except
as we state under Dividends on page 8. If this occurs,
you may be able to reinstate its full benefits.
Proceeds is a word we use to mean the amount we would
pay if we were to settle the contract in one sum. To
compute the proceeds which may arise from the Insured's
death, we start with a basic amount. We may adjust that
amount if there are dividend credits, premium in default,
or a premium paid (but not waived under a waiver of
premium benefit, if any) past the date of death. The table
on page 15 tells what the basic amount is. The table will
refer you to the parts of the contract which tell you how
we adjust the basic amount.

Proceeds which arise from the Insured's death often are
not taken in one sum. For instance, for all or part of those
proceeds, you may be able to choose a manner of
payment to fit the beneficiary's expected needs. If the
Insured dies, and one has not been chosen, the beneficiary may be able to do so. We will pay interest under
Option 3 from the date of death on any proceeds to
which no other manner of payment applies. This will be
automatic as we state on page 14. There is no r\—d to
ask for it.
You and we may agree on a change in the ownership of
this contract Also, unless we endorse it to say otherwise,
the contract gives you these rights, among others:
•
•
•
•

You may change the beneficiary under it.
You may obtain any dividend credits undar it.
You may be able to renew it for further term period(s).
You may be able to exchange it for a new contract of
life insurance.

The contract, as issued, may or may not have extra
benefits which we call Supplementary Benefits. If it does,
we list them under Supplementary Benefits on the Contract
Data page(s) and describe them after page 14. The
contract may or may not have other extra benefits. If it
does, we add them by rider. Any extra benefit ends es
soon as any premium is in default past its days of grace,
unless the form which describes it states otherwise.

(Contract Summary Continued on Page IS)
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CONTRACT DATA
INSURED'S SEX AND ISSUE AGE
RATING CLASS
STANOARD
INSURED

M-H2

LYNN HARDY

FACE AMOUNT
TERM PERIOD

$300,000—
S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE M

PREMIUM PERIOD
AGENCY

S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE M
G-SLCX

BENEFICIARY

E3100R

70 7fcb Hh3
SEP 17, H B 1

POLICY NUMBER
CONTRACT DATE

CHERYL HA?DY, WIFE, IF LIVING, OTHERWISE
THE ESTATE OF SAID CHERYL HARDY

LIST OF SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS
(EACH BENEFIT IS DESCRIBED IN THE FORM
WHICH BEARS THE NUMBER SHOWN FOR IT)
INSUREDS WAIVER OF PREMIUM BENEFIT.
***** END OF LIST *****

SCHEDULE OF PREMIUMS
DJE DATES OF CONTRACT PREMIUMS OCCUR ON THE CONTRACT DATE AND AT INTERVALS
OF 1 MONTH AFTER THAT DATE.
CONTRACT PREMIJMS ARE
$lbl.b5 EACH*
CONTRACT PREMIUMS INCLUDE THE PREMIUMS FOR BENEFIT EG100R.
•**•• E N D OF SCHEDULE *****
• SEE PAGE H FQ* TABLE OF RENEWAL PREMIUMS

P C0231
PAGE 3 C7T)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5 RC TR 75-MM2

POLICY NO.
TABLE OF RENEWAL PREMIUMS
ATTAINED
MONTHLY
AGE
PREMIUM

M7
52
S7
(.2
t7#
70

$230.bS
3b2.feS
557.bS
621.bS*
Ii3.a7.b5
l,b?b.b5

# THIS RENEWAL TERi PERIOD IS FOR LESS THAN S Y E A R S .
* CHANGING ON FIRST ANNIVERSARY AFTER I N S U R E D S bSTH BIRTHDAY
TO $ 7 3 S . b S .

P 00232
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ENDORSEMENTS
(Only we can endorse this contract.)

GENERAL PROVISIONS
Definitions.—We define here some of the words and
phrases used all through this contract. We explain others,
not defined here, in other parts of the text.

the issue age plus the length of time since the contract
date. You wilt find the issue age near the top of pege 3.

The Contract.—-This policy and the application, a copy
of which is attached, form the whole contract. We assume
that all statements in the application were made to the
You and Your.—The owner of the contract.
best of the knowledge and belief of the person(s) who
made them; in the absence of fraud they are deemed to
Insured.—The person whose name is in the window of
be representations and not warranties. We relied on those
the first page. He or she need not be the owner.
statements when we issued the contract. We will not use
Example: Suppose we issue a contract on the lift of your
any statement, unless made in the application, to void the
spouse. You applied for it and named no one else as
contract or to deny a claim.
owner. Your spouao is the Insured and you are the owner.
Contract Modifications.—Only a Prudential officer may
Issue Date.^The contract date.
agree to modify this contract, and then only in writing.
We. Our and Us.—Prudential.

Anniversary or Contract Anniversary.—The same day and
month as the contract date in each later veer.
Example: If the contract date is March 9. 1980. the first
anniversary is March 9, 1981. The second is March 9.
1982. and so on.
Contract Year.—A year which starts on the contract date
or on an anniversary.
Example: If the contract date is March 9. 1980. the first
contract year starts then and ends on March 8. 1981.
The second starts on March 9. 1981 and ends on March
8. 1982. and so on.
Attained Age.—The Insured's attained age at any time is

Ownership and Control.—Unless we endorse this
contract to say otherwise: (1) the owner of the contract is
the Insured; and (2) while the Insured is living the owner
alone is entitled to (a) any contract benefit and value, and
(b) the exercise of any right and privilege granted by the
contract or by us.
Suicide Exclusion.—Jf the Insured, whether sene or
insane, dies by suicide within two years from the issue
date, we will pay no more than the sum of the premiums
paid.
Currency.—Any money we pay. or which is paid to us.
must be in United States currency. Any amount we owe
will be payable et our Corporate Office.

(Continued on Next Page)
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Misstatement of Age or Sox.—If the Insured's stated
age or sex or both are not correct, we will change each
benefit and any amount to be paid to that which the
premium would have bought for the correct age and aex.

Incontestability.—Except for non-payment of premium,
we will not contest this contract after it has been in force
during the Insured's lifetime for two years from the issue
date.

The Sched* K of *r*reiums may chow that premiums
change or stop on a certain date. We may have used that
date because the Insured would attain a certain age on
that date. If we find that the issue age was wrong, we will
correct that date.

Assignment.—We will not be deemed to know of an
assignment unless we receive it. or a copy of it. at our
Home Office. We are not obliged to see that an assignment is valid or sufficient.

BENEFICIARY
You may designate or change a beneficiary. Your request
must be in writing and in a form which meets our needs.
H will take effect only when we file it at our Home Office;
this will be after you send the contract to us to be
endorsed, if we ask you to do so. Then any previous
beneficiary's interest will end as of the date of the
request. It will end then even if the Insured is not living
when we file the request. Any beneficiary's interest is
subject to the rights of any assignee of whom we know.
When a beneficiary is designated, any relationship shown
la to the Insured, unless otherwise stated. To show
priority, we may use numbered classes, so that the class
with first priority is called class 1. the class with next
priority is called class 2. and so on. When we use
numbered classes, these statements apply to beneficiaries
unless the form states otherwise:

3. Two or more in the same class who have the right to
be paid will be paid in equal shares.
4. M none survives the Insured, we will pay in one sum to
the Insured's estate.
Example: Suppose the dees 1 beneficiary is Jane and the
class 2 beneficiaries are Paul and John. We owe Jane the
proceeds if she is living at the Insured's death. We owe
Paul and John the proceeds if they are living then but
Jane is not But if only one of them is living, we owe him
the proceeds. If none of them is living we owe the
Insured's estate.
Beneficiaries who do not have a right to be paid under
these terms may still have a right to be paid under the
Automatic Mode of Settlement.
Before we make a payment, we have the right to decide
what proof we need of the identity, age or any other facts
about any persons designated as beneficiaries. If beneficiaries are not designated by name and we make payment(s)
based on that proof, we will not have to make the
payment(s) again.

1 . One who survives the Insured will have the right to be
paid only if no one in a prior class survives the Insured
2. One who has the right to be peid will be the only one
paid if no one else in the same class survives the Insured

moot POFTV f O ^ 2 2 ^ 4 T T A C H S D

Prudential

The Prudential
Insurance Company
of America

Insured

Policy No.

Lvnn Hardv

7Q 7$s 463

Ownership and Control
This contract is amended at issue to provide that, except as we may state below, all rights of ownership and control will
belong to the owner(s) shown here:

Cheryl Hardy, wife of the Insured, the estate of said wife.

P 00234

While the Insured is living, the owner(s). with no one else's consent, is entitled to any benefit and value, and to the
exercise of any right and privilege granted by the contract or by us. But if we are settling with an owner or someone else
who is not the Insured, then: (1) our consent is needed for a settlement option to be chosen for any proceeds which may
arise other than from the Insured's death; and (2) if this is a contract which calls for monthly payments upon its maturity
as an endowment, we will have the right at that time to pay its cash value in one sum instead.
Endorsed by attachment on Contract Date
The Prudential Insurance Company of America,
By

>ff,„rf./A #f,7£%«*•«•«>
Secretary

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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PREMIUM PAYMENT AND REINSTATEMENT
Payment of Pramiuma.—Tha Schedule of Premiums
shows tha amounts of tha premiums and how often they
must be paid. Wa tall you below how you may be able to
have them fall due either more or less often. Due dates
fall on the same day of tha month as tha contract data.
They occur only while the Insured is living and only in tha
premium period. The premium period, shown in the
window of the first page, starts on tha contract date. Each
premium is to be paid by its due date. It may be paid at
our Home Office or to any of our authorized agents. If we
are asked to do so. we will give a signed receipt. A
premium is in default if it is not paid whan it is due.
Change of Frequency.—You may ask us in writing to
have premiums fall due either more or less often. If we
agree, we will make the change and tall you what tha
new premiums are and whan they are due. The more
often premiums are due. the larger the total amount that
will have to be paid for a contract year.
Grace Period.—We grant 31 days of grace for paying
each premium except the first one. If a premium has not
been paid by its due data, tha contract will stay in force
during its days of grace. If a premium has not been paid
when its days of grace are over, the contract will and and
have no value, except as wa state under Dividends.
Pramium Adjustment.—The Insured might die in the
premium period while no premium is in default. If so, wa
will make an adjustment so that the proceeds will include
that part of tha last pramium paid which is mora than that
which was needed to pay premiums through the date of
death. Or the Insured might die in the days of grace of a
pramium in default. If so. the amount needed to pay

Paga 7 ( R T — 6 0 )

premiums through the date of death is due us. We will
make an adjustment so that the proceeds will not include
that amount.
Example: Suppose the contract date is in 1980. An
annual pramium of $400 due in 1982 is paid. The
Insurad diss nine months later. The proceeds will include
about $100 from the premium, since $300 was enough
to pay premiums through the date of death. The proceeds
could include slightly more or less than $ 100, since some
months have more days than others.
If a claim arises while the Insured is living, we will
subtract any pramium in default when we settle the claim.
Reinstatement.—You may reinstate this contract after
the days of grace of a premium in default. All these
conditions must be met:
1. The final term period for which the contract may be
renewed must not have ended.
2. Premium paymant must not be in default more than
three years.
3. You must give us any facts wa need to satisfy us that
the Insurad is insurable for the contract.
4. W e must be paid all premiums in arrears with
compound interest at 6% a year. We may set a lower rate
for any period in which there are arrears.
Example: Suppose a premium due May 1st is not paid on
time. The contract will stay in force until June 1st
whether the premium is paid or not. If the premium is not
paid by June 1st, you must meet all the above conditions
if you want to reinstate the contract.

P 00235

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4 O

-Vv-IDENDS
Participation.—-We will decide each year what part of
our surplus, if any, to credit to this contract as a dividend.
The contract will be eligible for such a dividend if (1) the
Insured is living; and (2) all premiums due before the
anniversary have been paid.
We will credit any such dividend on the anniversary. But
we do not expect to credit one before the second anniversary.
Dividend Options.—If you ask us in writing at our Home
Office and in a form which meets our needs, you may
choose any of these uses for any such dividend:
1 . Cash.—We will pay it to you in cash.
2. Premium Reduction.—We will use it to reduce any
premium then due.
3. Addition.—We will use it at the net single premium
rate at the Insured's attained age to provide an addition,
which is paid-up endowment insurance on the Insured's
life to mature on the contract anniversary when his or her
attained age is 7 5 .
Example: Suppose we credit a dividend of $10 to the
contract on en anniversary Suppose it will provide en
addition in the emount of $ 1 7. The amount of this
addition will not change. Its net velue is thet which we
will pey if the addition is surrendered The net velue,
which starts at $10, will increese with time end grow to
$17 by the Insured's attained ege 75 when that amount
will be paid as an endowment
4 . Accumulation.—We will hold it at interest. The rate
will be at least 3 % a year. We may use a higher rate.

If you have not made another choice by 31 days after the
anniversary, we will use the dividend as we state in 3
above.
Dividend Credits Described.—The phrase dividend
credits means the total of (1) any dividends and interest
we hold under 4 above; (2) either the amount or value, as
we explain below, of any additions under 3 above; and
(3) any other dividends we have credited to the contract
but have not yet paid. It includes the amount of any of
those additions when we refer to the proceeds which arise
from the Insured's death. It includes the net value of any
of those additions when we use it under Surrender of
Dividends and Automatic Cash Payment. The surrender
value of those additions will never be less than the
dividends we used to provide them.
Surrender of Dividends.—You may surrender any
dividend credits for their net value. But we must heve
your request in writing at our Home Office and in a form
which meets our needs.
Automatic Cash Payment.—We will pey promptly in
cash any dividend credits which exist (1) at the end of the
last day of grace of a premium in default; or (2) on the
date this contract is exchanged for a new contract of life
insurance on the Insured's life; or (3) at the end of any
term period if the contract is not renewed for a further
term period; or (4) on the contract anniversary when the
Insured's attained age is 75.
Settlement.—If any dividend credits exist at the
Insured's death, we will include them in the proceeds
when we settle the contract.

ENDORSEMENTS
(Only we can endorse this contract.)
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CONVERSION TO ANOT
Right to Convert.—You may be able to exchange this
contract for a new contract of life insurance on the
Insured's life. You will not have to prove to us that the
Insured is insurable. When we use the phrase new
contract we mean the contract for which this contract may
be exchanged.
Conditions.—Your right to make this exchange is subject
to all these conditions: (1) You must ask for the exchange
in writing and in a form which meets our needs. (2) You
must surrender this contract to us. (3) We must have your
request and the contract at our Home Office while this
contract is in force and not later than its contract
anniversary when the Insured's attained age is 7 0 .
The new contract will not take effect unless the premium
for it or the charge we describe under Charge for
Exchange is paid while the Insured is living. This must be
done within 31 days after the first to occur of (1) the dste
of your request; and (2) the date to which premiums for
this contract are paid.
There will be no charge for the exchange if the contract
date of the new contract is the same as the date of your
request. We will return that part, if any, of the last
premium paid for this contract which is more than that
which was needed to pay premiums to the contract date
of the new contract.
Contract Data.—The date of the new contract will be
the date you ask for in your request. But it may not be
after the date of your request or after the date to which
premiums are paid for this contract. It may not be before
the date of this contract or after the contract anniverssry
when the Insured's attained age is 7 0 . And it may not be
before the date when we first offered the form of the new
contract.
Contract Specifications.—The new contract will be in
the same rating class as this contract. We will set the
issue sge end the premiums for the new contract in
accord with our regular rules in use on the contract date
of the new contract.
The new contract may call for annual premiums. If we
agree, you will be able to have premiums fall due more
often.
The new contract may be on any life or endowment plan
we would regularly issue on its contract date for the same
rating class, amount, issue age and sex. But it cannot be
any of these: (1) a single premium contract; or (2) one
which insures snyone other then the Insured; or (3) one
which includes or provides for term insurance other than
extended insurance; or (4) one with premiums which
increase after a stated time, if its first premium is less
than 8 0 % of any later premium; or (5) one which
(Continued

R PLAN OF INSURANCE
provides an income if the Insured becomes disabled; or
(6) one with Supplementary Benefits other than the
benefits to which we refer later in these paragraphs.
Its face amount will be the amount you ask for in your
request. But except as we state below, that amount must
be an amount we would regularly issue for the plan
chosen. And it cannot be less than 1 5 , 0 0 0 or more than
the face amount of this contract. If the face amount you
want is less than the smallest amount we would regularly
issue on the plan you wish, we will issue a new contract
for as low as $ 5 , 0 0 0 on the Life Paid Up at Age 85 plan
if you aak us to do so.
tf (1) the new contract is either on the Life Paid Up at
Age 8 5 plan or has a premium period at least as long as
for that plan; (2) this contract has a benefit for waiving
premiums in the event of disability; and (3) we would %
include that kind of benefit in other contracts like the new
contract, we will put that kind of benefit in the new
contract, as we state in General below.
We will not deny a benefit for waiving premiums which
we would have allowed under this contract, and which we
would otherwise allow under the new contract, just
because disability started before the contract date of the
new contract. But any premium to be waived for that
disability under the new contract must be at the
frequency which was in effect for this contract when the
disability started.
W e will not waive any premium which would have been
due for the new contract before the date of the exchange.
And we will not waive any premium under the new
contract unless it has s benefit for waiving premiums in
the event of disability. This will be so even if we have
waived premiums under this contract.
If this contract has an accidental death benefit and we
would regularly issue contracts like the new contract with
that benefit, we will put that kind of benefit in the new
contract, as we state in General below. But (1) you must
ask for it in your request for the exchange; (2) the face
amounts of this contract and the new contract must be
the same; and (3) the amount of accidental deeth benefit
in the new contract will be the smaller of the face amount
of the new contract and the amount of the accidental
death benefit in this contract.
General.—Any benefit for waiving premiums and any
accidental death benefit in the new contract will be the
same one, with the same provisions, that we put in other
contracts like it on its contract date. But if either benefit
was added to this contract by rider and the contract date
of the new contract is earlier than the date of that rider,
the benefit, if any, in the new contract will be the same as
that provided by the rider. In any of these paragraphs.
Next Page)
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C O N V E R S I O N T O ANOTHER PLAN OF I N S U R A N C E (Continued)
when we use the phrases other contracts like it and other
contracts like the new contract, we mean contracts which
we would regularly issue on the same plan and for the
tame rating class, amount, issue age and sex.
Charge for Exchange.—If the contract date for the new
contract is before the date of your request, there may be a
charge to make the exchange. We will compute the
amount of any charge in two ways as we show below.
When we use the word interest, we mean compound
interest at 6% a year from each premium due date to the
date to which premiums have been paid.
1. We will compute the sum of the premiums, with
interest, which would have been due for the new contract
from its contract date to the date to which premiums have
been paid on this contract. Then we will subtract the sum
of the premiums, with interest, which were due for this
contract from the contract date of the new contract to the
date to which premiums have been peid on this contract.
But we will not subtract (a) any premiums, with interest,
due on this contract for any portion of its face amount
which is more than the face amount of the new contract;

or (b) any premiums, with interest, for any extra benefits
not included in the new contract.
2. We will compute the cash value of the new contract as
of the date to which premiums have been paid on this
contract. We will increase this amount by not more than
14%. We will add to this the sum of the premiums, with
interest, which would have been due for any extra
benefits under the new contract from the date the benefit
took effect to the date to which premiums have been paid
on this contract. Then we will subtract the sum of the
premiums, with interest, which were due for the same
extra benefits under this contract for the same length of
time.
We will compare the amounts we compute in 1 and 2
above. The charge to be paid will never be more than the
larger of the two. It may be less.
Changes in Plan.—- You may be ebie to have this
contract changed to another plan of life insurance other
than in accord with the requirements for exchange which
we state above. But any change may be made only if we
consent, and will be subject to conditions and charges
which we then determine.

ENDORSEMENTS
(Only we can endorse this contract.)
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SETTLEMENT OPTIONS
Payee Defined.—In thase provisions and under tha Automatic Mods of Settlement, tha word Payaa means a
parson who has a right to receive a settlement under the
contract. Such a person may be the Insured, the owner, a
beneficiary or a contingent payee.
Choosing an Option.—While the Insured is living you
may choose, or change the choice of, an option for all or
part of the proceeds which may arise from the Insured's
death. The requirements are the same as those to
designate or change a beneficiary. We describe them
under Beneficiary.
A Payee may choose an option for all or part of any
proceeds or residue which becomes payable to him or her
in one sum. We explain residua under Residue Described.
In some cases, you or another Payee will need our
consent to choose an option. Wa describe these cases
under Conditions.
Options Described.—Here are the options we offer. We
may also consent to other arrangements. As we use it in
Options 2 and 5, tha phrase regularly issued does not
include contracts which are used to qualify for special
Federal income tax treatment as a retirement plan.
Option 1 (Instalments for a Fixed Period).—Wa will
make equal payments for up to 25 years based on the
Option 1 Table. The payments will include interest at an
affective rata of 316% a year. Wa may credit more
interest. If and while we do so, the payments will be larger.
Option 2 (Ufa Income).-—We will make equal monthly
payments for as long as the person on whose life the
settlement is based lives, with payments certain for the
period chosen. The choices are either ten years
(10-Year Certain) or until the sum of the payments equals
the amount put under this option (Instalment Refund).
The amount of each payment will be based on the Option
2 Table and the age and sax, on the due data of tha first
payment, of the person on whose life the settlement is
based. But if a choice is made more than two years after
the contract proceeds first become payable, we may use
the Option 2 rates in Ordinary policies we regularly issue,
based on United States currency, on the due date of the
first payment. On request, we will quote the payment
rates in policies we then issue. We must hava proof of the
data of birth of the person on whose life the settlement is
based. The settlement will share in our surplus to the
extent and in the way we decide.
Option 3 (Interest Payment).—We will hold an amount
at interest. We will pay interest at an affective rata of at
least 3% a year ($30.00 annually, 114.89 semi-annually,
$7.42 quarterly or $2.47 monthly per $1,000). We may
pay more interest.

Option 4 (Instalments of a Fixed Amount).—We will
make equal annual, semi-annual, quarterly or monthly
peyments if they total at least $90 a year for each
$1,000 put under this option. We will credit the unpaid
balance with interest at an effective rate of at least 3tt%
a year. We may credit more interest. If we do so, the
balance will be larger. The final payment will be any
balance equal to or less than one payment.
Option 5 (Non-Participating Life Income).—We will
make payments like those of any life annuity wa than
regularty issue which (1) is based on United States
currency; (2) is bought by a single sum; (3) is not eligible
for dividends; and (4) does not normally provide for
deferral of tha first payment. For the first $250,000 or
less placed under this option on any data, tha payment
will be 103% of what we would pay under that kind of
annuity with its first payment dua on its contract date. For
any excess placed under this option on that data, tha part
of tha payment provided by the excess will be 101.5% of
the part of the payment the excess would buy under that
kind of annuity. In any case, we will compute the present
value of any unpaid payments certain at the same interest
rata we would use for that kind of annuity with the same
provisions as to withdrawal. At least one of the persons
on whose life the Option 5 is based must be a Payee. We
must hava proof of the date of birth of any parson on
whose life the option is based. Option 5 cannot be chosen
more than 30 days before the due data of the first
payment. On request, we will quote the payment which
would apply for any amount placed under the option at
that time.
First Payment Due Date.—Unless a different data is
stated when the option is chosen: (1) the first payment for
Option 3 will be due at the end of the chosen payment
interval; and (2) the first payment for any of the other
options will be due on the data the option takes effect.
Residue Described.—For Options 1 and 2, residue on
any data means the then present value of any unpaid
payments certain. Wa will compute it at an effective
interest rata of 316% a year. But we will use the rate we
used to compute the actual Option 2 payments if they
were not based on the table in this contract.
For Options 3 and 4, residue on any date means any
unpaid balance with interest to that date. For Option 5, it
means the then present value of any unpaid payments
certain. We will compute it at the interest rata to which
we refer in Option 5.
For Options 2 and 5. residua does not include tha value
of any payments which may become due after the certain
period.

(Continued on Next Page)
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S E T T L E M E N T O P T I O N S (Continued)

OPTION 1 TABLE
\

I

OPTION 2 TABLE
|

MINIMUM AMOUNT OF
MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR
EACH $1,000. THE FIRST
PAYABLE IMMEDIATELY
Number
of Years

Monthly
Payment

1
2
3
4
5

$84.65
43.05
29.19
22.27
18.12

6
7
8
9
10

15.35
13.38
11.90
10.75
9.83

11
12
13
14
15

9.09
8.46
7.94
7.49
7.10

;

16
17
18
19
20

6.76
6.47
6.20
5.97
5.75

j

21
22
23
24

5.56
5.39
5.24
5.09
4.96

25

l
j
|

j
I
]

Multiply the monthly amount
by 2.989 for quarterly.
5.952 for semi-annual or
:
11.804 for annual.

MINIMUM AMOUNT OF MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR EACH $1,000, THE FIRST
PAYABLE IMMEDIATELY
KIND OF LIFE INCOME
KIND OF LIFE INCOME J
10-Year
I
10-Year
T Instalment
Instalment
AGE
AGE
Certain
Refund
Certain
Refund
|
LAST
I LAST
BIRTHDAY Male l Female Male Female BIRTHDAY Male Female Male l Female]
$3.23 $3.16 $3.22 $3.15
45
$4.33 $4.01 $4.21 $3.96
10
and under
46
4.39 4.06 4.27 4.00
3.24
3.17 3.23 3.16
47
4.46
4.12 4.32 4.05
11
12
3.26
3.18 3.25
3.17
48
4.53 4.17 4.38 4.10
13
3.27
3.19 3.26
49
4.60 4.23 4.44 4.15
3.18
14
3.29
3.20 3.28 3.19
4.67 4.30 4.51 4.21
50
15
3.30 3.21 3.29
3.20
4.75 4.36 4.58 4.26
51
16
3.32
3.23 3.31
3.22
52
4.83 4.43 4.65 4.33
3.34
3.24
3.33
3.23
53
4.92 4.50 4.72 4.39
17
18
3.36
3.26
3.34
54
5.00 4.58 4.79 4.46
3.25
3.37
3.27
19
3.36
3.26
5.10 4.66 4.87 4.53
55
20
3.39
3.29 3.38
3.28
56
5.19 4.74 4.96 4.60
21
3.41
3.30 3.40
57
3.29
5.29 4.83 5.05 4.68
22
3.44 3.32 3 42 3.31
58
5.40 4.92 5.14 4.76
23
3 46 3.34 3.44
5.02 5.24 4.85
3.33
59
5.51
24
3 34
3.48
3.36 3.46
5.34 4.94
5.12
60
5.62
25
3.51
3.37
3 49 3.36
61
5.74
5.23
5.45
5.04
26
3.53
3.39 3.51
3.38
62
5.87
5.34
5.56
5.14
27
3.56
3 42 3.54
3.40
63
6.00
5.46
5.68
5.25!
28
3.59
3.44
3.56
3.42
64
5.37
5.59 5.81
6.13
3.44
3.62
29
3.46 3.59
5.94
65
6.28
5.73
5.49 j
30
3.65
3.48 3.62
3.47
66
6.43
5.87 6.08
5.62 |
31
3 68 3.51
3 65 3.49
67
6.58
6.02 6.23
5.76
32
3.71
3.54 3.68
3.52
68
6.74
6.19 6.39
5.91
33
3.75
3.56 3.71
3.54
69
6.07 I
6.91
6.36 6.56
34
3.78
3.57
3.59 3.74
70
7.08 6.53 6.74
6.23!
35
3.82
362
3.78
3.60
71
7.26
6.41 |
6.72 6.93
36
3.86
3.65 3.81
3.63
72
7.43
6.92
6.61 j
7.13
37
3.91
369
3.85
3.66
7.12
7.34 6.81 !
73
7.61
38
3.95
3.72 3.89
3.69
74
7.80
7.32
7.57
7.03
39
4.00 3.76 3.93
3.72
7.98
75
7.53
7.81
7.26
40
4.05
3.79 3.97
3.76
76
8.16
7.74 8.06
7.51
41
4.10 3.83 4.02
3.79
77
7.77
8.33
7.95 8.34
42
4.15
3.87 4.06
3.83
78
8.52
8.06
8.15 8.63
43
4.21
3.92 4.11
3.87
79
8.35 8.95
8.68
8.36
44
4.27
3.96 4.16
3.91
8.85
80
8.54 9.29 8.68
and over
(Continued on Next Ptge)
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S E T T L E M E N T O P T I O N S (Continued)
Withdrawal of Residue.—Unless otherwise stated when
the option is chosen: (1) under Options 1, 2 and 5 the
residue may be withdrawn; and (2) under Options 3 and
4 all, or any part not lest than • 100, of the residue may
be withdrawn. If an Option 3 residue is reduced to less
than $ 1,000, we have the right to pay it in one sum.
Under Options 2 and 5. withdrawal of the residue will not
affect any payments that may become due after the
certain period; the value of those payments cannot be
withdrawn. Instead, the payments will start again if they
were based on the life of a person who lives past the
certain period.

Changing Options.—A Payee under Option 1, 3 or 4
may choose another option for any sum which the Payee
could withdraw on the date the chosen option is to start.
That date may be before the date the Payee makes the
choice only if we content. In some cases, the Payee will
need our content to choose or change an option. We
describe these cases next.

Designating Contingent Payees).—A Payee under an
option has the right unless otherwise stated, to name or
change a contingent payee to receive any residue at that
Payee's death. This may be done only if (1) the Payee has
the full right to withdraw the residue; or (2) the residue
would otherwise have been payable to that Payee's estate
at death.

2. The person will be paid as assignee.

A Payee who hat this right may choose, or change the
choice of, an option for all or part of the residue. In
tome cases, the Payee will need our content to choose
or Change an option. We describe these cases under
Conditions.
Any request to exercise any of these rights mutt be in
writing and in a form which meets our needs. It will take
effect only when we file it at our Home Office. Then the
interest of anyone who is being removed will end as of
the date of the request, even if the Payee who made the
request is not living when we file it.

Conditions.—Our content it needed for an option to* be
used for any person under any of these conditions:
1. The person is not a natural person who will be paid in
his or her own right.

3. The amount to be held for the person under Option 3
is lest than $ 1,000. But we will hold any amount for at
least one year under the Automatic Mode of Settlement.
4. Each payment to the person under the option would
be less than $20.
5. The option is for residue arising other than at (a) the
Insured's death, or (b) the death of the beneficiary who
was entitled to be paid as of the date of the Insured's
death.
6. The option is for proceeds which arise other than from
the Insured's death, and we are settling with an owner or
any other person who it not the Insured.
Death of Payee.—If a Payee under an option diet and if
no other distribution is shown, we will pay any residue
under that option in one sum to the Payee's estate.

ENDORSEMENTS
(Only we can endorse this contract.)
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AUTOMATIC MODE OF SETTLEMENT
Applicability.—Thasa provisions apply to proceeds
arising from the Insured's death and payable in one sum
to a Payee who is a beneficiary. They do not apply to any
periodic payment.

the Insured had not died until immediately after the Payee
died. Then we will pay the residue in one sum to such
other benefici8ry(ies), according to that designation. But
if, as stated in that designation, payment would be due
the estate of someone else, we will instead pay the estate
of the Payee.

Interest on Proceeds.—We will hold the proceeds at
interest under Option 3. The Payee may withdraw the
residue. We will pay it promptly on request. We will pay
interest annually unless we agree to pay it more often.
We have the right to pay the residue in one sum after one
year if (1) the Payee is not a natural person who will be
paid in his or her own right; (2) the Payee will be paid as
assignee; or (3) the original amount we hold under
Option 3 for the Payee is lass than $ 1,000.

Example: Suppose the class 1 beneficiary is Jane and the
dees 2 beneficiaries are Paul and John. Jane was living
when the Insured died. Jane later died without having
chosen an option or naming someone other than Paul and
John as a contingent payee. If Paul and John are living at
Janes death we owe them the residue. If only one of
them is living then, and if the contract called for payment
to the survivor of them, we owe him the residue. If
neither of them is living then, we owe Jane's estate.

Settlement at Payee's Death.—If the Payee dies and
leaves an Option 3 residue, we will honor any contingent
payee provision then in effect. If there is none, here is
what wa will do. We will look to the beneficiary designation of the contract; we will see what other beneficiary(ies}, if any, would have been entitled to the portion of
the proceeds which produced the Option 3 residue if

Spendthrift and Creditor.—A beneficiary or contingent
payee may not, at or aftar the Insured's death, assign,
transfer or encumber any benefit payable. To the extent
allowed by law, the benefits will not be subject to the
claims of any creditor of any beneficiary or contingent

ENDORSEMENTS
(Only we can endorse this contract.)

Voting Rights.—We are a mutual life insurance company. Our principal offica is in Newark, Naw Jersey, and we are
incorporated in that Stata. By law, we have 24 directors. This includes 16 elected by our policyholders (four each year for four
year terms), two of our officers, and six public directors named by New Jersey's Chief Justice.
The election is held on the first Tuesday in April from 1 0 : 0 0 A . M . to 2 : 0 0 P.M. in our office at the Secretary's address shown
here. After this contract has been in force for one year, you may vote either in person or by mail. We will send you a ballot if you
ask for one. Just write to our Secretary at Prudential Plaza, Newark, New Jersey 0 7 1 0 1 , at least 6 0 days before the election date.
By law, your request must show your name, address, policy number and date of birth. If you ara an individual, you must be at
least 18 years old to vote.
Home Office Locations.—When we use the phrase Home Office we mean any of these Prudential offices:
Corporate Office, Newark, N.J.
Central Atlantic Home Office, Fort Washington, Pa.
Eastern Home Office, South Pis infield, N.J.
Head Office, Canadian Operations. Toronto, Ont.
Mid-America Home Office, Chicago, III.
North Central Home Office, Minneapolis. Minn.

Northeastern Home Office, Boston, Mass.
South-Central Home Office, Jacksonville, Fla.
Southwestern Home Office, Houston, Tex.
Western Home Office, Los Angeles, Calif.

The Prudential Insurance Company of America,
y

COMB 3 4 6 9 3 — 7 9

*J(m+.A**A-JC PjZi*cJU*m*0
Secretary
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RIDER FOR
INSURED'S WAIVER OF PREMIUM BENEFIT
This Benefit is a part of this contract only if it is listed on the Contract Data page(s)

Total Disability Benefit.—We will waive contract
premiums which fall due while the Insured is totally
disabled. But this is subject to all the provisions of this
Benefit and of the rest of this contract.
Disability Defined.—When we use the words disability
and disabled in this Benefit we mean total disability and
totally disabled. Here is how we define them: (1) until the
Insured has stayed disabled for two years, we mean that
he or s!ie cannot, due to sickness or injury, do any of the
duties of his or her regular occupation; but (2) after the
Insured has stayed disabled for two years, we mean that
he or she cannot, due to sickness or injury, do any gainful
work for which he or she is reasonably fitted by education,
training, or experience.
Except for what we state in the next sentence, we will at
no time regard an Insured as disabled who is doing
gainful work for which he or she is reasonably fitted by
education, training, or experience. We will regard an
Insured as disabled, even if working or able to work, if he
or she incurs, during a period in which premiums are
eligible to be waived as we describe below, one of these
conditions: (1) permanent and complete blindness of both
eyes; or (2) severance of both hands at or above the
wrists or both feet at or above the ankles; or (3) severance
of one hand at or above the wrist and one foot at or
above the ankle.
Premiums Eligible To Be Waived.—If the Insured
becomes disabled before the first contract anniversary
after his or her 60th birthday and that disability begins
(1) on or after the first contract anniversary after his or
her 5th birthday, if the contract date was before that
birthday; or (2) on or after the contract date, if that date
was on or after his or her 5th birthday, we will waive all
premiums which fall due while he or she stays disabled.
If the Insured becomes disabled on or after the first
contract anniversary after his or her 60th birthday, we will
waive only those premiums which fall due before the first
contract anniversary after his or her 65th birthday and
while he or she stays disabled.
If the Insured becomes disabled on or after the first
anniversary after his or her 65th birthday, we will not
waive any premium which falls due in that period of
disability.

Conditions.—Both of these conditions must be met:
(1) The Insured must become disabled while this contract
is in force with no premium in default past its days of
grace. (2) The Insured must have stayed disabled for a
period of at least six months while living.
Exceptions.—We will not waive any premium if the
Insured becomes disabled from: (1) an injury he causes to
himself, or she causes to herself, on purpose; or (2)
sickness or injury due to service on or after the contract
date in the armed forces of any country(ies) at war. The
word war means declared or undeclared war and includes
resistance to armed aggression.
Successive Disabilities.-—Here is what happens if the
Insured has at least one premium waived while disabled,
then gets well so that premium payment resumes, and
then becomes disabled again. In this case, we will ignore
the six-month period which would otherwise be required
by Condition (2) and consider the second period of
disability to be part of the first period unless (1) the
Insured has done gainful work, for which he or she is
reasonably fitted, for at least six months between the
periods; or (2) the insured became disabled the second
time from an entirely different cause.
If we ignore the six-month period required by Condition
(2), we also will not count the days when there was no
disability as part of the two year period when disability
means the Insured cannot work at his or her regular
occupation.
Notice and Proof of Claim.—Notice and proof of any
claim must be given to us while the insured is living and
disabled, or as soon as reasonably possible. If notice or
proof is not given as soon as reasonably possible, we
will not weive any premium due more than one year
before the date that notice or proof is given to us. We
may require proof at reasonable times that the Insured is
still disabled. After he or she has been disabled for two
years, we will not ask for proof more than once a year. As
a part of any proof, we may require that the Insured be
examined at our expense by doctors of our choice.
Recovery from Disability.—We will stop waiving
premiums if (1) disability ends; or (2) we ask for proof
that the Insured is disabled and we do not receive it; or

(Continued on Next PBQ9)
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(Continued from Preceding Page)

(3) we require that the Insured be examined and he or
she fails to do so.

If we owe the Insured a refund of premium but have not
paid it before his or her death, we have the choice of
paying the beneficiary for insurance payable upon the
death of the Insured or the Insured's estate.

Miacellaneous.~-Any premiums which fall due are
payable until we approve a claim. We will refund any
premium paid which is later waived. There might be
unpaid premiums which fall due (1) after disability starts;
but (2) more than one year before we have notice of claim
at our Home Office. Or disability might start in the days of
grace of a premium which is unpaid. In either case, if we
are otherwise able to approve a claim, those unpaid
premiums which we do not waive will be due us with
compound interest at 6% a year. If we do not receive
them, we will deduct them with interest from any amount
which we pay under the contract.

Benefit Premiums.—The premiums for this Benefit are a
part of the contract premiums due before the first contract
anniversary after the Insured's 65th birthday.
Termination.—This Benefit will end on the earliest of:
1. the end of the last day of grace of a premium in
default; it will not continue if a benefit takes effect under
any contract value options provision which may be in the
contract;
2. the end of the day which is the last premium due date
in the premium period;
3. the date the contract is surrendered under its Cash
Value Option, if it has one;

Any premium we waive will be at the frequency in effect
when the Insured becomes disabled.

4. the end of the day before the first contract anniversary
after the Insured's 65th birthday, unless the Insured has
stayed disabled since before the first contract anniversary
after the 60th birthday; and

If we waive premiums, the effect on this contract will be
the same as if the premiums had been paid in cash. But
the Premium Adjustment provision in the contract will not
apply to any premium we waive under this Benefit.

5. the date the contract ends for any other reason.
This Supplementary Benefit rider
attached to this contract on the Contract Date
The Prudential Insurance Company of America,

By

>ff,..<«//< J* TfLicJL***,
Secretary
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RENEWAL
You may ranaw this contract at tha and of aithar its tarm
pariod or a ranawal tarm pariod. You will not hava to
prove to us that tha Inaurad is insurabla. All thasa
conditions must ba mat:
1. A ranawal tarm panod must start not latar than tha
contract anniversary on which tha Insured's attained age
is 70.
2. Tha contract must ba in force with no premium in
default past its days of grace.
3. We must be paid the first premium for a ranawal tarm
period as wa describe below.
In any of these paragraphs when we use the phrase
renewal term period we mean a tarm period for which the
contract may ba renewed. Except as we state in the next
sentence, a renewal tarm period will be the term period of
this contract, as wa show on page 3. But if a renewal
tarm period begins on the contract anniversary whan the

Insured's attained age is 66, 67, 68 or 69, that renewal
tarm pariod will be for the number of years between the
Insured's attained age on that anniversary and age 70.
Wa show the amount(s) of renewal premiums in the Tsble
of Renewal Premiums on page 4. We base them on the
Insured's attained age on the due date of the first
premium for the renewal tarm period. The first of the
premiums to be paid during a renewal term period will be
due on the anniversary at tha end of the most recent of
the term periods; the premium period for the renewal
term period will start on that date. The Premium Payment
and Reinstatement provisions of this contract will also
apply to all premiums which become due during that
pariod.
The anniversary at the end of the final renewal term
period is part of that tarm period. Unless we endorse it to
say otherwise, any renewal of the contract will continue
the interest of any beneficiary, owner or assignee.

BASIS OF COMPUTATION
Mortality Table and Interest Rata.—for dividend
additions, we base net premiums end net values on the
Insured's attained age and sax. We use the Commissioners 1958 Standard Ordinary Mortality Table. If the
Inaurad is female and at least age 15, we sat tha table

back 3 years. If she is younger, we use the female
extension of the table for eges less than 15. We use
continuous functions based on age last birthday. We uaa
an interest rate of 4% a year.

C O N T R A C T S U M M A R Y (Continued from Pege 2)
[

TABLE OP BASIC AMOUNTS

If tha contract is in force and tha proceeds arise from the Insured's daath within the term period:

Then The Basic Amount is:

And Wa Adjust The Basic Amount For:

tha face amount (in window on page 1), plus the
amount of any extra benefit arising from the
Insured's death

dividend credits (see pege 8), end premium in
default or paid (other than by a waiver benefit, if
any) past tha date of death (see page 7).
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Dan S. Bushnell #0522
Merrill F. Nelson #3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL HARDY,
Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF JAN HARDY

VS.

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE L.
RIGBY, Insurance Agent,

Civil No.

C83-7195

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
JAN HARDY, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
1.

She is a former daughter-in-law of LYNN and CHERYL

HARDY, and at the time of the events discussed here, she was
married to Lynn and Cheryl's son, David Hardy.
2.

She makes this affidavit on the basis of her personal,

first-hand knowledge.
3.

She was present in the home of Lynn Hardy when Agent

Wayne L. Rigby was there discussing the matter of life insurance
with Lynn Hardy.

on, McConkto
I Bushnell
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4.

She heard Lynn Hardy tell Agent Rigby that he had a

heart attack in 1974.
5.

*

She heard Agent Rigby respond that Lynn need not worry

about the heart attack because it occurred more than five years
before and would therefore not be relevant to the application,
6.

She was present in the Hardy Trucking Co. office

when Agent Rigby delivered the insurance policy to the Hardys.
7.

She heard Agent Rigby exclaim that there'was no prob-

lem with the policy, that it was issued without rating or waiver.
DATED this /3L

day of February, 1985.

^sy7 J A.TIH
N ninnv/i'
HARDYS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO

before me this /gA-day of

February, 1985.

•3&^£: ^ ^ ,
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My commission expires:

f//S-/t7

on, MeConfcte
I Busfmtll
Immonat Corporator*
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Dan S. Bushnell #0522
Merrill F. Nelson #3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL HARDY,
Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK ITH

vs.
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE L.
RIGBY, Insurance Agent,

Civil No.

C83-7195

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

MARK ITH, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
li

He is the step-son of LYNN HARDY and the son of CHERYL

2.

He makes this affidavit on the basis of his personal,

HARDY.

first-hand knowledge.
3.

He was present in the home of Lynn Hardy when Agent

Wayne Rigby was there going over the questions on a life insurance
application.
4.

He heard Lynn Hardy tell Agent Rigby that he had had

a heart attack seven years before.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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5.

He heard Agent Rigby respond that the heart attack did

not matter because the application was concerned with medical
history for only the past five years.
DATED this / 2.

day of February, 1985.

' M A R K
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

I

T

H

.

/£**~&ay of

February, 1985.

<%£w?^

7Z£^

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My commission expires:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thi
Jbrt contains information pertinent to Life Insurance
Underwriting and was prepared for that purpose only.

LIFE, REPOKT—ADVANCED

DfruAgcy. or Br. G S a l t Lake
Policy No. ns

17
Date
Name
Address
Occupation and
Employer on Inq.
Date of Birth
Amt. Appl.

By phone.
>ther sources
In person.
[Yrs. known to each) By phone.
>rev. Rpts.

7. Smoking
A. Smoke cigarettes?
If yes, how long?

Wife
~2j£....y.earjaf 4 years.

leside with someone other than an immediate family
nember?
[s beneficiary someone other than an immediate family
nember? (It yes, cover relationship & reason.)
Occupation
Occupation, job, or employer differ from that given
MI inquiry?
•art-time or off-season occupation? (Describe fully.)
Change jobs frequently?
Plan to work or travel in foreign countries?
&vtatk>n—Sports—Avocations
Flown as pilot or student pilot?
(If yes, cover Handy Guide.)
Hazardous sports or avocations (racing, skin or scuba
diving, sky diving, snowmobiling, hang gliding, etc)?
Driving Record
Driver's license number:
004653871
Utah
and state or province:
Moving traffic violations? (Cover at least past 3 yrs.)
Traffic accidents? (Cover at least past 3 yrs.)
Driver's license suspended or revoked?
Own or drive motorcycle, motorbike, dune buggy,
or high performance car?
Appearance—Impairments
Unusual build? (If yes, describe appearance.)

( X )(

Address.
City & State or Province

C.

SL^JLLtaix.

Why?
3. Results:

.Iffav € « » v f a > M It

A.

(X
(X

)(
)(

(

)(X

.

,

A.

)
) B.

C.

Fam.
or Indv

Indv.

.-

(No) (Yes)

)( X )
Jtei

pkgs. a day—]—sa. 2.

cigs

(X ) (

3. what?

Mixed

4. How many?
5. When?
6. Where?
7. Drive after drinking?

E.Y.en±ags..
Home.

)( x )

1—zz—2

2. What?
3. How many?
4. How long?
5. When stopped?
6. Why stopped?
7. Received counseling or treatment for alcohol use?
Drugs (Amplify as necessary on reverse.)
Use(d) or experiment(ed) with marijuana, LSD, or nonrescribed stimulants, depressants or narcotics?
Rher Source Information (Alcohol-Drugs)
(Amplify as necessary on reverse.)
1. Does applicant use alcohol? (If no, see "B.")
2. Any personal observation of noticeable effects
from drinking?
3. Drive after drinking?
4. Any known financial, job or personal problems
caused by drinking?
5. Received counseling or treatment for alcohol use?
Used alcohol in past?
Use(d) or experiment (ed) with marijuana, LSD, or nonprescribed stimulants, depressants or narcotics?

(X
(X

)(
)(

)
)

(X
(X
(X

)(
)(
)(

)
)
)

(X

)

(X

)

(X
(X
(X
(X
(X
(X
(X

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

10. Personal
(X )
A. Except for traffic violations, ever been arrested?
B. Any comments about reputation, life style, or
(X )
home environment?
11. Interview Information
(X )
A. Ever rated or declined for insurance?
(X )
B. Individual life insurance in force at this time?
(X )
C. Group life insurance in force at this time?
(If 11 B-C answered "Yes," give name of carrier and amount(s) in
Insurance History paragraph.)
12. Answer only if Family Polky:
)
Illness, injury or operation of other family .
. ,
v
K
members? (Past or present)
'K
'
)
) 13. If Family Life requested, complete & attach Family Life Supplement,
Form 18008.
___

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
?Digitized
00208
-To(OVER)OCR, may
Report
Transferred
Machine-generated
contain
errors. on..
(date)

)

:

S

)( x
( X )(
( X )(
(X )(
(

)(

-

10. Drinking pattern changed?
11. Received counseling or treatment for alcohol use?
1. Used alcohol in past?

(X )(
(X )(

<*

>

8. Any noticeable effects from alcohol use?
9. How long drinking?

)(
)(
)(
)(

JQ&

Ilmess, injury, operation, past or present, not
covered in 6A? (If yes, see reverse.)
Use medication regularly?
Family member (parents, brothers and sisters) had
diabetes, cardiovascular disorder, or cancer?

)

(X )(
(X )(

If interview, give:
ht—§JLA
:
wt.. 185...
Deformity, amputation, blindness, deafness or other
(X ) (
impairments?
Health (Amplify as necessary on reverse.)
Personal Physician:
Name J B H S _ E J B t e r S O n

»•

(Cover additional alcoholic beverages in narrative.)

-44-

(X
(X
(X
(X

50M

If yes, when?
Why?
Interview Information (Alcohol-Drugs)
Alcohol (Amplify as necessary on reverse.)
1. Use alcohol? (If no, see "B.")
(
2. How often?
Q.££.aSti.Qna 1 l y _

7 years

s date of birth on inquiry incorrect?
Marital status? (M S Sep. Wid. Div.)dumber of children in household:

Amt or
Type Coverage

B. Stopped smoking?

(no. reports—longest time known)
Jow many days since you or sources have seen or
-. < j a . .
liked to applicant? (If not within 2 weeks, explain.)
•*» q a X

ilfax Services Inc.

S a l t Lake C i t y

8/13/81-6-5
Acct. No.
Date'
Insurance History: 2 / 1 3 / 7 8
HARDY, LYNN.
12486
SLC, Utah, 1650 W. Southgate
Self-employed
c&a
re* .V 7
r*w*w
4/26/39
300M
(No) (Yes)

Date(s) Inspection Made
AIUJJJBOL.
Identity
interview (applicant, spouse, other adult family member):
In person.

Date last seen:

Office :

(branch office)

Worth

Finances*
Cash to banka
Real estate
Car(s)
Stocks/bonds
Business equity
Personal!

Income

2,000
70,000
10,000

Salary

125,000

Self-employed (Unincorporated)
Gross Income
$
Expenses

$

150,000
20,000

Net income
- ^ (adjusted gross)

S

Bonus

$

Commission

$

3f)?,Q0Q

Total
Accounts payable

30,000
50,000

Mortgages
Secured Loans

Total Earned $ £ g . Y . ( & Q Dividends
Interest
Net rentals

Personal notes

$
$
$
$
$

8(J,Q0Q

Total Liabilities

Net Worth

$
Total Unearned $

I JLZLU
Total Income (Earned and Unearned) $ 2 S y O 0 Q . . . —
Ac

low was worth acquired?
CUfflula t e d .
Vho gave worth/income figures?—# .1 f e
If 11 A-C answered "Yes," comment
Show type of source, e.g., banker, business associate, neighbor. If applicant not interviewed, state why.
business: Name of employer, line of business, approximate number of employees, how long employed. Describe business history for last 3 years. If fluctuations
a business/profession, what are reasons? Describe business record for last 3 years when applicable.
taties? Answer Handy Guide questions.
'Inancets Amplify as needed.
kViatfon—Sports—Avocations: Comment if question 3 A-B answered "Yes.** Cover Handy Guide questions.
drivings If 4 B-E answered "Yes," give details.
leaitfc: Give details of "Yes" answers to questions 6 B-D.
Jcobol—Drugs: Give details of: noticeable effects of alcohol; any known related financial, job or personal problems; changes in usage; treatment Cover
se of other alcoholic beverages. Describe in detail present or past usage of marijuana, narcotics, sedatives, depressants, stimulants or hallucinogens.
'ersonal: Describe associates, home life, living conditions and neighborhood. Comment on social/club life if developed.

SOURCES: Applicants wife, neighbor known for 272 years, neighboiS known for 4
years, previous report for 7 years.
BUSINESS:
H P K £X

e«» <iK n A ^% 4>

The applicant, Lynn Hardy, is present!^ self-employed as a trucker.
,-...-» «

C

*. _ . . .« 1 .

.J

. .• n i

i •

'

™—^

years and is stable. He will w^rk in the local area and will work bn"a
contract basis with various companies. He will generally not do long-haul
driving, however, will occasionally if necessary. The subject currently has
a contract with the Clark Tank Lines to haul asphalt products..
DUTIES: The applicant's duties are* those of a truck driver. He will work
primarily in the local area and will maintain his own trucks and will haul
asphalt and lumber products.
Digitized
by
the
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
•
* '
••-."
x
Machine-generated
OCR,remarks.
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"** fctBvttdtatfvfr—UM ContmuatloB of Re % p Form
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P 00209

fage

2

nnation
Cport

-

*"^ Account Na

1/

> m

*
.HARDY.

Lficitkm L i f e

LYNN

:

Report-Advanced

:

•

#

DRIVING: • The applicant has received one speeding violation in
the past 10 years.
HEALTH: The applicant is in good health and is 6*1 and weighs
185 pounds. We learned that his brother has some heart problems,
however, is still living.
PERSONAL: The subject is married and resides with his wife and
three children in a middle-class surroundings. He is well regarded.
042:cp

V 00210

(UiTtMi In*.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MEDIC/

DEPARTMENT—X-ray and Electrocardi'09

• • *

.'Section

• REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION

PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA, W.H.O. LOS ANGELES, CAL.'

Lynn mra^f

NAME
SIGNATURE

__

X RAY NO.

DR

—Date.
Weight_

Height.^

Age

Pol. No.

f

()

X - R A Y OF „

?)
()

ECGNn
METABOLISM

I)

Insurance

( ) Field

()

Disability
CI. No

( ) Other

CASE HISTORY (Give briefly significant records):
() H.O. Case
() Borrowed
(± Credit
(T Photo-Copy

$13.00
*l*'w

M.D.

Hi Amount
x RAY

REPORT OF EXAMINATION
DATE

Date

8-17-ftl

FROM

Exam. Mgmt. Services
Salt Lake City, UT

Code
34 Q
{) X-ray returned
( ) Film filed
(il ECG to Underwriting
( ) ECG copied and returned
by X--ray

I 7 T . Wilson, CPT

m
AUG 1 8 7981

\ cc: 11

ITW/vcm
Comb 16600-A ED 5/81 (W)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CAT.#4005W5G

Wtm^"''\

EMERGENCY ROOM RECORD

5 § " 5 o# TN( c*«u«cfl^usCHM.JT or k A T T f * o * v t « t * ^ H k

l l ^ | r Soc.
No—
C O T T C m o O D HOSPITALW
soc Sec.
sec. NO..

6:24 m

s of P a t i e n t .
ft.ti.nt

isible P a r t y

M c K i n l e y

SLC
City

34

—

PARENTS [NOTIFIED OR.

YES

^ ^ 1 J Y E S

-m

State

—

_Q HJO»I \ 3{ * N
- . O

PT.

CHECKED
Witness:

Zip
Occupation

Retatlonship_HifS

Employer of R.P .
( N a m e o f business

ice: I n d u s t r i a l : Y e s

No—Medicare: Yes

No

Other.

V . Sundwa 11

REFERRED

Firm

—

Address)

.Charge N . T C * .

gating O f f i c e r : .

—

Group No.)

Taylor/Burton

_E.R. Doctor on Call:

wife

it in B y :

—

Travelers
( N a m e of Insurance Carrier

an:

Signed f o r

_BirthOate 4-26-39 g™» 5 4 4 4 8 2
ph^> 2 9 8 - 2 6 9 3
^ M <: ft .Q w S e P .

84119

T r u c k i n g

Wanda

_&2SL
-Age.

First

Street
rer o f

Q

.Patient Log N u m b e r .

HARDY,
LYNN F .
Last'
3717 S. 3200 W.

•f Patient .

U

m* 68 7934 fwlf e ^ QD WNO
ITH

Drivers L i e . N o . .
.Time,

^^m

C L O T H I N G & VALLWVLFTS

,.<• 5 7 7 0 ' S o u t h 300 East. Murray. Utah 84107

1-5-74

I NOTIFIED

^Ra.

S .

R a g e r

. M a n n e r Received:

W a l k i n g

.Dept:
M u r r a y , Highway Patrol, S.L. C o u n t y , Midvale

>f

.Time.

nt
. or C o m p l a
Orders

.Location

po6S corpnary

Date.

.X-Ray No..

7Gtn?

rs ( F i n a l ) Diagnosis

i "M *T,V& CJttsJ/%£««zf: &•{<. Jp*,.
'
e**es

_S7J^< y(Q4>

< ^ <-' ' ^ 7^
&

- •

_~

^^

EMR

DISPOSITION
(CIRCLE ONE)

'ZV^.-U
f

/

.*=»,

^£

"=T<+

7

E2S
#f-

R E C Q

Out

"

^

Report:

Rm.

^~rr?

•&,,

A U T H O R I Z A T I O N A N D G U A R A N T E E O F P A Y M E N T : I h e r e s y c^ffsent t o a n y medical,
surgical a n d anesthetic procedure w h i c h t h e p h y s i c i a n m a y consider or advise in t h e treatm e n t of m y case a n d guarantee p a y m e n t of t h e charges i n c u r r e d . In case this account is
placed in t h e hands of an a t t o r n e y for c o l l e c t i o n , t h e undersigned agrees t o pay a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s fee w i t h all costs a n d expenses i n c u r r e d . I U N D E R S T A N D T H A T P A Y M E N T
IS D U E A T T H E T I M E S E R V I C E IS R E N D E R E D . T h i s o f f i c e w i l l not accept t h e responsib i l i t y f o r f i l i n g or collecting y o u r insurance c l a i m or f o r negotiating a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h your
insurance c o m p a n y . S h o u l d y o u have insurance benefits due y o u for this hospital service,
w e w i l l provide y o u w i t h a c o p y of y o u r bill w h i c h y o u m a y f o r w a r d t o y o u r insurance
c o m p a n y f o r r e - i m b u r s e m e n t . Y o u are responsible for p a y m e n t of y o u r account w i t h i n the
limits of t h e above p o l i c y . I hereby agree t o p a y a service charge at t h e rate of V/z% per
m o n t h ( 1 8 % per year) o n t h e u n p a i d balance.
,.

c's Orders

:ian's R e p o r t : .
Signed

\)0fo<vj>i*y

UMSLJL^>

Witness

P]

• - • i.

*

3*

/3*4U^O
Z&C^/t.f
'TZZ^t^crjf-r.
e&<*
<x

BP

Jd
?U4?iyA

^7 .<i&i&:ff< / ^ TTi/r^J-^SyLQ'fJts)*x^ r JASS

^it^o^^Ty
<ZLJHi*rJ'„,*,s'Yjr

4=-:—v—>t^—-y^V < j>rr f-f

VITALSIGNS

Time

NURSE'S NOTES

5&fr^

ftf

A^A/l

dl<2St<7.<!.
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<p-7?>/r^l

<$h<UsT~

CW ft <Q
OAJ>^

^
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HARDY L Y
APPLICANT

JRJL'

, 7sl ?gt?bt,k3lzli inbal

IT.-SLC *

W R I T I N G REPRESENJA

R1GBY. W L
HARPY CHERYL
THIS APPLICATION HAS BEEN APPROVED* STANOARD.
POLICY SHOULD BE DELIVEREO BY 11 05 A l
POLICY DATE 0 1 17 B l ISSUE DATE 10 OS A l
REMIUH
Itl.tS
MODE H
PRODUCTION CR
CONTRACT # TQ1113 COMH
71,13 (12)
MHO
lAOV PAY
111.US
lib SO M SOUTHCATE
SALT LAKE CTY UT BM111

r

AGE 1 OF 1

COMB 8 1 0 6 8 A

ED 1-79 PART II • R E P R E S E N T A T I V E ' S COPY

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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COMB 9280

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA

RECEIVED

LIFE & HEALTH CLAIM DIVISION, W.H.O.

DIVISION

POLICY NOS.

DATE OP APP8.

JIU0.H.
SETTLEMENT OP CASE

TYPE OF INV.

Broth
Contest>

(Underwriting!

Am mint

| R.P.
Comp.

CHIP/EBP
CLAIM

L&fttuscJ

K3SP Claim

Funds From*.
Advance
Draft
Dist. Off.

1 District Office Notmed?

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT TO FOLLOW?

Date of Death
This Report Requested By.

& < U CONTROL DESK
January 10, " 8 3

TO 766 463
LfcH CUid

JA/Vl4l9ftQ

INSPECTION REPORT
Richard S. Stelzner
RSS/jg

INSURED: Lynn Hardy

EO 6-81 (VV)

Vicki Lavetts

, Division

Yes Q
L&H Clm.

January 6, 1983
Visited the Exam Center, 1735 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City. The
Medical Secretary informed me that there were no copies of our Insured*s
Medical Records kept by them.
Visited our Beneficiary at her place of employment, Lynn Hardy Trucking
Company, 2717 South Redwood Road. Our Beneficiary told me that our Insured
became ill at about 3:00 a.m. with chest pains and pain in one of his arms.
She drove him to St. Marks Hospital. His condition worsened and he died at
approximately 5:00 a.m. that same morning, December 4, 1982.
Our Beneficiary said that our Insured has never had any heart problems in the
past. He and our Beneficiary had been married for 5 years and she is unaware
of any medical history prior to their marriage. She said she could not
recall any specific medical history, however, she said that he had seen Dr.
Sundwall.
I asked about our Insured's prior physical examinations for his driver's
license. Our Beneficiary went to the file cabinet in her office and removed
copies of a January 7, 1977 examination and an August 7, 1981 examination.
She gave me copies of these reports. All of the categories were within
normal limits. A signed Medical Authorization was obtained from our
Beneficiary.
Visited the office of Dr. Val Sundwall, 4815 Center Street, Murray. The only
items in our Insured's medical folder was a visit on September 30, 1980 for
ocass Nocheria. I asked the Medical Receptionist if there was other medical
history perhaps in another folder. She stated that 4 or 5 years ago, all of
the records for patients who had not been seen within 5 years were destroyed.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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.

Lynn Hardy
70 766 463

The
had
who
now

-2-

January 10, 1983

only records that they have for our Insured is the 1980 visit, which I
obtained from them. I learned that there is also a Dr. David Sundwall,
at one time, practiced at the Utah Medical Center. I was told that he is
in Washington, D.C., working with Senator Hatch.

Visited the Utah Medical Center. Initially, I was not allowed to inspect nor
obtain copies of our Insured's Medical Records, by the Medical Secretary. I
asked to speak to the Director of Medical Records, Mr. Tohenaka. Vith much
persistence, I was able to obtain copies of our Insured's only admission,
which was on March 9, 1974. The final clinical impression for that visit
was, organic heart disease. Etology, ASHD, secondary to hyerlipidemia.
Anatomy high grade obstruction of the midcircumflex and right coronary
arteries, inferior wall, myocardial infarction.
Our Insured was referred to Dr. T h o m e , in the Cardiac Clinic. Our Insured
had also been seen by Dr. Huckleberry, a Urologist, for prostatitis.
Mr. Tohenaka would not allow me to inspect our Insured's Medical Records.
Vith reluctance, he personally obtained copies of the records for me. He
said the Records Department was undergoing an audit and they were being
extremely cautious in releasing records. I asked about our Insured's Clinic
Records. I learned that Dr. T h o m e had moved his practice to another
location. After searching the files, Mr. Tohenaka informed me that there had
been no Clinic Records in the files. He said that had there been Clinic
Records, they would have been in the file.
Visited the Cottonwood Hospital, Salt Lake City. Obtained copies of our
Insured's Medical Records. Our Insured was seen on December 6, 1965 with
left hip pain, Etology, unknown. On March 28, 1967 he was treated for
recurrent genito urinary tract infection, probably recurrent prostatitis. On
January 4, 1974, our Insured was admitted for pain in his chest and down both
arms. A discharge diagnosis was (1) Arteriosclerotic heart disease with an
apparent acute myocardial infarction. (2) Mild hypercholesteresolemia. (3)
Strong family history for early coronary death. I obtained medical leads to
Dr. Val and David Sundwall, Dr. C. A. Natoli and Dr. W. T. Black.
A call is made to the office of Dr. V. T. Black, 870 East 94th South, Sandy.
The Medical Secretary was unable to locate any Medical Records for our
Insured.
An attempt was made to locate Dr. C. A. Natoli, however I was unable to
locate any evidence of this physician.
Visited St. Marks Hospital, Salt Lake City. Obtained copies of our Insured's
Autopsy and Medical Records. Our Insured was seen in the Emergency Room on
December 4, 1982, complaining of chest pains. He expired that same day.

COMB 9280 A ED 3-81 (W)
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Lynn Hardy
70 766 463
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January 10, 1983

The Autopsy Report states both severe arteriolsclerosis causing 70% to 80%
luminal narrowing. I obtained leads to Dr. Adamson and Thorn*.
I learned that Dr. Adamson is a staff physician at St. Marks Hospital and he
does not have a private practice.
-Visited the office of Dr. J. L. Thome, 1200 East 3900 South, Suite 3 F,
Cardiovascular Disease. The Medical Receptionist would not permit me to
review our Insuredfs medical records. She did however, make copies of the
records for me. The records include a January 2, 1980 visit in the records
of our Insured's March 9, 1974 visit at the University of Utah Medical Center
for organic heart disease. I was told that there were no other visits to the
doctor's office. There were no referring physicians.
Visited the County Courthouse in Salt Lake City. Criminal and Civil Records
were checked. There was no criminal record for our Insured. Civil Records
revealed a law suit case #80-CV4934, A. J. Dean & Sons Ready Mix & Concrete
versus Lynn & Cheryl Hardy, for the amount of $946.26. This case involved
non-payment for services rendered. There were no medical leads.
A call was made to Dr. Neel Huckleberry, M.D., a Urologist, at 1002 East
South Temple Street. I learned that our Insured had been seen for urinary
tract infections on June 6, 1967, July 1, 1967, July 8, 1967, September 27,
1967, December, 1969 and May, 1972. There were no medical leads obtained.
No Medical Reports obtained.
A call was made to the SLCX Agency. I spoke with Wayne Rigby, the Writing
Representative. Mr. Rigby first met our Insured approximately one month
prior to the date of application. Rigby had been at a booth which had been
set up at a local fair. He met our Insured's son and wife and they had a
conversation about insurance. Our Insured's name and business had been
obtained from the son as a possible lead. Mr. Rigby went to our Insured's
place of business and attempted to interest our Insured in a Group Policy.
Instead, our Insured applied for Life Insurance for himself. He requested
$300,000 coverage for himself, because he had 3 or 4 semi-truck and trailers
which he still owed money for.
Mr. Rigby is unaware of any medical history pertaining to our Insured which
is not on the application form.

#»n*4o ooon A e n *JM fwt
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.January 10, 1983

CONCLUSIONS:
All medical leads were followed. Medical evidence was obtained which shows
that our Insured had a prior history of heart-related problems, which was not
admitted to on the application.
Please find all of the Medical Reports obtained, inside the jacket of this
file.
This concludes the handling of this file.
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9 hospitalization to the application date? Who initiated the
negotiations for insurance? What other insurance did our insured
have? (These factors are not conclusive, but may help to
evaluate good faith)

4

•What factual information can ve prove?
•What is the probable underwriting significance?
Given information that an insured had incorrectly answered question 7 a. on
the application because he had a physical two years ago at which time his
blood pressure was found to be a "little high", we would have insufficient
information to determine whether the insured had given us a "no" answer in
good faith. Did he give us the date and name of the doctor in questions U,
9> or 11? What were the actual Blood Pressure Readings? What was he told?
Was medication prescribed? Were there sub sequent visits or treatment? The
answers to these and other questions would have to be obtained before good
faith could be evaluated and probable .underwriting significance Judged.^ " "

4

<

Even though an insured omitted information from the application, common
knowledce or a review of the Underwriting Manual may disclose that the
information would not have had underwriting significance. The file should
be noted to reflect this unless the information relates to treatment so old
or a condition so minor that it would obviously be of no significance.
Question 9 on our application - the "Other than as disclosed in the answers
to the preceding questions have you..." is limited to treatment, tests, etc.
within five years of the application date. Although the other questions on
the application do not have any time limitation} it has been our practice to
-disregard treatment more than five years old,-

4

0.

Occasionally the rnvnrit
of the Part 2 Medical Application or our investigation
will disclose that our Examining Physician was also the insured1 s attending
physician. In such cases the law will generally imply that any knowledge the
physician has about his patient will be imputed to us under general rules of
Agency. Therefore! given a misrepresentation which results from our own
examiner's failure to record treatment he rendered to our insured there is
generally little we can do other than pay the claim and refer the file to
our Medical Department for appropriate action such as removing the examiner
from our list.
Partial admissions present particular difficulties for Claim because the
question then becomes whether the insured in good faith told us what he
believed to be true, or vhether deliberately tried to mislead us. For example,
if the insured admits hospitalisation for 10 days for "pneumonia" when in fact
he was hospitalised three weeks for surgery to remove a tumor from his lung,
this would have to be viewed as an admission deliberately designed to mislead
us in the absence of conclusive proof that he was never told anything other
than that he had pneumonia.
The majority of questions on Part 2 of our application are objective ('Vhen
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MEMORANDUM FOR: MARY BURKE
ASST. CLAIM CONSULTANT
LIFE AND HEALTH CLAIM
WHWH

February 4, 1983

You've referred this large amount contestable claim for review.
files, these are the details.

For our

On 8-4-81, Lynn Hardy, age 42, applied for a 5 yr. term policy for $300,000,
naming his wife, Cheryl, as beneficiary.
Based upon his age and the amount applied for, the insured was required to
take an exam and an EKG. Upon questionning on 8-17-81 by the paramedic,
Mr. Hardy indicated that his father had died of a heart attack, his mother
of a stroke and two brothers of a heart attack. The only other medical
history furnished by the insured was an examination in 9-79 for his truck
drivers license. The ECG was reported as normal "showinq a first dearee
AV heart block".
Because cardiovascular disease is heredity and because the insured's family
demonstrated a high incidence of young age coronary deaths, the underwriters
were concerned about Mr. Hardy's cardiovascular status. They requested an
attending physician's statement from the only doctor the insured had admitted
to seeing (the doctor who did his truck driver's physical) and ordered
another examination - by a physician - and a chest x-ray.
This time, Mr. Hardy indicated "unknown" to all questions regarding his
family history. Additional medical history was furnished which included another
truck drivers exam, a history of prostatitis ten years ago and rheumatic fever
as a child. Questions 7a (Have you ever been in a hospital . . . for
observation, rest diagnosis or treatment?), 8b (Have you ever been treated
by a doctor for or had any known sign of chest pain, pressure or discomfort?)
and 9b (. . .had any known sign of a disease or disorder of the heart,
arteries or veins?) were all answered "No". The APS which was pursued verified
the department of transportation exam.
The file was submitted to the medical department because of the family history
and the AV block in the current ECG. The doctor decided that the case could
be issued standard "absent other ratable impairment".
Mr. Hardy died on 12-4-82 of a myocardial infarction. A contestable investigation
was conducted. The investigation revealed that the insured was hospitalized
at Cottonwood Hospital on 1-5-74,*at the age of 34, with chest pain. He
remained in the coronary care unit for ten days with a diagnosis of acute
myocardial infarction, ASHD, and multiple episodes of ventricular tachycardia and
/venticular extrasystoles. On 3-9-74; he was admitted to Utah Medical Center
for cardiac catherization. The results showed the insured had a 92% occlusion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

P

00117

- 2 -

of the right coronary artery and moderate occlusion of the circumflex
coronary artery. He was discharged on digoxinfquinidine sufate and
atromed arid was followed in a Dr. Thome's cardiac clinic.
Unfortuantely Dr. Thome's clinic records have been either lost or destroyed.
The only subsequent medical record we have obtained is a 1-2-80 visit
to Dr. Thome which Dr. Thorne had in his possession as the visit was
after Dr. Thome left the cardiac clinic 3 years ago. The clinic would
not allow him to take his records on patients he saw there.
On. 1-2-80 the insured was not suffering from any cardiac symptoms and was
doing yery well. This v i s i t , however, establishes that the insured was
s t i l l being seen periodically by this cardiologist.
Generally medical history over five years old can be disregarded in a claim
investigation because medically i t would have been of no significance at
underwriting time. This is not always true,particularly in a case of
myocardial infarctions and severe arteriosclerosis at a very young age.
You referred the case to the underwriters who advised that had they had
the 1974 information the case would have been a minimum Special Class 4 with
a sizeable temporary extra. This information therefore clearly meets Utah's
requirement that any misrepresented information be material to the hazard
assumed by the insurer.
I t also appears that there was a deliberate concealment of the facts by the
Insyred. He furnished medical history of a genitourinary infection three years
prior to his coronary as well as the childhood episode of rheumatic fever.
I doubt he could have forgotten his myocaridal infarction and subsequent
catherization. Each of the questions answered incorrectly was asked twice
since the applicant had two exams.
In addition Utah law stipulates that an insurer cannot void the policy on
the grounds that i t relied on the misrepresentation of a material fact by
applicant i f the insurer had "sufficient indications that would put a prudent
man on notice and would have caused him to start an inquiry which i f carried
out with reasonable thoroughness, "would reveal the truth . . . "
In this instance the family history provided such indications. Uiderwriting
thoroughly investigated all given possible leads to information but was prevented
from discovering the history because the insured did not furnish * the names
of any physicians who had knowledge of his history (namely, Dr. Thorne) or
mention being confined to Utah Medical Center.
I t is therefore my recommendation that l i a b i l i t y be denied on the grounds of
material misrepresentation.
^ — )
Jan Drosendahl
Senior Claim Consultant
General Actuarial and Claim Division
9 Gib - CORP
JD/qh
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STATE OF UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
826 South 600 East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

( INSURANCE REPORT FORM")
This Insurance Report Form is sent in response to your recent request for assistance.
Upon completion return both copies to the above address.
t
Approximately 30 days is required to review and take appropriate action.
$ZJU*//fo

t^&AS
/Df"**

PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT FIRMLY TO MAKE A CLEAR COPY
urName.

fUlmjl
H*trllj
*etl&£& it), S^f-ka^te.
tfi/e^

Insurance Company
'Prude.nTial
(Against which complaint is directed)

y. State.

Agent's Name L)<!Lt{ ttfi.
(&$hu
Adjuster's Name.
Insured's Name 6 Addremt A-Un/f
Md/-c/<f
fff
nam)
'
7
(If n<*
not vnnr
your own)

iAWr i/awy 0*7)/ 7.,-p w t n
ur Telephone - Home
97^ &Z&QWork
SAM?
iployer's Name
;
I group policy)
APPROXIMATE AMOUNT OF MONEY INVOLVED
%9£>C.60O
ase indicate which of the following is applicable:
My complaint is against:

fif

Company

Type of Insurance

LSTE'

Policy* *7A~?CCVG 3
Company Claim #
D Agent

. Policy D a t e _ 2 i Z £ ^ 7
Dtte of LossJ^/^/p-c

D Adjuster

Briefly and in your own words, describe your problem. If more space is needed, please add additional sheets in
duplicate. Enclose copies of papers and other correspondence relative to this problem. (Do not send policy.) A copy of
this form may be forwarded to the insurance company involved.
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STATE OF UTAH
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT

C 0 T T M. MATHESON
Governor

160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 5803
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5803
Phone:(801)530-6400

July 5, 1983

ROGER C. OAV
Commi&tion«r of Insurance

^RECEiVED^
' UUU121983

Mr. Ernest A. Long
Vice President and Counsel
Prudential Insurance Company of America
P. 0. Box 9247
Van Nuys, CA 91409

J.D°
CONSUMER AFFAIRS

RE:

Policy No. 70766463
Insd: (Deceased) Lynn F. Hardy
Beneficiary: Cheryl Hardy
Our File 13906

Dear Mr. Long:
Enclosed is a complaint concerning your company. We request that the
problem described in this report form be subject to an independent review in
your office to ascertain the validity of this complaint.
We also request that you reconsider or review your decision to rescind
the policy, paying particular attention to the evidence of insurability. It
appears an error may have occurred in the underwriting department regarding
questions 5, 8c f 10a and 10b of the application. If any of these questions
had been reviewed more thorougnly the policy may not have been issued; but the
policy was issued and the insured and beneficiary believed they would be
protected if^a loss did occur. .
appreciate receiving at your earliest convenience a report^jj
Please attach to the report copies of any material that supports
on.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
ROGER C. DAY
Commissioner of Insurance

//fe>^U^ )l "£^<*o
MarjorTe J. Pierce
Consumer Service Division
MJP:lm
cc:
3407u

Ms. Cheryl Hardy
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Dan S. Bushnell - # 0522
Merrill F. Nelson - # 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE S> BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL HARDY,

]
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DR. JOSEPH L. THORNE

1

vs.
• ./

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE L.
RIGBY, Insurance Agent,

)

:•'•"•

•

.

'

"

•

"

:..•-•

.:•;.;,,;.•

•'

;•'"

..-.

..

.

,i,~.

,

.

-i

••*.--

Civil No. C83-7195

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Dr. JOSEPH L. THORNE deposes and states that:
1.

He is a physician engaged in the exclusive practice of

cardiology since 1965.
2.

He was an Associate Professor of Cardiology at the

University of Utah College of Medicine from 1965 until 1980.
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3.

He is currently a member of the cardiology staff at St.

Marks Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.
4.

He followed and monitored Lynn Hardy in his Cardiac

Clinic through annual check-ups from 1974 until 1980.

During

that time, Lynn Hardy's physical condition steadily improved, his
heart condition was totally asymptomatic, and he carried on a
totally active and normal life.

Between 1976 and 1980, Lynn

Hardy received no special therapy for heart disease.
5.

Between 1974 and 1980, Dr. T h o m e prescribed no •

medication for Lynn Hardy.

The only medication that Lynn Hardy

may have been taking at that time is atromid-S.

Atromid-S is not*

a medication for heart disease, but is prescribed only to
regulate the cholesterol and triglyceride level.

Atromid-S has*

no direct physiological function or effect on the heart.
6.

Dr. Thorne referred Lynn Hardy to the Multidisciplinary

High Risk Corornary Consultation Clinic at the University of
Utah, not to receive special treatment for heart disease, but to
participate in a study of the effect familial relationships have
on cardiac disorders.
7.

The Electrocardiography Request Form, completed at Lynn

Hardy's August 1, 1979, check-up, shows "angina with exertion.1"
This notation is a reference to Lynn Hardy's medical history, and
does not represent a current angina problem;
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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8.

The facts that Lynn Hardy's father and two brothers had

died prematurely of heart disease, that another living brother
also had heart disease, that Lynn had smoked at least one package
of cigarettes per day for over twenty years, and that a recent
EKG exam revealed a first degree AV heart block, taken together*
constitute significant external indications of potential cardiac
abnormalities,
Dated t h i s • c C

^
day of February,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o bifore/ae

1985,

thisjfrfAiay

1985.

My Commission Expires:

.

Notary Public
Residing: ^zJf/' Lake, £*s4*&v

?A/r7
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Individual ID Number
_

ce-

f)20

/(UAMA

Subjects Name

, n/~S.
^"Tf^i.
First •

Last

V

Visit:

Vfe"-

2iL

Kindred Number

Initial

BLOOD PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS

i-_-i f

,'sH

Cufl&xt:
/ ^ p f e g t H a r AduR
^ - t r t a r g a Arm

Year
Time:

3) Thigh
4) Packatric

5) Want

SKINFOLD MEASUREMENTS

Pub*

Triceps skinfold fS. CL cm.
/(].

&

fWouiaTt^Yev)
<J No"""

'2/

cm.

/5" /

. em* m x s«c_sL_I_

cm.

Average

.J-IPMH] e..,,/***,,.

cm.

Subscapular skinfold /_5 • ~ZL cm.

Put*a.Ob*tarat»on Presawre

1/ JAM

/C/. £. cm.

ic^L
Average^

•so

cm*
cm*

Ulnar skinfold _£. ^

cm.

*>. 3-

cm.

SL4.

cm*

Paa* Inflation (aid)

Peak Infttaon (R-Z)

uj y

y

q
2J

Diastole

cm*
Systole

//S.V cm*
-ZLi2 a*Average

1(1) Sttt
R-ZUncon.
Zero

cm.

£}/£>

(2)

cm*

p)

Percent body fat

R-ZBP

R-Zuncorr.

(cm to nearest .1 inch)

Height
(round kg to nearest *1 kg)

/' V 5.0/ b S
Is there a diagonal ear lobe crease?
1) Yes. right ear only
2) Yes, left ear only
Yes. both ears
4$o
5) Can't tell
Which of the following is the ear lobe?
^Connected
bulated

oFTfclFPy
\f / s] El
bk*i o»U £
|g'7iy| M2i-

dM
QI

Disappear

<x

(7FT7i f7T7i6ir^7ra
fq2,V ol
1/ Q1 ~T]
<^'
cA

Zero
\A)

Muflte

Automated (tf sk anacnad)
BP

2JZS5L

o>

UL

Mai Ztro (R-Z)

Suprailiac skinfold / 7, t-( cm*

Weight

-Si

STTTINO BLOOO PRESSURE

Average^

Abdominal g i r t h

1/

R-ZBP

\L

0 £d

BLOOO PRESSURE STANOING (2 MIN.)
-J

f

[7 /

J

?
0
«>

it ^

[7 CJ <"

3

.1
_
i d C El zJ LL/Loj
3 ^

(S) R-Z BP IX-

Follow-up need for HBP?
(^No
^ ) Yes. r .Referral made 1) No

2) Yes
mo

Screener Number
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v.. "VENTILATORY

FUNCTION

^©

Forced vrtal
FEV
• Fev.
25-75
Hair

color

rtJuu>&*uJLs\r

Male h a i r p a t t e r n

2-

For how many hours have you been fasting
How long ago did you have your last cigarette?

//c.

Have you taken any special dietary precautions in preparing for this visit?

Ih.

If so, please describe

COMMENTS:

J
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ersity of Utah
i State Division of Health

•*rW
PHYSICIAN HISTORY 4 EXAMINATION

.3/3^/79

Date

Tamlly Number _ _ &\

Name

&

P a t i e n t Number
Last

7

First
13,

CURRENT SYMPTOMS
1 . ^JSy^ptom Summary
/ O v / N oNone
n e (Skip
(Skip'to
t #9)
Some (Check below)
2*

Coronary Anfiiofiram
Q))

g ) None

Dyspnea
None
Class
3) Class
4) Class
5) Class

or
" <

year

month

year

Valvular Heart Disease
15. ^yar
Absent
Present (circle) MS MR

I (vith marked exertion)
II (vith ordinary exertion)
III (vith minimal exertion)
IV (at rest)

16. ^History of CHF
£3,} Absent
^ ) Present _
month

jthopnea
Absent
# Present

• Coue]
Absent
Present
Fatigue or Decreased Exercise Tolerance
^Tp~Absent
1) Present

8.

month

^UJ^C

1*. Coronary Artery Surgery
Q > No '
2) Yes Date: _
month year

Iptemittent Claudication
Qy
Absent
2) Present

AS

AR Other

year

17.

J^ story of Cardiac Arrhythmias
'D^ Absent
Present
^T
month
year

18.

i

Absent
Present

7.

Tes Date: ^ ^ ^
'^ ^
month
year

Chest Pain ( i f yes, l i s t onset mo/yr)

2) Non-anginal pain
3) Atypical angina
A) Typical angina
5) Unstable angina

Tfcf.TU.

story of Heart Block
7 Absent
Present
year
month

Other Heart Di sea se:

CARDIOVASCULAR RISK FACTOR HISTORY
19.

Risk F a c t o r Summary
Q

Other

(3

None (skip to 28)
Some (checked belov)

20.
CARDIOVASCULAR HISTORY
9.

C-V History Summary
„
No abnormalities (Skip to 19)
2)} Some findings (checked below)
10.

'

Coronary Artery Disease (clinical onsets
Ho
_
•
Yes Onset: ^ ErtO
~")U
<&
month
year

Hypercholesterolemia
Absent
Present
" * : Not known (never measured)

21. Hypertriglyceridemia (including history cloud
serum)
1) AJbRent
JJ Present
\2U Not knovn (never measured)
22.

11,

Myocardial Infarction (suspected)
0r2)) Yes Onset: 3*Pt^
5j^L4
^
month

12,

i W
year

First Myocardial Infarction (definite)

1JL No
JK"
/'lY^Yes

Onset:
:s

vVJ^_^f
month
year

Cigarette Smoking
1) Never
2) Past smoker: Quit
month
year
Average
pks a day
years
X
Current smoker for: n*-<~>
years
_
Average frpks a day

After smoking:

Q

Other Myocardial Infarctions
23. Knovn Hypertension
Onset:
_
1) No
month
year
(on
treatment)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark2)
LawYes
School,
BYU.
Onset:
3)
Suspect
(no therapy)
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month
year

24.

ramlly Historv of P r c T 7 4

• JTto

-

Q)Z Yes
3)

Suspect

tHD

—

£>

}
42.

betes Mellitus
No
2) Yes, non-insulin
3) Yes, insulin
4) Yes, dietary therapy

27.

Peripheral Vascular Disease
1) Absent
2) Present

Antihypertensive
2) Yes

43. ^Anticoagulants
No
2) Yes

'd*

ASSOCIATED CO-MORBID CONDITIONS
26 ^ _
Summary
^
of Co-Morbid Conditions
0 » / b s e n t (skip to #33)
'
r:
Present (check below)

44. ^ r t h Control Pills
( l y No
^0
Yes
45.

Aspirin
In
arely (less than 2/month)
fl)) Rat
ccasionally (3-8/month)
^ T Occ
3) Frequently (9-15/month)
4) Regularly (at least one a day or one every
other day)

28.

Ceobral Vascular Disease
1) Absent
2) Present

29.

Kidney Disease
1) Absent
2) Present

46. ^insulin

30.

Chronic Pulmonary Disease
1) Absent
2) Present

47,

31.

Peptic Ulcer Disease
1) Absent
2) Present

48.

32.

Gout
1) Absent
2) Present

Special Diet
1) Low fat
2) Low salt
3) Low calorie
Diabetic
None

49.

rcise Program
1L No
Yes

(Jr~No~

Other:
E.

Yes

0£>No

"•d$
D.

r^tJL-i

41

7 ) Yes
Oral Diabetes Medication
Ora] No
Yes Name:

PRESENT THERAPY
Other
33.

Therapy Summary
IX No therapy (skip to 050)
^J2J) On therapy (check below)
34.

nitroglycerine
M L > No
N2) Yes

35.

Long-Acting Nitrate

c^£
36.

.

Propranolol

Q P No
37.

^ 0 Yes
. B i l e Sequestrant

50. Summary
^ i 4 ^ T o t a l l Y normal (skip to 86)
C*?2)DSome findings (checked below)
.nthoma
51. sX*y
Absent
Present
a) Planar
b) Palmar
c) Tuberous
d) Tendenous
t ) Eruptive

(f

52.

CjP~tio
2)

38.

Yes

EYES:
53.

Atrooid
No
& 2L. Yes
rrhythmics

"•<$n> No
2)
40.

&

Yes

italis
No
2) Yes

Xjjithelpasma
Absent
Present

Arcus Cornea
1) Absent
Q L Partial annulusJ^C^vL
3) Complete annulus
Pi

FUNDUS:
54. Fundus Summary
U)
Not done
C p ) Normal (skip to fib**)
^ t ~ Abnormal (note below)

55. Areriolar Narrowing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark1)LawAbsent
School, BYU.
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^O

)
)

Absent
Present

m

57. Silver-wire Changes
)
)
58.

1) AbsenJt.
2) P r e / ^

7A, "He*rt Sounds

Absent
Present

•2)

lame-Shaped Hemorrhages
) Absent
) Present

59.
#•
60*

75. S3 Gallop
1) Absent
2)

76. SACallop
1) Absent

Hard Exudates
) Absent
) Present

77.

2)

Present

Paradoxically Split S2

1) Absent
2)

ipemia Retinalis
) Absent
) Present
Cotton-Wood Patches
) Absent
) Present

63.

Present

Round Hemorrhages
) Absent
) Present

61.

62.

Normal (skip 1
Some abnormal:

1}J

Mlcroaneurisns
) Absent
) Present

78.

Present

Mid-Systolic Click

1) Absent
2)

Present

Other
•eart Murmur Summary
Absent (Skip to #86)
) Present

"d

80.

Systolic Ejection

1) No
Other:

2)
81.

LUNGS

Yes

Holosystolic Ejection

1) No
,ung Summary
64.^-4*ung
Normal (skip to #68)
Abnormal (note below)

2)

C2T*

^M
65. AlBasilar

82.

Yes

Late Systolic

1) No
Rales

2)

Yes

1) No
2)

83.

Yes

Early Diastolic Blow

1) No
66.

Wheezes

2)

Yes

1) No
2)

84.

Yes

Diastolic Rumble

1) No
67.

Dullness

2)

Yes

1) No
2)

ripheral Pulses
Normal
Abnormal (describe belov)

85.

Yes

CARDIOVASCULAR

68.

y Summary
l^.All findings normal (skip to #86)
Some findings (checked below)

Brachial

Radial

Femoral

DP

Pt

1 R

PL""
69.

Carotid Arteries: upstroke/volume
(Grade 0-4, 3+ being normal)

1) Normal
2)
3)
70.

Decreased unilateral
Decreased bilateral

Other Abnormalities and Comments (Bruits)

Carotid Bruits

1) None
2) . Unilateral (right or left)
3) Bilateral
86.
71.

Other Findings and Comments:

LVH by Palpation

1) No
2)
72.

Yes

RVH by Palpation

1) No
2)

C

Yes
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CLINIC NOTE
LYNN HARDY
^January 2, 1980

,

Lynn is doing very well, he lives an active physical
life, he has not had any symptoms to suggest coronary
artery insufficiency and has not had anything to suggest
angina pectoris. His physical capacity is good, he has •
not had orthopnea or PND and he is not aware of palpitation.
Over the past several weeks he has had an upper respiratory
tract infection with myalgia, malaise, sore throat, hoarsenes
and a cough.
Physical examination reveals abundant post nasal drainage,
he has no evidence of lymphadenopathy. His neck is supple
with no venous distension. The chest is symmetrical. There
are no rales or rhonchi, and the breath sounds are normal.
The heart is in a regular sinus rhythm, no cardiomegaly,
no extrasystoles. The abdomen is not remarkable and the
extremities are normal with no evidence of edema.
We have given Lynn 1.2 mil units of Wycillin, he will
take Turpin Hydrate 1 tsp Q4 hr. PRN for cough and Afrin
nasal spray BID daily for four days and he will return
in one day for follow up penicillin.
J.L. Thome, M.D.

%^^^Z^^^J>,^ L. M^^_

P 0CH55
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31-27-22. Discrimination between risks of same class prohibited—Preference based on fictitious grouping prohibited—Revocation of certificate
of authority.—(1) *Ko insurer shall make or permit any-unfair discrhnina*
tion in favor of particular individual* or persons'between-insurants or>
•subjects of insurance having substantially like insuring, Tisk and exposure
factors or expense elements, in the terms or conditions - of an7* insurance*
contract; w in the rater or amount of premiums cbwged lhereforr-or-in ~^
•the dividends or other benefits payable therenndcr.%

, 31-1-8. Governmental regulation—Business affected with public interest—Moral obligations of persons concerned.—Within th<5~intent of this"
eode thn bnsinoss of insurance is-one affected with "the public^ntereal/fn*
quiring that all persons be actuated by good faitfr, abstain from deception? J
-and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters! Upon the in*
•urer, the insured, and their representatives rests-the duty of preserving
inviolate the integrity of insurance.

31-27-1. Unfair competition, or deceptive acts or practices prohibited—
Commissioner to define unfair acts or practices—Effective date of regulation—Penalties for violations.—(!) i\o person engaged in-the business of>
insurance shall engage in unfair methods 'of competition or in unfair or J
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of such business as sucli methods,
acts or practices are defined in this chapter.
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Section 2.

Purpose

The business of insurance is a public trust assumed by persons accepting
^-'
licenses to operate in this State and inherently includes a duty to treat
claimants equitably and in good faith. The breach of such duty is considered to
be an unfair or deceptive business practice and, if generally engaged in, an
unfair method of competition. Such a practice is detrimental to free competition and injurious to the insuring public. The purpose of this regulation is ton
respond to the volume of complaints arising from claims settlement practices by
affirmatively establishing standards of equity and good faith to guide licensees
in the settlement of claims. This regulation defines and provides notice of
such minimum standards which, if violated knowingly, or with such frequency as
to indicate a general business practice, will be considered to constitute unfair
claims settlement practices. The promulgation of this regulation is done in
recognition of the limited jurisdiction of the Utah Small Claims Court, and the
practical unavailability to the public of other legal remedies to handle common
claims disputes.' It is intended that this regulation will help to establish
parity between the public and professional insurance licensees and facilitate
I
the prompt and fair settlement of insurance claims.
[
— —
L
Section 5.

Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive Acts
and Practices Defined

The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance:
(a) misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance*policy'provisions: relating to
coverages at issue;
(b) failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies;
(c) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation of claims arising under insurance policies;
(d) refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation;
(e) failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after
proof of loss statements have been completed and communicated to the
company or its representative;
(f) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(g) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due-under an?
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by such insureds when claims or demands have
' been made for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately
recovered;
(h) attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable
person would have believed he or she was entitled by reference to written
or printed advertising material reasonably related to the insurance
contract;
(i) attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was
altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured;
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of the ASTZ test is in ruling out rheumatic fever when the titer
is low in patients with isolated polyarthritis. To date, the specific antigens involved in the ASTZ test remain unidentified
and therefore the test has not yet been adequately standardized. A rise in titer of two dilution tubes or more can be demonstrated for at least one of the streptococcal antibodies in
almost all recurrent as well as primary attacks of rheumatic
fever (Table 257-2). Increased streptococcal antibodies, however, do not reflect rheumatic activity per se, and their rate of
decline is independent of the course of the rheumatic attack.
Isolation of group A streptococci Some patients continue to
harbor group A streptococci at the onset of acute rheumatic
fever, but these organisms are usually present in small numbers
and may be difficult to isolate by a single throat culture. The
administration of penicillin or other antibodies may also result
in failure to isolate the infecting organism. In addition, a significant number of normal individuals, particularly children,
may harbor group A streptococci in the upper respiratory
tract. For these reasons, throat cultures are less satisfactory
than antibody tests as supporting evidence of recent streptococcal infection.
Acute phase reactants These tests offer objective but nonspecific confirmation of the presence of an inflammatory process.
The erythrocyte sedimentation

rate (ESR) and the test for C-

reactive protein (CRP) in serum are used most commonly. Unless the patient has received corticosteroids or salicylates, these
reactions are almost always abnormal in patients presenting
with polyarthritis or acute carditis, whereas they are often normal in patients with chorea. Other laboratory findings which
reflect inflammation include reactions such as leukocytosis,
and increases in serum complement, mucoproteins, and alpha2
and gamma globulins. Prolongation of the PR interval of the
electrocardiogram, although neither specific for rheumatic fever nor diagnostic of serious cardiac involvement, is frequent
in acute rheumatic fever (about 25 percent of all cases), and
other nonspecific electrocardiographic changes are also common. Anemia, due to the suppression of erythropoiesis characteristic of chronic inflammatory diseases, is another feature of
rheumatic activity.
COURSE AND PROGNOSIS The course of rheumatic fever
varies greatly and is impossible to predict at the onset of the
disease. In general, however, approximately 75 percent of
acute rheumatic attacks subside within 6 weeks, 90 percent
within 12 weeks, and less than 5 percent persist more than 6
months. The latter usually consist of severe, intractable forms
of rheumatic carditis or stubborn, prolonged attacks of Sydenham's chorea, both of which may persist for as long as several
years. Once acute rheumatic fever has subsided and more than
TABLE 257-2
Serologic results in patients with streptococcal disease
Percent of patients whose serums were "positive"
Patient group (no.)
Acute rheumatic
fever (20)
Acute glomerulonephritis (22)
Convalescent pharyngitis (11)
Convalescent pyoderma (23)
Total (76)

ASO

AH

AntiDNaseB

At least
lof3

ASTZ

90

65

85

95

100

50

63

72

91

95

81

54

54

91

91

2 months have elapsed after withdrawal of treatment with salicylates or adrenal corticosteroids, rheumatic fever does not
recur in the absence of new streptococcal infections. Recurrences are most common within the first 5 years of the initial
attack and tend to decline with increasing duration of freedom
from rheumatic activity. The frequency of recurrences is dependent upon the frequency and severity of streptococcal infection, the presence or absence of rheumatic heart disease following an attack, and the duration of freedom from the last
attack.
Approximately 70 percent of patients who develop carditis
do so within the first week of the disease, 85 percent within the
first 12 weeks of the disease, and almost all within 6 months
from the onset of the acute attack. Thereafter, if significant
murmurs have not appeared, the prognosis for a patient in
whom recurrences are prevented is excellent.
Chronic rheumatic carditis and the course of rheumatic heart
disease The remarkable variability in the course of rheumatic carditis and rheumatic valvular disease stems from several factors: (1) the variability in the duration and severity of
the rheumatic inflammation: (2) the amount of scarring of the
valves and myocardium following the abatement of the acute
inflammation; (3) the location and severity of the hemodynamic lesion due to valvular insufficiency or stenosis: (4) the
frequency of recurrent bouts of carditis: and (5) the progression of valvular calcification and sclerosis, which occurs as a
secondary phenomenon in a deformed or injured valve without
recurrent or persistent rheumatic inflammation (as seen in congenital valvular disease or following healed acute bacterial endocarditis). These factors, and possibly others not yet appreciated, produce striking variations in the clinical syndromes of
rheumatic heart disease.
Chronic rheumatic myocarditis In this syndrome, the presenting picture is one of chronic heart failure in a patient with a
markedly dilated heart and with physical, roentgenographic,
and electrocardiographic findings of mitral regurgitation. The
differentiation of this syndrome from other forms of chronic
myocarditis may be very difficult, if not impossible, when the
associated extracardiac features of rheumatic fever (chorea,
polyarthritis, and so forth) are not present (Chap. 263). Although rheumatic fever does not produce isolated myocarditis,
and is almost invariably a pancarditis, the pericardial inflammation may not be clearly evident, and the mitral valvulitis
may not be distinguishable from mitral regurgitation due to
dilation of the mitral ring. In such cases one must search diligently for an evanescent friction rub. evidence of pericardial
effusion, appearance of a soft aortic regurgitation murmur, and
extracardiac clues such as fever responding promptly to salicylates, arthralgias, transient subcutaneous nodules, evanescent
erythema marginatum, and subtle signs of chorea.
The course of chronic rheumatic carditis may be intractable
and end fatally after months or even several years. Often, however, the patient improves rather suddenly and even recovers
cardiac reserve dramatically in association with the disappearance of systemic manifestations of the inflammatory process.
The heart may remain large, may decrease somewhat in size, or
in occasional instances may return to normal size with varying
degrees of residual valvular deformity. Such a course signals
the termination of the "toxic" phase of the rheumatic process,
and thereafter the course of rheumatic heart disease depends
on the variables in healing cited above.

DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS Early cases of rheumatic fever
may be confused with other diseases which begin with acute
35
35 . 91
96
91
polyarthritis. It is wise to exclude bacteremia by blood cultures,
61
54
79
93
95
particularly because such infections may be masked by penicilSOURCE: AL Bisno. I Ofek, Am J Dis
Child 127:676,
1974. W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized
by the Howard
lin given for presumed acute rheumatic fever. Polyarthritis due
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to infective endocarditis in a patient with preexisting rheumatic
heart disease may be mistaken for a recurrence of acute rheumatic fever. If streptococcal antibodies are not increased, polyarthritis should be attributed to some cause other than rheumatic fever. Gonococcal polyarthritis may be distinguished
from rheumatic fever by the dramatic response of the former to
a therapeutic trial of penicillin. In rheumatoid arthritis, joint
involvement will persist and characteristic joint deformities
may appear. The latter are not seen in rheumatic fever. The
rheumatoid factor so characteristic of rheumatoid arthritis is
not present in rheumatic fever. Antibodies against nuclear
components and other autoantibodies are absent in rheumatic
fever. Rheumatic pericarditis and myocarditis, associated with
cardiac enlargement and heart failure, are both almost invariably associated with valvular lesions which produce significant
murmurs.
Overdiagnosis of rheumatic fever should be avoided. Unless
ill-defined febrile syndromes are clearly associated with a major manifestation of rheumatic fever, the diagnosis of rheumatic fever should not be made. A common error is the premature, vigorous administration of corticosteroids or salicylates
before the signs and symptoms of rheumatic fever are unmistakable. In the absence of a curative agent, one should not
suppress the signs and symptoms of rheumatic fever until they
are clearly expressed.
Particularly confusing in the differential diagnosis of rheumatic fever is the drug sensitivity with fever and polyarthritis
which may occur after administration of penicillin for a previous pharyngitis. Urticaria or angioneurotic edema, if present,
helps differentiate penicillin sensitivity in such cases. The abdominal pain of rheumatic fever may be mistaken for appendicitis, and the crisis of sickle-cell anemia may also be associated
with joint pain, enlargement of the heart, and cardiac murmurs. The rapidity with which the arthritis symptoms of rheumatic fever are controlled with salicylates is characteristic of
this disease. Dramatic response to salicylates does not in itself,
however, establish a diagnosis of rheumatic fever.
In order to help clarify the diagnosis of rheumatic fever, the
American Heart Association has accepted and modified criteria usually referred to as the Jones criteria (Table 257-1). They
are not to be used as a substitute for good medical judgment
but are recommended as a guide for careful study of questionable cases. The finding of two major criteria, or of one major
and two minor criteria, indicates a high probability of the presence of rheumatic fever if supported by evidence of a preceding streptococcal infection. The absence of the latter should
always make the diagnosis questionable, except in the situation
in which rheumatic fever is first discovered after a long latent
period from the antecedent infection (Sydenham's chorea or
low-grade carditis). Because the prognosis may differ according to the major manifestations, for recording purposes the
diagnosis of rheumatic fever should be followed by a list of the
major manifestations present, e.g., rheumatic fever manifested
by polyarthritis and carditis. An indication of the severity of
carditis in terms of presence or absence of congestive heart
failure and cardiomegaly is also advisable.
TREATMENT There is no specific cure for rheumatic fever,
and no known measures change the course of the attack. Good
supportive therapy, however, can reduce the mortality and
morbidity of the disease.
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intramuscularly or 600.000 units of procaine penicillin intramuscularly daily for 10 days. Attempts to reduce ultimate
heart damage by administering penicillin early in the acute
rheumatic attack in larger doses have not been successful. After completion of the therapeutic course of penicillin, continuous protection from reinfection with streptococci should be
provided by instituting one of the prophylactic regimens described below.
Suppressive therapy For patients without carditis treatment
with adrenal corticosteroids is unnecessary. Acute arthritis can
be relieved with codeine or with salicylate, the latter being
preferable to reduce fever and joint inflammation. When salicylate is used in the therapy of rheumatic fever, the dosage
should be increased until the drug produces either a clinical
effect or systemic toxicity characterized by tinnitus, headache,
or hyperpnea. A starting dose of 100 to 125 mg/kg per day in
children and 6 to 8 g in adults given in four or five divided
doses is recommended. Of the various salicylate preparations
ordinary aspirin is cheapest and most effective. Gastric intolerance can usually be diminished by administering aspirin after
meals or by giving antacids 15 to 30 mi n after each dose of
aspirin.
Many physicians prefer corticosteroids to salicylates for the
treatment of carditis, despite the lack of a demonstrated advantage of these adrenal hormones in controlled clinical trials.
Corticosteroids are more potent anti-inflammatory agents but
are more likely to be followed by posttherapeutic "rebounds,"
and they have the additional disadvantage of more frequent
side effects, particularly acne, hirsutism, and cushingoid
changes in facies and habitus. For this reason it is preferable to
begin treatment of patients who have carditis with salicylates;
if these drugs fail to reduce fever and to ameliorate heart failure, therapy with corticosteroids may be initiated promptly.
Prednisone is administered in doses of 60 to 120 mg or higher
when necessary in four divided doses daily. After the inflammation has been brought under control by either salicylates or
corticosteroids, treatment should be continued until the sedimentation rate approaches near-normal values and should be
maintained for several weeks thereafter. To prevent poststeroid
rebounds, an "overlap" course of salicylate therapy may be
added when steroids are tapered off over a 2-week period. A
useful method for tapering steroids is outlined in Chap. 112.
Salicylates may then be continued for an additional 2 to 3
weeks. Rebounds of rheumatic activity are usually of short duration and, when mild, are best managed without resuming
anti-inflammatory treatment, because a second or even a third
rebound may occur when suppressive therapy is discontinued.
About 5 percent of rheumatic attacks persist for 6 months or
longer, either in the form of spontaneous acute recrudescences
or as posttherapeutic rebounds. These "chronic" attacks are
most likely to occur in patients with cardiac damage and with
previous rheumatic episodes. Weekly tests for C-reactive protein in blood and for erythrocyte sedimentation rate are useful
in following the healing process, particularly while treatment
with corticosteroids or salicylates is gradually withdrawn.

Treatment of chorea The signs and symptoms of chorea usuChemotherapy After rheumatic fever is first diagnosed, a
ally do not respond well to treatment with antirheumatic
course of penicillin should be given to eliminate group A strepagents. Because the patient with chorea is frequently emotiontococci. This is advisable even if bactenologic examination
ally unstable and because the manifestations of chorea may be
yields throat cultures negative for streptococci, since the orgaexaggerated by emotional trauma, complete mental and physnisms may be present in areas inaccessible to swabs. It is prefical rest is essential. Patients with chorea should be kept in a
erable to administer penicillin
parenterally. An effective course
quiet room and cared for by sympathetic attendants. CorticoDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
is a single injection of 1.2 million units of benzathine
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tives and tranquilizers, particularly diazepam and chlorpromazine, are useful. If the chorea is severe, large doses of
phenobarbital rather than tranquilizers alone are usually necessary to control purposeless movements. Padded sideboards
for the bed may be necessary to avoid injury to the patient. In
the absence of other evidence of acute rheumatic disease, it is
advisable to allow gradual resumption of physical activity
when improvement is apparent rather than waiting for all choreiform movements to disappear, which may require many
months.
Because of the great variability in the course of chorea,
evaluating the effectiveness of various therapeutic measures is
difficult. It is well to remember that chorea is a self-limited
disease which is usually not followed by significant neurologic
sequelae and that good results are almost invariably obtained
by patient, attentive nursing care and by conservative medical
management.
PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE The most efficient regimen
for continuous prophylaxis against group A streptococci is a
monthly intramuscular injection of 1.2 million units of benzathine penicillin. The disadvantages and discomfort of this regimen have to be weighed against the individual patients susceptibility to recurrences. Those with rheumatic heart disease,
recent rheumatic fever, and exposure to an environment in
which the incidence of streptococcal infection is frequent deserve the most effective protection. As a second choice, prophylaxis may be administered orally with either I g sulfadiazine daily in a single dose or 200.000 units of penicillin given
twice daily on an empty stomach. The duration of continuous
prophylaxis cannot be fixed arbitrarily for all patients, although the safest generalization is that it be continued indefinitely. Certainly, those under the age of 18 years should receive
a continuous prophylactic regimen. A minimum period of 5
years is recommended for patients who develop rheumatic fever without carditis over the age of 18 years. The decision to
continue prophylaxis beyond this period should take into account a number of variables. Patients with rheumatic heart
disease are more susceptible to reactivation of rheumatic fever
if they contract a streptococcal infection. Moreover, patients
who have had carditis in a previous attack are much more
likely to suffer carditis again in a subsequent attack. Climate,
age, occupation, household situation, cardiac status, and
length of time since the previous attack are all significant variables which influence the risk of recurrence. The decline in
recurrence rates with increasing age is due to (1) decreased rate
of streptococcal infection and (2) decrease in the rate of rheumatic reactivation following streptococcal infection in older
rheumatic subjects. Despite this decreased rate, however, the
risk of rheumatic recurrence in adults remains relatively high
when the streptococcal disease encountered is severe or epidemic.

Streptococcal pharyngitis is adequately treated by a single
intramuscular injection of 600.000 units of benzathine penicillin in children less than 10 years of age or 1.2 million units in
older children and adults. Any alternate plan of parenteral
therapy or combined parenteral and oral therapy should provide for treatment over a period of 10 days. If oral penicillin is
employed, at least 800.000 units per day in four divided doses
must be given for no less than 10 days to achieve results comparable with a single injection of benzathine penicillin. Erythromycin in daily doses of I g for 10 days may be substituted in
penicillin-sensitive individuals. Tetracycline is not recommended because some strains of group A streptococci have
acquired resistance to it. All group A streptococci have so far
remained extremely sensitive to penicillin.
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The role of physical examination in the evaluation of patients
with valvular disease is considered in Chap. 248: of echocardiography, phonocardiography, and other indirect graphic techniques in Chap. 250: and of cardiac catheterization and angiography in Chap. 251.

MITRAL STENOSIS

PATHOPHYSIOLOGY In normal adults the mitral valve orifice is 4 to 6 cm 2 . In the presence of significant obstruction, i.e..
when the orifice is less than one-half of normal, blood can flow
from the left atrium to the left ventricle only if propelled by an
abnormally elevated left atrioventricular pressure gradient, the
PREVENTION OF INITIAL RHEUMATIC ATTACKS Early and
hemodynamic hallmark of mitral stenosis. When the mitral
adequate treatment of pharyngeal infection due to group A
valve opening is reduced to I cm 2 , a left atrial pressure of
streptococci will prevent initial attacks of rheumatic fever. If
approximately 25 mmHg is required to maintain a normal carclinical streptococcal disease were properly detected by throat
diac output. The elevated left atrial pressure in turn raises pulcultures and adequately treated, the spread of infection in a
monary venous and capillary pressures, reducing pulmonary
given population would be prevented, the epidemiology of
compliance and causing exertional dyspnea. The first bouts of
streptococcal disease would be modified markedly, and the indyspnea are usually precipitated by clinical events which incidence of rheumatic fever in the community would be dimincrease the rate of blood flow across the mitral orifice, which
ished. In communities where group A streptococcal disease has
results in further elevation of the left atrial pressure. In order
been diagnosed early and treated well and where socioecoto assess the severity of obstruction, it is essential to measure
nomic standards are high, the group A organisms cultured freboth the transvalvular pressure gradient and the flow rate. The
quently from schoolchildren's throats may be of relatively low
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ment; and a surrounding zone of edematous connective
tissue in which some degree of nonspecific, chronic
inflammation may be seen (Fig. 16-34). Within the outer
zone, there may be proliferation of blood vessels, but this
is not a conspicuous feature.291 Foci similar to Aschoff
bodies sometimes are noted. The subcutaneous nodules
usually occur in association with evidence of rheumatic
carditis. 289 A lesion has been described in apparently
nonrheumatic children that simulates the rheumatic
nodule but is believed to represent an unusual reaction
to trauma. 285
Arterial lesions
Rheumatic arteritis is present in many instances of
rheumatic fever. The lesions are not confined to the coronary arteries but may be seen in arteries in various
organs of the body. They are described in the discussion
of coronary artery diseases earlier in this chapter (Fig.
16-33). When the aorta is involved, the lesions are found
predominantly in the proximal part of the vessel.
Polyarthritis
The rheumatic changes in the joints are not as well
known as those in the heart. The synovial membrane and
the periarticular connective tissues are the sites of hyperemia, edema, neutrophilic infiltration, fibrinoid change,
and foci of necrosis of connective tissue, followed by proliferative changes of a granulomatous character. Focal
lesions similar to Aschoff bodies are observed. Serous or
serosanguineous fluid may be present in the joint cavity.
This usually subsides, without leaving a residuum. 284
Pleural and pulmonary lesions
Pleuritis may develop in association with polyarthritis
or carditis. Pleural effusion usually is present, and the
pleural surfaces appear slightly opaque as a result of a
fine film of fibrin. No definite Aschoff bodies are
described in the pleura. Rheumatic pneumonia has been
described, but there is a question about its specificity.
There is no pathognomonic picture. Grossly,, the lungs
are large, bluish or purplish, firm, and rubbery. Microscopic changes include edema, capillary hemorrhages,
and a patchy fibrinous exudate in the alveoli. The fibrin is
in the form of globular masses or hyaline-like membranes
and often is associated with monocytes.29° Organization
of the fibrinous masses occurs with formation of so-called
Masson bodies. Fibrinoid changes and angiitis may be
seen, but Aschoff bodies are not evident.
Lesions of central nervous system
One of the major manifestations of rheumatic fever is
chorea minor (Sydenham's chorea, St. Vitus' dance),
although this entity has been reported in association with
other clinical states. The word chorea (Greek choreia,
"dance") refers to the disordered and involuntary movements of the trunk and extremities that are characteristic

of the disease. Chorea minor, often associated with or
preceded by acute rheumatic fever, is seen in childhood
and early adolescence, more commonly in girls. It has
been shown to be associated most frequently with a
benign form of rheumatic fever.295
Chorea minor must be differentiated from Huntington's chorea, a chronic hereditary disorder occurring
usually in adults. The cerebral lesions in chorea minor
consist of a diffuse meningoencephalitis of mild degree
that is not pathognomonic. Grossly, changes are not
striking, but there may be evidence of edema, hyperemia, and petechiae. Microscopically, lesions have been
described in the cerebral hemispheres, the brainstem,
and, most frequently, the basal ganglia. Small hemorrhages, edema, and perivascular exudation of lymphocytes are commonly seen. The ganglion cells may show
some changes, but these are not specific.
Late sequelae of rheumatic heart disease in the brain
include chronic obliterating endarteritis and embolism.
Rheumatic obliterating endarteritis and other vascular
changes, including thrombosis, involve particularly the
meningeal and cortical vessels, with subsequent gross or
microsopic softenings in the brain. 286,287 Cerebral embolism results especially from thrombi in the left atrium or
its appendage, most frequently in patients with mitral
stenosis and atrial fibrillation. Other sources of emboli
may be the vegetations of nonspecific, nonbacterial
thrombotic endocarditis and bacterial endocarditis,
either of which may be superimposed on the deformed
valves.
Prognosis and causes of death
The outlook today for patients with acute rheumatic
fever is much better than it was several decades ago. In
one study of children admitted to the hospital with presumably initial attacks, exclusive of chorea, a comparison
was made of the number of fatalities among the first 100
consecutive patients seen during the first year of each of
four decades. The percentages of deaths were as follows:
1920-1921, 24%; 1930-1931, 20%; 1940-1941, 8%; 19501951, 3%. 2 9 4 The 3% mortality represents an eightfold
decrease since the beginning of the study. Other observations in this investigation were a modest decline in the
incidence of cardiac involvement and a twofold improvement in the severity of carditis.
The decline in incidence and severity of rheumatic
fever was noted even before the advent of antibiotics in
the 1940s. Among the factors that contributed to the
favorable state was improvement in standards of living
for the poorer classes of urban areas after the extreme
privation and crowded quarters of the depression years.
There also was an awareness of the role of streptococcal
infections in the first and succeeding attacks of the disease, so that the medical profession instituted measures
to protect the patient and to isolate carriers. Natural
mutation of the disease as a result of a new generation of
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more resistant hosts and less vigorous organisms also
may have been a factor.294 With the development of antimicrobial prophylactic programs and the use of potent
antirheumatic agents, there was acceleration of the
decline in mortality and lessening severity of the disease.294
Certain factors, such as the nature of the attack of
rheumatic fever and the cardiac status at the time the
patient isfirstseen by the physician, have been shown to
influence the subsequent course of the disease. Many
patients who initially had arthritis or chorea but no significant murmurs remain free of rheumatic heart disease.296 The frequency, duration, and severity of recurrences (the last being most significant) affect the prognosis. 295 The more frequent and more severe the recurrences, the greater are the disability and mortality. In
patients who have evidence of rheumatic heart disease
when first observed, there is a greater likelihood that the
cardiac damage will disappear during subsequent years
(1) in those who had no previous attacks of rheumatic
heart disease than in those who had previous attacks, (2)
in those without diastolic murmurs, and (3) in those with
no cardiomegaly.296 Patients who have considerable cardiomegaly or congestive heart failure at the onset of
rheumatic fever do poorly, and it is unusual for the ones
who survive adolescence to reach 30 years of age.29a
Patients with little or no cardiac enlargement early in the
disease are relatively free from serious recurrences and
have a longer life.295
The chief causes of death in patients with rheumatic
heart disease 295-298 2 " are cardiac failure with or without
associated rheumatic activity, bacterial endocarditis, and
embolism. Death also may be attributed to other complications, such as bronchopneumonia.
Cardiac failure is the most frequent cause of death
from rheumatic heart disease, and it often coexists with
and is caused by active rheumatic fever, particularly in
early life. In young or middle-aged adults, heart failure is
likely to be caused by various valvular deformities. In
older patients, other types of lesions, such as coronary
heart disease, often are superimposed on old rheumatic
heart disease and may be the cause of death. Patients
with heart failure are more susceptible to the development of other lesions (pulmonary infarcts).
Bacterial endocarditis, usually of the subacute type,
shows a downward trend as a cause of death in rheumatic
heart disease, probably because of the use of antibiotics
and chemotherapeutic agents in the treatment of the disease and their use in prophylactic programs in the management of patients with rheumatic heart disease. The
peak incidence of bacterial endocarditis in rheumatic
patients occurs at about 20 to 39 years of age.298 Older
patients are more likely to have the acute type of bacterial endocarditis.298
Embolism as a cause of death in rheumatic heart disease shows a substantial increase, in contrast to the
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downward trend of deaths caused by bacterial endocarditis.298 The organ most frequently affected is the brain,
followed by the kidneys, spleen, and lungs. The majority
of emboli are bland, but occasionally they may be septic,
the latter arising from superimposed bacterial endocarditis. Most of the emboli originate in mural thrombi within
the left atrium or its appendage, particularly in association with mitral stenosis and atrial fibrillation. Another
possible source of emboli is a concomitant, nonspecific
nonbacterial thrombotic endocarditis on a valve.298 In
contrast to emboli from the atrium or its appendage,
emboli from nonbacterial thrombotic endocarditis are
not dependent on atrial fibrillation, for they may occur
whether the rhythm is regular or not. 298 2 " At times the
source of the emboli cannot be identified in the heart at
autopsy. In such instances it has been suggested that
mural thrombi or vegetations of nonbacterial thrombotic
endocarditis were washed away completely. If roughened surfaces from which they were dislodged cannot be
found, one may assume that the areas healed. Because of
the high frequency of occurrence of thrombosis of the left
atrial appendage, there is a danger of causing an arterial
embolism during the course of mitral commissurotomy
for mitral stenosis by inadvertently dislodging a fragment
of a thrombus. 293 Occasional cases have been reported
in which death was caused by emboli arising from calcific
fragments of a greatly calcified mitral valve during valvulotomy.292 Calcific emboli also have been reported to
occur spontaneously, as well as in association with surgical procedures on the aortic valve, in patients with calcific aortic stenosis.29' Another source of embolism, particularly pulmonary, is a thrombus in the veins of the
lower extremities.
Sudden death may occur as a result of obstruction of a
stenotic mitral orifice by a ball thrombus in the left atrium or as a result of coronary insufficiency associated with
aortic stenosis.
Heart in rheumatoid arthritis

The possible relationship of rheumatic fever to rheumatoid arthritis has long been a subject of discussion in
the literature. Many pathologic investigations have
shown that rheumatic heart disease and rheumatoid
arthritis frequently coexist. The reported proportion of
patients with rheumatoid arthritis who have postmortem
evidence of associated rheumatic heart disease varies
from 7% to 65.7%.)09 There is, of course, the possibility
that use of less rigid criteria of what constitutes rheumatic heart disease may account for the high incidence of this
disease in some of the investigations. In a comparative
study, one investigator observed that the incidence of
rheumatic heart disease was somewhat higher (12.2%) in
the group with rheumatoid arthritis than in the general
population, in whom the incidence was 6 . 1 % . ^ These
data, together with those in the other published cases,
suggest that coexistence of the two diseases is not merely
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DISORDERS OF THE CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM
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FIGURE 28-34 SA block. In each
pause the entire P-QRS-T sequence is
missing, and the long cycle is approximately equal to two of the sinus cycles.

pause is equal to two sinus cycles (Fig. 28-,'M): if an
existing sinus rate exactly halves, 2:1 SA block is
diagnosed.
It is important to recognize SA Wenckebach periods because they invariably indicate an abnormality of the sinus node, yet they are usually overlooked
and (ailed sinus arrhythmia—a normal mechanism.
Their recognition is discussed further on in this
chapter. If P waves are entirely absent, complete SA
block may be diagnosed, but it is well to keep in
mind that there are four possible explanations for
absent P waves: (1) failure of the sinus tiode to form
impulses (generator failure): (2) failure of the impulse to emerge from the node (exit block); (3) atrial
paralysis, as in potassium intoxication: and (1) a
sinus impulse that is too weak to activate normally
responsive atria (inadequate stimulus). Block should
be diagnosedonlv when a mathematical relationship
can be demonstrated between the P waves, or when
the c\ c le sequence of Wenckebach conduction is recognized.
Am abrupt pause produced by failure of one or
more sinus impulses to occur on time, and failure
to satisfy the mathematic relations of recognizable
block, may be called s-iitu.s pause and its duration
specified.

classification expanded by several additions and subcategories is needed (Table 28-7. bottom).
One of the manv factors that have helped to
maintain the unsatisfactory status quo is the consistent failure of almost all authors to define terms
such as complete, high-grade (or advanced), and
type II AV block. An extreme example of the unfortunate result of not defining these terms is that
disturbances as different as spontaneous ventricular
asystole and AV dissociation, at least partly due to
block but in the company of an independent junctional rhythm at a rate of 45 per minute or more—
a combination which, for want of a bettei term, we
have called blnckhttccleratimi di$sociatinn-~:\\'v often
lumped under the heading of "complete AV block."
Yet, in acute myocardial infarction transient spontaneous ventricular asystole (Fig. 28-35,\) is associated with a mortality (whether paced or not) of
about 90 percent, while block/acceleration dissociation (Fig. 28-35/i) in our experience is associated
with a mortality of less than 10 percent.
Another factor is that "degrees" as thev are cur-

Atrioventricular (AV) Block'

First degree (prolonged PR interval)
Second degree:
Type I (Wenckebach periodicity)
Type II
High grade (advanced)
Third degree (complete)

AV block is usually classified into three degrees
(Table 28-7). In first-degree, AV conduction time isl
prolonged, but all impulses are conducted to the ?
ventricles?Second-degree means that more or less frequent impulses are blocked and fail to reach the
ventricles. This is usually subdivided into tvpe I.
tvpe II, and high grade (or advanced). Third-dcgrct
is complete block, in which no impulses can reach
the ventricles.
The current classification of AV block has serious
shortcomings because its categories fail to correlate
with prognosis or with indicated therapy. This is
because two decades ago there was no consistentJ\
effective treatment for AV block, and consequenth
it mattered little how blocks were graded. Pacemakers then entered the picture and revolutionized
the therapy of block, while nothing was done to renovate its taxonomv. It is regrettable that, in the da\ <
before pacemakers muddied the prognostic waters,
a careful assessment of the many and various patterns of AV conduction disturbance was not attempted. There is no doubt that, to correlate real
isticallv with prognosis and the need for therapy, a

TABLE 28-7

Classification of AV Block

Common Classification of AV Block

Categories of AV Block Requiring Consideration

Prolonged PR interval
Block acceleration dissociation
Occasional "dropped"' beats:
Type I (Wenckebach periodicity)
Type II
2:1 AV block:
Type I
Type II
High-grade block:
Type I
Type II
Complete block:
Junctional escape
Ventricular escape
Transient ventricular asystole:
Spontaneous
Phase 4 (?)
Vagal
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FIGURE 28-35 A. Spontaneous ventricular asystole lasting for over 7 s and due to the abrupt development of AV block at a time when
no escaping pacemaker is active. From a patient with acute anteroseptal infarction. B. Complete AV dissociation due to a combination
of some degree of AV block with an accelerated junctional rhythm (rate 68 per minute). From a patient with acute inferior infarction.

diagnoses of AV conduction disorders; and (3) the
rently defined do not necessarily correlate with the
AV blocks should be reclassified into a realistic set
severity of the conduction disturbance—definitions
of sufficient and defined categories, including at least
are predicated mainly on conduction ratios to the
those listed in Table 28-7. Only then will the current
neglect of atrial rate. Thus 2:1 block, which some
confusion be remedied and indications for therapy
classify as high grade, may represent anything from
clearly limned.
a disaster (2:1 block at an atrial rate of 60) to a
Since most reports concerned with AV block fail
blessing \2:\ block at an atrial rate of 140). Again,
to define their terms, and since basic terms are varif the sinus rate is 70 and, despite a slow independiably used, some of the following observations on
ent ventricular rate of 30, no impulses are conetiology and incidence must be accepted with apducted to the ventricles, complete AV block can be
propriate reservation.
diagnosed; but if the rate of an independent accelProlonged PR intervals are occasionally found i m
erated A V junctional pacemaker is 85, complete abapparently normal subjects.40 In their survey of over
sence of AV conduction in these circumstances may
67,000 asymptomatic Air Force personnel, Johnson
represent only a minor degree of block. In fact,
et al.84 found 350 examples of first-degree block (5.2
mere delayed AV conduction (prolonged PR interper 1000). Twenty percent of them had PR intervals
val) associated with an accelerated subsidiary pacethat were over 0.24 s. Of 19,000 young aircrew apmaker may be responsible for this form of complete
plicants, 59 had PR intervals of 0.24 s or greater. h3
AV dissociation. It is therefore obvious that in any
In both normal and diseased hearts, atropine,
meaningful consideration of AV block the respecs t a n d i n g , exercise, and i s o p r o t e r e n o l tend to
tive rates of the involved pacemakers must be taken
shorten the lengthened PR interval. There is a wideinto account.
spread belief that the PR interval tends always to
In fact, with definitions and misconceptions as
shorten with an increase in heart rate. Though this
they presently exist, a patient with "first-degree
is true in normal hearts with natural acceleration,
block" may have a worse conduction disturbance
when the rate is increased with artificial atrial pacthan another erroneously labeled as having "highing, the PR lengthens even in normal hearts; in disgrade block."
eased hearts a natural increase in rate is frequently
The recipe for confusion is complete if we add
associated with lengthening of the PR interval. AV
the following widespread misconceptions to the lack
block with Wenckebach periods may occur in norof precise definitions and the fact that "degrees"
mal hearts 10 and was found in 3 of the 67,0U() Air
are not leally degrees: 2:1 AV block is necessarily
Force personnel screened by Johnson." 1
high-grade; 7 '' 2:1 AV block is necessarily type II
8nMI
Prolonged AV conduction (PR interval) and* CZaMfeJ
block;
the block is necessarily high-grade when
dropped beats can be caused by vagal stimulation*
most, but not all, atrial impulses are not conducted
and by a variety of drugs, including digitalis, qtiinto the ventricles; 82 and total absence of conduction,
idine sulfate, procainamide, propranolol, and poas in Fig. 28-35/*, is necessarily evidence for comtassium. Diseases that most commonly produce AV*
plete-block.** In view of these deficiencies in current
block are rheumatic fever; chronic ischemic heart ?
usage, it seems desirable that the following three
disease, and myocardial infarction, especially inferemedial measures be implemented: (1) "degrees,"
rior infarction. Any infectious disease that produces
as presently used, should be eliminated or at least
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effect. Some patients with
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Clinical Cardiology

disorder using pharmacologic means. In the usual event of
this variety of ventricular tachycardia not being hemodynamically tolerated, cardioversion is performed as an
emergency procedure, and generally several hundred v\att
seconds are required for conversion to sinus rh>thm. Occasionally this rhythm disturbance will convert to sinus
rhythm following a sharp blow on the chest, but the
authors do not recommend this as the usual approach to
correcting it. There are many different causes of cxtrasyslolic ventricular tachycardia, but acute myocardial ischemia and infarction, digitalis excess, severe hypoxia
and/or acidosis, hypokalemia, hypercalcemia, hyperkalemia, systemic infection, viral myocarditis, ind
hypotension need to be emphasized in particular. Occasionally this rhythm disturbance occurs in apparently
normal individuals; the reason for this is not known.
Idioventricular Tachycardia
The two major reasons for the development of this
rhythm disturbance are digitalis excess and acute
myocardial infarction. This rhythm is common in the setting of acute myocardial infarction and is generally benign. It may be present in as many as 30-40 percent o(
patients with acute myocardial infarcts, and it is usually
so benign that it goes unnoticed by patient, nurse, and
physician. Even when discovered it generally requires no
treatment as long as the patient is hcmodynamically ucll
compensated and there are no other foci of ventricular
ectopic activity and "no bursts of more rapid ventricular
tachycardia as described above. When this rhythm disturbance is due to digitalis excess, the medication should be
discontinued. This possibility should be suspected in any
patient on digitalis who develops the rhythm disturbance.
When pharmacologic treatment is necessary, either atropine or xylocaine are preferred. If xylocaine is utilized,
one needs to be careful that one docs not suppress the only
pacemaker rhythm a patient has, and one probably should
remain by the bedside of the patient as xylocaine is
administered, ready to insert a temporary pacemaker
should that be necessary. The administration of atropine
is based on the recognition that this rhythm disturbance
generally occurs by default, i.e., the accelerated ventricular rhythm usurps pacemaker control from a slower
sinus or A V junctional pacemaker.
Bedside examination of the patient may be very helpful in correctly identifying ventricular tachycardia.
Clinical manifestations are those produced by the A-V
dissociation. The physical findings include cannon A
v. ;ives in the jugular venous pulse, varying intensity of the
first heart sound, and variations in systemic peak systolic
blood pressure. Atrial gallops, ventricular filling gallop*,
and summation gallops that may be of constant or variable intensity may also occur as a manifestation of the
A-V dissociation. Wide splitting of both the first and second heart sounds is also frequently noted. Another helpful
clue of A-V dissociation may be obtained from the electrocardiogram itself if one can identify the presence of
Dressier or fusion beats which represent a "hybrid beat"
between a partially conducted supraventricular impulse
and a ventricular ectopic beat. The presence of fusion

beats identifies independent supraventricular and ventricular pacemakers and, in the opinion of the authors,
helps to prove the presence of ventricular ectopy. Occasionally AV junctional tachycardia may also be
characterized by A-V dissociation and demonstrate the
same clinical signs, but this phenomenon occurs infrequently. As a practical point, the presence at the
bedside of signs of A-V dissociation in association with a
rapid regular tachycardia with bizarre QRS complexes indicates the presence of ventricular tachycardia
Atrioventricular Block
The dilTerent types of atrioventricular block (AV
block) are ordinarily classified into three degrees. First
degree AV block represents that situation in which there
is a delay in atrioventricular conduction manifest by a
prolonged PR interval on the electrocardiogram
(generally one longer than 0.20 sec) but each atrial impulse is conducted into the ventricles. Second degree
heart block represents that situation in which some atrial
impulses are not conducted into the ventricles. Third
degree heart block represents complete inability to
conduct atrial impulses into the ventricles and the
existence of a totally independent ventricular pacemaker.
Third degree heart block needs to be difTerentiated from
complete A-V dissociation in which instance independent
atrial and/or AV junctional and ventricular pacemakers
do exist but only for temporary periods of time since the
mechanism of the A-V dissociation is an accelerated AV
junctional or idioventricular pacemaker, slowing the sinus
rate, digitalis excess, ischemia, etc. Third degree heart
block implies complete inability to conduct supraventricular impulses into the ventricles while complete A-V
dissociation suggests conduction would' be possible if
physiologic circumstances were appropriate.
First degree heart block. As previously discussed,
first degree heart block is recogni/ed by identifying a
prolonged PR interval on the resting electrocardiogram.
In both normal and diseased hearts atropine, exercise, and
catecholamines tend to shorten PR intervals. In addition,
in normal hearts physiologic increases in heart rate tend
to shorten PR intervals although in diseased hearts
physiologic and artificial increases in heart rate may
result in PR prolongation. Prolonged PR intervals in first
degree heart block may be caused by vagal stimulation, a
number of different pharmacologic interventions, including importantly digitalis and disease processes, such as
ischemic heart disease, infiltrative myocardial diseases,
acute myocardial infarction (especially acute inferior or
diaphragmatic myocardial infarcts), myocarditis. Addison's disease, congenital heart disease (especially atrial
septal defect and Fbstein's anomaly), rheumatic fever,
and streptococcal infections. Prolonged PR intervals are
occasionally found in apparently otherwise normal subjects and in well-trained athletes.
The presence of first degree heart block generally
does not constitute an indication for any particular form
of therapy. In children the development of first degree
heart block may represent ^digitalis excess, and cardiologists usually decrease the amount of digitalis a child
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*£^C»V«CU* *£* E . A. iCT-L£T
DHECT^R
bNOERViRlTlNG AND INSURANCE SERVICES

March 2 9 , 1983

Re: Agent's Responsibility
• Don C. Painter, FTSA
Detroit Agency
Insured: Barbara Sullivan
Policies.: 34 986 134
34 998 589

This case involves two Whole Life insurance policies on the life of
Barbara G. Sullivan written by Full Time Special Agent, Don Painter.
Policy 34 986 134 is a Life Paid-Up at Age 65 plan for 512,000 applied
for on January 22, 1981. Policy 34 998 589 is a Modified Whole Life
policy for $35,000 applied for on March 16, 1981.
The Insured died on June 14, 1982, within the two year contestable period
on both policies. The cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest due to
scleroderma, A routine contestable investigation was conducted and we
determined that the scleroderma had been diagnosed in 1978* 'This history
was not included in the answers to the Part II health questions on either 7
application. Had this health history been admitted, both applications-*
would have been rejected at.Underwriting time.. 'On August 11, 1982 we
informed the Co-Conservators of the minor beneficiary that because of
material misrepresentations in the applications for insurance, our only
liability was the return of premiums paid plus interest ($909.03).
We subsequently received a l e t t e r dated February 5, 1983 (copy enclosed)
from an attorney representing the Guardian of the minor beneficiary. This
letter contained serious allegations about Agent Painter's knowledge of
the Insured's poor health as Veil as allegations that the Prudential policies
replaced coverage the Insured had obtained from Agent Painter when he had
been an agent for Equitable. These allegations were subsequently investigated
by Home Office Representative Marsano. A copy of his March 11, 1983 report
is attached.
. Because i t is apparent that Agent Painter not only did not follow replacement
, regulations and Company guidelines but was also cognizant (and had been f o r
Vsome time) of the Insured's poor health at the time he toote'jehft*applications^
/ we have dropped our misrepresentation action and are accept+n^fu'U death claim
i liability.at.$47,000. t ~
•--••
^
•- ~
*

In addition to a $47,000 claim loss, Agent Painter's actions made the Company
highly vulnerable to an expensive lawsuit.
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BRANCH C

phone, call. 2 0 6 - 7 5 2 - 4 6 9 ; >
*™^ ron
fc.q"™S
(Area code <k Branch Office phone no. >
Type Report-

D.t,ofblrtb

7,39,20

Datefs) of this Investigation.

SPECIAL CONTESTABLE I
12-31-31

1 STATUS:
A- D ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. Your

Claim request dated...
.~. If poasibie, final report will be sent on or before.-..
(Explain below any mail or other Irregular delay encountered thus far.)

wis rtc(

OIL....
B

* D PARTIAL REPORT A partial report Is included covering our findings to date. If possible, final report will be sent ywi on
before
O. O CASE IS STILL PENDING An Acknowledgement or Partial Report was last sent you on
If possible, final » p will be mailed to you on or before.
-. (Qlre reason for delay below.)
& SP FINAL REPORT Investigation by this office Is being closed with this report.
X. PL
i r TRANSFER CASE: You will receive (or may have already received; reportisi from our . . . j Q l O T i n i i i . .
- Officers).
*
- C1KC I MSTA_\CES: Give brief resume of pertinent information such as date of issue or loss, date oi disability, amount & nature of dlasbiiii
or loss. (If circumstances previously given, so state; do not repeat. If customer request contained in ietter. refer tc date of letter & writer wm
out repeating enure letter. Do NOT repeat any special attention points here.)

2

• Please refer to report from t h i s office dated 12-l3-£l.
3. CLAIM HISTORY (Give all Claim History. If already given, so state; do NOT repeat.)

Date

Name & Address of Company

Type Report

Claim, Pol. I, etc

QY.

EJ N °

IKVSSTIOATIOK
This case was transferred to our Aberdeen Sub Office for
further handling at the St* Joseph Hospital in Aberdeen
and Dr. M.C. Lindell of Montesano, WA.
Attached are out-patient emergency
room record, in-patient
admitting form, and doctor Reedfs summary, as well as EKG
tracing and nurses constant care record.
Note Dr. Reed's comments on Mrs. Floyd's past health
history.
In view of our good relations with Dr. Lindell f s office, as
well as to expedite handling,
field representative f i r s t
telephoned Dr. Lindell f s office in Montesano 10 miles east
of our Aberdeen sub office. There was no record of recent
treatment of Mrs. Floyd by Dr. Lindell. A check was then
made of past f i l e s in storeroom where i t was found that
Dr. Lindell last saw Mrs. Floyd as a patient in October 1973.
Since t h i s i s well beyond the five year l i m i t , we did not
contact Dr. Lindell's office in person.
Our Aberdeen sub office i s closing handling with foregoing.
ROY HOVTLA, Claim Specialist, Aberdeen Sub Office
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Prudential
9

Mr. Lennox F. Pruitt, CLU
Director, Claims
General Actuarial and Claim Division
9 Gib - CORP

July 16, 1982

Insured:
Policy:

Manfred Mandelbaum
70 743 521

Dear Len:
We are referring this $300,000 death claim to you in accordance with
existing Corporate authority limits.
On April 4, 1981, this 52-year old drapery store owner completed Part I
of the application for a 5-year R&C policy with a face amount of $300,000
on a COD basis. It is interesting that the agent noted Policyholder Service
as the source of the sales lead. On April 10, 1981, the insured completed
the required physical exam; the application reflects treatment at Kaiser
Foundation, Cadillac and Sunset locations, for annual physicals, a URI,
a right inguinal hernia for 15 years, and a kidney stone in 1966. The
underwriter obtained the records of Kaiser-Sunset, which reflected a
history of vague chest pain, an abnormal stress test, and PVCs. The
underwriter recommended issue at Special Class 2, which our Medical Dept.
liberalized to standard, and the policy was issued June 3, 1981. It was
not placed until August 19, 1981, when the agent visited the insured at his
place of business and collected the initial premium. The agent confirms that
he asked the insured the usual "placement1* questions.
The insured died on May 2, 1982, of ASHD, and the death certificate was
certified by Dr. Jerry Drexler of Kaiser-Cadillac, who had been the AP since
1974. (An irrelevant note to this is that Dr. Drexler is the husband of
our Associate Counsel Ruth Drexler.) We received the proofs on May 25 and
immediately began our investigation. The HOR (whose investigation was
unfortunately delayed and, we feel, pretty sketchy) obtained the records
from Kaiser-Cadillac and a Dr. Alpern, who the insured consulted in February
1981 for exertional angina and a stress test (abnormal). The records reflect
that the insured consulted Dr. Drexler on July 6 — during the COD period —
with a request for a hernia repair, and complaints of angina after dancing.
Coincidentally, the insured was dancing when his fatal attack occurred.
Marilyn Reed, Mike Zevin, and our Dr. Ketchum have all reviewed this file
and agreed that, had the underwriter gotten the completed Kaiser records,
Special Class 3 would have been an appropriate rating. Given that we
waived a recommendation for Special Class 2 on the information we did have,
which included references to the cardiac abnormalities, Tom Potter and I
feel that we would have no basis now for declaring a misrepresentation to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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either the Part II information, or the COD placement, and that we should
pay the claim.
As well as the subject policy file, we are also enclosing the files for
policy 33 917 120 and 70 924 993 (both descended from 33 586 892). These
policies totalled $160,800 and were cash surrendered in November and October
1981, respectively. The subject of insurance replacement was not taken up
with the agent (who has been the servicing agent since the 1960 f s), and
under the circumstances, I don't think we need do so now. It is interesting
to note that in connection with a 1978 <t\^f\6^t^oX
we obtained the records
from both Kaiser Cadillac and Sunset, showing the insured's lengthy history
of angina pain.
Policy H9 2 74 546 is a 2-year S&A policy issued in 1968, for which we have
no record of ever receiving a claim. We enclose it just to complete the
package.
Please feel free to call if you would like to discuss this case any further.
As always, I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Ic <w-^-._
^

*

Susan A. Frankel (Mrs.)
Senior Claim Consultant
Life and Health Claim D i v i s i o n
(213) 992-2127
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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUSAN FRANKEL
SENIOR CLAIM CONSULTANT
LIFE AND HEALTH CLAIM
WHWH

S. A. F,
•w _

.1 -

I

•^•^>C

1 '}L\PL
July'21, 1982

Insured:

Manfred Mandelbaum

For our records, these are the details of the large amount claim you sent
for our review.
Manfred Mandelbaum, 4-13-28, applied on 4-4-81 for a 5 yr. R&C for 300,000
naming his wife, Nili, as beneficiary. On the exam taken on 4-10-81 the
insured gave a medical history of 1) annual physical exams by KaiserPermanente the last being 11-80 2) a kidney stone in 1966 and 3) a right
inguinal hernia still present. The exam and ECG taken for the policy were
within normal limits.
Medical records were requested from Kaiser-Permanente at the Sunset location.
The insured had stated that annual exams were done at either of two
locations, Sunset or Cadillac. The records sent by Kaiser-Sunset only
contained records through 1976. These included a 12-4-74 stress ECG
interpreted by our medical department as abnormal. Kaiser had also
interpretated the ECG as abnormal and indicative -of ischemic heart disease.
In addition, underwriting attached and reviewed two older policies on the
insured - 33 917 120 and 70 924 993. As you mentioned, during underwriting
of a long form reinstatement in 1S78« records were obtained from KaiserCadillac through that date which revealed that the insured occasionally had
anginal symptoms after exertion.
The case was referred for acceptance at Special Class 2 rates based on the
abnormal stress ECG. It was decided, however, to issue the policy at
standard rates based on the recent normal resting ECG. The policy was issued
on June 3, 1981 and was placed on August 19, 1981.
Mr. Mandelbaum died on 5-2-82 of an acute myocardial infarction.
The H0R obtained the medical records from Kaiser-Cadillac which included
details of medical visits through 2-82. They revealed that the insured had
anginal pain with exertion for several years and that in July 1981 he had
requested a hernia repair.
Based on this underwriting advised that had they had these records the policy
would have been issued at Sp CI 3 rates for the angina and the hernia.
Because it was decided at issue to waive a Special Class 2 ratina based on
the insured's cardiac abnormalities you are recommending that we pay the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I agree. As I see it, there is no basis for a misrepresentation defense.
At underwriting^'me we were on notice that 1) the insured suffered from
anginal paid ofPexertion, 2) hjjs^jfress ECG's were abnormal and 3)
i^rhemir heart" disease ha^ h O A n H^Tjnncon
m e insured stated on the
application that he had annual physicals with the last one only four months
before the application date.- Underwriting received records only through
1976 and, in spite of his medicaThi story, did not pursue obtaining his
medical records for the period between 1976 and 1981. In addition, the fact
that the insured had an inguinal hernia present for 15 years was stated on
the application and the medical records obtained referred numerous times
to the hernia and the symptoms and treatment of it. His physical condition
did not change significantly during the placement period.
Full proceeds may be paid to the beneficiary, Nili Mandelbaum.
I also agree that, since we are paying full benefits of this policy, the
question of whether this policy is a replacement of the previous two is a
moot one. It is questionable since policy loans were taken to pay premiums
on those two policies after this one was issued and it is unlikely that this
would have been done if replacement and cash surrender were contemplated
when this coverage was applied for.

q^y
yOan Drosendahl
Claim Consultant
General Actuarial and Claim Division
CORP
JD/gh
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed to the
Respondent by depositing them in the United States Mail on
this

/Sjh^

day of August, 1985, to the following counsel

of record:
Richard Ferrari
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
310 South Main Street - Suite #1200
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101
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